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ABSTRACT
Conservative constitutionalism is committed to “originalism,” that is,
to interpreting the Constitution according to its original public
understanding. This defining commitment of constitutional interpretation
is sound. For decades, however, constitutional conservatives have diluted
it with a methodology of restraint, a normative approach to the judicial
task marked by an overriding aversion to critical moral reasoning. In any
event, the methodology eclipsed originalism and the partnership with
moral truth that originalism actually entails. Conservative
constitutionalism is presently a mélange of mostly unsound arguments
against the worst depredations of Casey’s Mystery Passage.
The reason for the methodological moral reticence is easy to see. It
came into being as an understandable strategy to halt the Warren Court’s
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judicial activism. The conservative diagnosis was simple, and largely
correct: judicial philosophizing not called for by the constitutional text or
by a sound interpretation of it lay at the root of these judicial excesses.
The treatment that conservatives prescribed hit the mark they sighted.
Where resort to moral reasoning seemed inescapable, conservatives
turned to some species of conventional moral belief, usually to what some
group thinks, or once thought. Conservative constitutionalists have been
committed to an “objectivity” wherein facts about what some believe to
be morally sound folded into a regimen of restricted legal reasoning from
text, history, structure, and precedent.
This conservative constitutionalism is well-suited to damage control
whenever legal elites are in thrall to unsound moral and political
philosophies. Conservative constitutionalism can even stymie for a time
the introduction of new mistaken premises. But now, more than 50 years
into the revolution, contemporary constitutional conservatism is incapable
of wresting control of the law back from the regime-changing project of
autonomous self-definition. We have passed a tipping point where damage
control amounts to no more than a slow-walking surrender.
Conservative constitutionalists need only choose originalism, which
will lead them to recognize the necessity for strategic resort to critically
justified metaphysical and moral truths, as the Constitution directs. In
fact, the contemporary judge can be faithful to the Founders only by
sometimes relying on moral and metaphysical truths that lie beyond the
Constitution. These truths include, crucially, answers to such foundational
questions as: When do persons begin? What is religion? Which
propositions about divine matters are answerable by use of unaided
human reason? What is the meaning of that “marriage” that Supreme
Court cases for over a century have spoken of, when it declares that
everyone has a “fundamental right to marry”?
The truth about constitutional law is that, sometimes, the problem with
an errant Supreme Court opinion is not that it relies on philosophy, but
that it relies upon bad philosophy. Then the conscientious judge is obliged
to replace bad philosophy with good philosophy. And the linchpin of that
good philosophy is the “liberty,” not of self-creation ex nihilo, but of selfconstitution in a morally ordered universe.
INTRODUCTION
“The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty, and
the American people, just now, are much in want of one. We all declare
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for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the
same thing.”1
When Abraham Lincoln uttered these words on April 18, 1864, to a
Baltimore audience, he contrasted those who meant by “liberty” each
person’s proper moral self-government “with others, [for whom] the same
word may mean for some men to do as they please with other men, and
the product of other men’s labor.”2 Lincoln declared: “Here are two, not
only different, but incompatible things, called by the same name—
liberty.”3
Our sixteenth president illustrated the point in his characteristically
earthy way. “The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep’s throat, for
which the sheep thanks the shepherd as a liberator, while the wolf
denounces him for the same act as the destroyer of liberty, especially as
the sheep was a black one. Plainly the sheep and the wolf are not agreed
upon a definition of the word liberty.”4
Lincoln’s was an “Address at a Sanitary Fair,” a fundraiser for the sake
of wounded Union soldiers. It lacked the rhetorical melodrama of his justly
famous “House Divided” speech in Springfield, Illinois, six years earlier.
The circumstances in war-torn Baltimore probably supplied drama
enough. Lincoln had declared in 1858, “I do not expect the Union to
be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will
cease to be divided.”5 Lincoln well understood how these two
“incompatible” concepts of liberty called into being correspondingly
opposing cultures, customs, institutions, and laws. He recognized earlier
than most that North and South were two different worlds. He saw that
they could not long last as one polity. Lincoln predicted in Springfield that
the country “will become all one thing, or all the other.”6
The American people today use the word “liberty” in not only
different but incompatible ways. They consequently straddle unquietly
two incompatible social worlds. Many Americans still hold fast to that
liberty which has endured throughout our country’s history: each adult
person’s independence from the arbitrary authority of another (thus, no
1. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Sanitary Fair, Baltimore, Maryland (Apr.
18, 1864), in 7 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 301 (Roy P. Basler et
al. eds., 1953).
2. Id. at 301–02.
3. Id. at 302.
4. Id.
5. Abraham Lincoln, “A House Divided”: Speech at Springfield, Illinois
(June 16, 1858), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461 (Roy P.
Basler et al. eds., 1953).
6. Id.
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slavery or servitude); the right to direct one’s own life towards genuine
human fulfillment by and through free choices; to be (in this way) the
author of one’s own life.7 This liberty does not presuppose that the

7. In the western philosophical and legal traditions, there has been a key
distinction between “liberty” and “license.” Even beginning with the story of
Adam and Eve in the Garden of Eden with its Tree of the Knowledge of Good
and Evil (Genesis Ch. 3), thinkers have identified a difference between (a) the
freedom to choose the good (liberty) versus (b) the mere permission to pursue
whatever one wills (license). In a modern context, Norman L. Rosenberg notes
that concerning freedom of the press, for example, “Joseph Story complained to
a colleague at Harvard Law School, ‘it seems to be forgotten that the same
instrument that can preserve, may be employed to destroy.’” Norman L.
Rosenberg, Thomas M. Cooley, Liberal Jurisprudence, and the Law of Libel,
1868-1884, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 49, 53 (1980) (quoting Letter from J. Story
to J. Ashmun (Feb. 13, 1831), in 2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 50 (W.W.
Story ed. 1851)).
Some evidence of the distinction’s meaning and prevalence at the time of
the Founding is found in M. Peterson, “The New Right Renews Americanism”:
One of the central arguments for the passage of the Constitution was to
promote this form of liberty consonant with classical and Christian
virtues over and against licentiousness. As Noah Webster defined it in
the first American dictionary in 1806, “Licentiousness” referred to the
“contempt of just restraint,” i.e., freedom unrestrained by, and therefore
in, opposition to justice.
This distinction was embedded deep in American political thought from
the start. Even as the Constitution of the State of New York protected
“the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference,” in 1777, for instance, it qualified
this freedom, “[p]rovided that the liberty of conscience hereby granted,
shall not be so construed, as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State.” . . .
When George Washington argued that stronger governmental unity
between the states was needed in his Circular to the States in 1783, he
warned that “arbitrary power is most easily established on the ruins of
liberty abused to licentiousness.” The sentiment ultimately became part
and parcel of the argument for the adoption of the Constitution of the
United States. Benjamin Rush echoed the rest of the Federalists in 1787
when he said:
In our opposition to monarchy, we forgot that the temple of tyranny has
two doors. We bolted one of them by proper restraints; but we left the
other open, by neglecting to guard against the effects of our own
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individual is an asocial, atomistic being. Nor is it rooted in moral
skepticism. On the contrary, this liberty has long been nested among
abiding societal convictions that there are basic aspects of human wellbeing which are good for everyone, and moral norms which are true for
everyone. These universal aspects of human flourishing were the anchor
points of a genuinely common good, which public authority had an
inalienable duty to promote in appropriately limited ways for the sake of
everyone’s flourishing.8 A greater-than-human source of meaning and
value created, and sustained, this morally ordered world.9
ignorance and licentiousness. Most of the present difficulties of this
country arise from the weakness and other defects of our governments.
Matthew J. Peterson, The American Founding Was Not Libertarian Liberalism,
THE AM. MIND (June 14, 2019), https://americanmind.org/features/why-the-newright-rises/the-american-founding-was-not-libertarian-liberalism/ [https://perma.
cc/62Q4-X6GM].
8. The most important example of “appropriately limited” promotion of true
human well-being pertains to religion. As long ago as 1786, James Madison made
the essential point, in his “Memorial and Remonstrance” against a Virginia state
tax to support teachers of religion:
Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, ‘that Religion
or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging
it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or
violence.’ The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction
and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise
it as these may dictate.
In other words: assuming that governments should promote religion
among the people for the sake of their flourishing (on the further assumption that
getting into a right relationship with the transcendent source of meaning and value
is good for persons), the “appropriate” way for government to do so is, basically,
by protecting everyone’s right to religious freedom. As Madison indicates, if
government tried to force religiosity upon persons or even to promote it in a
heavy-handed way, it would undermine the true value of religion, which value
depends upon (as Madison says) persons voluntarily performing their religious
duties. Government could and should promote the religious life of the people, but
in suitably non-coercive ways by, for example, mandating that employers not
interfere with employees’ Sabbath observances.
Madison’s “Memorial and Remonstrance” appears as an Appendix to the
opinion of Justice Rutledge in the Court’s foundational Establishment Clause
case, Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 63–
74 (1947).
9. This is not to suggest that it is impossible to hold fast to the conception
of liberty described in the text without also holding fast to the existence of God.
In fact, many people hold this conception of liberty on what might be called
naturalistic grounds. The most important scholarly work affirming this liberty
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When a plurality of the Supreme Court declared on June 29, 1992, in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey that “the heart of liberty” is “the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life,”10 they substituted an altogether “different but
incompatible” sort of liberty.11 In the Justices’ construal of human wellbeing in Casey, what a person chooses is not the criterion of moral value.
What counts is that whatever one chooses is, in some hypothesized sense,
really one’s own choice—and so constitutive of one’s singular “identity.”
Yet, even this description overborrows from the traditional worldview. For
the value theory of the Mystery Passage supposes that “choice” is not so
much the agent’s sober deliberation about intelligible options, and the
deliberate uncoerced selection of one of those options in light of moral
truth. On that theory, “choice” is more the unimpeded expression of some
perceived inner emotion, psychological complex, or imagined “self”—the
actualization of a “real” me, or you.12
There is no further objectivity of value behind the new liberty of selfdefinition epitomized in Casey. Each person is the source of meaning and
value for himself or herself. No greater-than-human source of meaning
and value supervenes upon the expressing person’s idea of what is real and
worthwhile. A genuinely common good then becomes difficult to imagine:
if there are no objective goods, then any allegedly “common good” can
only appear to the persons living in their own mental universes as a
contingent consensus, as a more or less stable agreement on an agenda, as
something external and arbitrary.
without reference to the question of God is John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural
Rights (Oxford 1980). In that work Finnis (who is himself a believer) describes,
explains, and defends through the first 12 chapters an account of self-constitution
through free choice directed towards the actualization of true human goods. In the
thirteenth chapter he turns to the question of God. Another formidable scholarly
explication of such liberty without reference to the question of God and religion
is that of Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford 1986).
10. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). Hereafter I shall refer to this sentence as the
“Mystery Passage.”
11. See Lincoln, supra note 1, at 302.
12. Perhaps the most pertinent example of the scholarly deployment of
Mystery-Passage-type liberty is the “Philosophers’ Brief,” filed by John Rawls,
Ronald Dworkin, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Thomas Nagel, Thomas Scanlon, and
Robert Nozick in the Supreme Court’s assisted suicide cases in 1997. The brief
itself was published in Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers’
Brief, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 41–45 (Mar. 27, 1997 issue), https://www.nybooks.com/
articles/1997/03/27/assisted-suicide-the-philosophers-brief/ [https://perma.cc/FH
A5-8TLC]. The cases are Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) and
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 214

5/26/21 11:50 AM

2021]

MORAL TRUTH

1323

If the Mystery Passage were a one-off rhetorical extravagance, this
Article would not be written. But the Justices said in 1992 that they were
synthesizing a generation of prior Court holdings on subjects as important
as religion in public life, religious liberty, marriage and family, having and
raising children, education, and sexual morality. “These matters, involving
the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”13
Another generation has passed since Casey. Three Republican
appointees authored the Mystery Passage. It has since been ratified by
Supreme Court majorities several times.14 Its effects are on full display in
the Court’s repeated affirmations of abortion rights, the sphere in which
the Passage originated.15 We also see its effects in the Court’s anointing of
same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges,16 surrounding the collapse of
any tenable conception of a critically justified public morality in its
jurisprudence,17 and elsewhere in constitutional law.18 Now a generation
past 1992, Americans have nearly exhausted the moral capital that the
adherents to biblical religions who came before them stored up, stores
which for a time muffled the effects of the new world heralded by Casey.
The Greatest Generation is now nearly gone.19 Their Boomer offspring
who rebelled against their elders’ world are retiring.20 The United States
is run now largely by persons who did not know the world before 1968.
Read just by itself, the Mystery Passage might seem to pertain only to
an invisible sphere of mind, where each person could silently star in his or
13. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851.
14. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Whole Women’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
15. See, e.g., Whole Women’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292.
16. 576 U.S. 644.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part V (discussing the state of constitutional jurisprudence in
the arena of religious liberty).
19. See Don C. Brunell, The Greatest Generation Is Quickly Slipping into
History, COURIER-HERALD (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.courierherald.com/busi
ness/the-greatest-generation-is-quickly-slipping-into-history-don-brunell/ [https:
//perma.cc/GS47-DAGY] (“According to the U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, the
men and women who fought and won World War II are now in their late 80s and
90s. They are dying quickly (400 per day) and the last estimate is fewer than
389,000 of the 16 million Americans who served are alive.”).
20. See Andrew Van Dam, Baby Boomers Are Retiring in Droves. Here Are
Three Big Reasons for Concern., CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.chicago
tribune.com/business/success/ct-biz-baby-boomers-retire-dollarsense-20190301story.html [https://perma.cc/C2XD-KUUN].
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her own superhero cosmic narrative. But the Supreme Court has now
weaponized this solipsist.21 Whatever a person’s imagination conceives,
he or she today is by dint of constitutional law entitled to openly express,
and then to publicly actualize in and through his or her “identity” and
behavior. The corollaries of Casey now include a communal duty to affirm
the imagined world of others out of respect for the person whose world it
is. To instead criticize another’s “identity” is harmful, and to act in
derogation of it invites social ostracism and sometimes legal penalty.22
The Mystery Passage has called into being corresponding
vocabularies, concepts, meanings, customs, and cultures. It has redefined
basic social forms such as marriage, family, and religion. Even biology
and metaphysics are meat in its maws: not even male or female are we
created any more.23 These bold aggressions are in due course, for this
“liberty” was born of a redefinition of one metaphysical reality, namely,
what constitutes morally significant free choice, and in the rejection of
another, namely, that there are a host of objective human goods which
constitute the true flourishing of every human person there is and ever was.
After a half-century’s march through our law and culture, we can see what
it is like to ride bareback across the open range of human egotism, desire,
and fantasy—the “heart of liberty”—unconstrained by the Decalogue and
by the God who delivered it to Moses.
In both Springfield and Baltimore, Lincoln emphasized the practical
difficulty of living in a foreign world, of living according to one concept
of liberty where the surrounding social structure is determined by the
other. Two radically different social worlds now occupy the same territory.
Each requires a culture and law suited to it. America’s house is divided,
and it cannot long persist in that condition. Save for the probably enduring
possibility of living incompatibly within one’s own mind or within an

21. Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644; Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga, 140 S. Ct. 1731
(2020).
22. See, e.g., Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 675 (“Especially against a long history
of disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right
to marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on
gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them.”). A brief history of
how this suffering solipsist has assumed this commanding position in our
constitutional civil liberties is Paul R. McHugh & Gerard V. Bradley, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, FIRST THINGS 29–33 (Dec. 2020), available at https://www.
firstthings.com/article/2020/12/therapeutic-jurisprudence [https://perma.cc/G4H
L-V486].
23. See infra Part IV.
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insular community willing to separate to live according to the recessive
“liberty” gene, our country “will become all one thing or all the other.”24
This Article is not another lamentation about the mischiefs of identity
politics, or the wages of culture wars. The argument here is rather one for
reclaiming constitutional jurisprudence for a liberty “different but
incompatible” with that of the Mystery Passage.25 It is a project for which
today’s conservative constitutionalism is, unfortunately, inadequate.
Conservative constitutionalism is defined by a stated commitment to
originalism, that is, to interpreting the Constitution according to its
original public understanding, as nearly as possible, given the limitations
of historical sources and the development of the law since the Founding.
This defining commitment of constitutional interpretation is sound. For
decades, however, constitutional conservatives have also defined their
project by a methodology of judicial restraint, a normative approach to the
judicial task marked by an allergy to critical moral reasoning and to resting
their constitutional opinions upon value judgments and moral norms
which the constitutional conservatives on the Court affirm precisely as
true.
Perhaps, hypothetically, these defining commitments could be
maintained in harmony. But, as a matter of fact, our Constitution often
requires for its sound interpretation—according to its original public
meaning—frank resort to truths of morality and, sometimes, to a sound
metaphysics. This requirement is not satisfied by judicial recourse to an
alleged moral consensus at some particular historical moment or to the
Founders’ opinions about what is morally the case. This requirement is
satisfied only by the constitutional interpreter’s reliance upon
the critically justified truth of the matter.26 In any event, methodology has
eclipsed originalism.
An abiding aversion to critical moral thinking has come to define
constitutional conservatism in derogation of originalism. Inoculating
judicial interpretation of the Constitution against infection by judges’
moralizing—what Justice Scalia described as the brethren’s
“predilections”27—has become the overriding desideratum. It is now all
but axiomatic: philosophical abstinence is the proposition on which the
24. See Lincoln, supra note 5.
25. See Lincoln, supra note 1, at 302.
26. This is the central burden of this entire Article. Nonetheless, see
especially infra notes 190–216 and accompanying text.
27. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849,
863 (1989) (“Now the main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution—
or, for that matter, in judicial interpretation of any law—is that the judges will
mistake their own predilections for the law.”).
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structure of constitutional conservatism is built.28 Interpreting the
Constitution according to the original public understanding of it is
secondary to this end. This whole development is captured in the image of
Supreme Court Justices settling the meaning of the Constitution as if they
were umpires calling balls and strikes.29
The chief reason for conservatives’ moral reticence is easy enough to
identify. Conservatives’ judicial restraint came into being as an
understandable strategy to halt the Warren (and, to some extent, the
Burger) Court’s judicial activism.30 The conservative diagnosis was
simple and substantially correct: judicial philosophizing not called for by
the constitutional text or a sound interpretation of it underlay many of
these judicial excesses. The treatment that conservatives prescribed hit the
mark. Their remedy was a strict moral-philosophical abstinence. Where
resort to critical moral reasoning seemed to conservatives to be
inescapable in answering a question about constitutional meaning, they
turned to some sector of conventional moral belief, usually to what some
group of lawmakers, or a popular majority, thinks or once thought.31
Conservatives most often cited “majoritarian morality” past or present—
and, frankly, without consideration of whether it was true or false—to plug
this gap in their arguments. “Majoritarian morality” is, however, a fact
about what people think (or thought). It is not itself a moral norm. It cannot
supply a “rational basis” for any law.
Constitutional conservatives have rightly tried to lower the moral
temperature and the raw social significance of civil-liberties cases by
extricating the law from the philosophical mistakes of the Warren and
Burger Courts.32 But, to twist a Freudianism, sometimes a mistake is just
a mistake. The solution to bad philosophy is sometimes better philosophy,
28. The judicial bête noire of the conservatives is, most recently, Anthony
Kennedy, and his opinions for the Court in Lawrence and then Obergefell, as well
as his participation in the Casey joint opinion in which the Mystery Passage
appeared for the first time. In an earlier era, Justice Brennan would have hayed
the villain’s role. The most prominent scholarly exponent of judges’ frankly
relying upon moral philosophy is surely Ronald Dworkin. His Taking Rights
Seriously (Harvard 1977) is a most formidable defense of, in effect, the “liberal”
philosophizing from the bench so lamented by constitutional conservatives.
29. See, e.g., Roberts: ‘My Job Is to Call Balls and Strikes and Not to Pitch
or Bat’, CNN (Sept. 12, 2005, 4:58 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/
09/12/roberts.statement/ [https://perma.cc/52NS-AF5U] (reproducing Chief
Justice Roberts’ opening statement during his confirmation hearing for his seat as
Chief Justice that it is a judge’s job “to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat”).
30. See infra Parts I–V.
31. See infra Part III.
32. See infra Parts I–IV.
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not no philosophy at all. The truth about the Constitution is that sound
moral reasoning has less to do with its proper interpretation than liberals
typically assumed. Moral truth nonetheless has more to do with
constitutional law than conservatives have been willing to recognize.
Conservative constitutionalism is well-suited to damage control
whenever legal elites, including, most prominently, “progressives” on the
Supreme Court, are in thrall to unsound moral and political philosophies.
Conservative constitutionalism can stymie for a time the introduction of
catastrophic innovations in constitutional law, like abortion or same-sex
marriage. More than 50 years into the Supreme Court’s Age of Aquarius,
however, constitutional conservatism is incapable of wresting control of
the law back from the regime-changing project of autonomous selfdefinition.
Our nation has passed a “tipping point” where damage control is not
enough; it is tantamount to a slow-walking surrender. The liberated self’s
signal breakthroughs (such as Roe and Obergefell) are in the rear-view
mirror. Going forward, activist judges need only consolidate their gains,33
gradually erase vestiges of the rival “liberty,” and before long our polity
“will become all one thing.” It is time for constitutional conservatives to
change course and partner with moral and metaphysical truth in a way
which they have so far denied to themselves by adopting their
characteristic vow of moral abstinence.
Of course, not all constitutional conservatives are upholders of a
morality recognizably congruent with that which was held as
philosophically (and religiously) true down to the 1960s.34 Many
constitutional conservatives do, however, hold opinions of the kind that
can be captured sufficiently accurately, though ultimately misleadingly,
by the term “social conservative.”
Conservatives would be in a pickle if they faced a choice between
what they judge to be the right way to interpret the Constitution and the
only way to salvage a decent society. Fortunately, they face no such
33. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Moral Constitutionalism, FIRST THINGS (Mar.
2021), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2021/03/moral-constitutionalism [https:
//perma.cc/Q52Y-7WCD].
34. Robert Bork defended constitutional “originalism” largely by appealing
to, if not relying upon, moral skepticism in The Tempting of America (Free Press
1990). While Antonin Scalia no doubt affirmed traditional moral and
metaphysical truths (and could therefore be described as a “social conservative”),
his jurisprudence also depended upon an appeal to moral skepticism; that is, to
the practical fact that, although moral truth might be accessible in principle to
humankind, judges can be counted on to mistake what are in fact their own
“predilections” (Scalia’s word) for true moral norms. See infra Part VI.
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choice. Conservative constitutionalists need only choose originalism,
which choice will lead them to recognize the necessity for strategic resort,
as the Constitution directs, to critically justified metaphysical and moral
truths. The contemporary judge can be faithful to the Founders only by
relying upon moral and metaphysical truths that lie beyond the
Constitution. Sometimes the judge must replace bad philosophy with good
philosophy.
In these pages, I first undertake to show that this is so by looking at
five foundational aspects of the common good of our polity. Part I
examines the meaning of “persons” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment,
particularly in the context of abortion. Part II concerns the meaning of
marriage and the family in our constitutional jurisprudence. Public
morality generally is the subject of Part III. In Part IV, I address questions
raised by the courts’ approach to issues concerning biological sex and
gender identity, issues raised by the transgender challenge to sexsegregated intimate facilities in public schools. Part V focuses on the
nature of religion and religious liberty according to the First Amendment’s
Religion Clauses. In each instance, the perennial “liberty” of personal selfdirection within a morally ordered universe can recover lost territory, and
claim its rightful primacy in constitutional law, only by resort to the
frankly philosophical readings that the key constitutional provisions, as a
matter of historical faith and sound legal reasoning, so clearly call for.
In Part VI, I take up the formidable constitutional conservatism of the
movement’s leading light over the last half-century, Antonin Scalia. Scalia
is the best Justice of the Supreme Court during that time. He reached the
right result in constitutional cases more often than any other Justice. His
approach nonetheless exhibits the characteristic weaknesses of
constitutional conservatism.
I. PERSONS
Abortion is the most important civil-liberties issue of our time because
it uniquely presses the foundational question about justice that every legal
system faces: whom is the law for? That question is prior and paramount
to the question, what should the law be? Jurists as far back as Justinian in
the 6th century saw clearly that law is for persons, not the other way
around.35 Persons are the point of law. Law is their servant. The whole
35. See John Finnis, The Priority of Persons Revisited, 58 AM. J. JURIS. 45,
46 (2013) (discussing “cases where the judges professed themselves helpless in
the face of a just, law-based argument by or on behalf of real human beings” and
concluding that in each of those cases “the court should have thought, like the
Romans, that law is for the sake of persons”).
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complex of materials, mores, and manners that constitute a political
community’s common good is for the sake of persons, and for their efforts
to perfect themselves through freely chosen, morally significant actions.
Anyone can see that even an exquisitely balanced account of legal rights
and duties is worth dust if the strong can manipulate the prior question
about who counts as a person with impunity.
Neither capital punishment nor euthanasia nor police use of deadly
force (to cite some other important legal questions pertaining to intentional
killing) raises this foundational question. All parties to those debates agree
that they are talking about persons with a right not to be unjustifiably
killed. They disagree about the requisite justification. Besides, the total
number of persons killed annually in all three of those scenarios combined
is, depending on how accurately one guesses at the prevalence of
euthanasia, smaller, and perhaps far smaller, than those killed by abortion.
It is certain that 25 people were executed by public authorities in America
in 2018.36 The police killed approximately a thousand people that year.37
Approximately 860,000 abortions were reported to public health officials
the year before.38 How many more unreported abortions occurred is
unknown. This massive hemorrhage might be justified if, in truth, persons
do not begin until birth. Even someone who believes that persons truly
begin at fertilization, might be somewhat consoled if today’s abortion
liberty had its origins in a good-faith effort to discern the truth about when
persons begin. At least then, better information and more disciplined
reasoning could perhaps restore justice. But the Roe Court said that it
would not consider the “difficult question of when life begins” at all.39
Now, any society keen to be a just one must establish in its
fundamental law, whether that be a constitution or other foundational
36. Jessica Gresko, Executions Remain at Near Record Lows in 2018, PBS
(Dec. 14, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/executionsremain-at-near-record-lows-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/V4JV-S87S] (noting that a
“report by the District of Columbia-based Death Penalty Information Center says
25 executions were carried out in 2018”).
37. Michael Harriot, Here’s How Many People Police Killed in 2018, THE
ROOT (Jan. 3, 2019, 4:44 PM) https://www.theroot.com/here-s-how-many-people
-police-killed-in-2018-1831469528 [https://perma.cc/S2GL-SP7S] (“Police killed
1,165 people in 2018.”).
38. See Number of Abortions in U.S. Drops to Lowest Since They Became
Legal Nationwide, Report Finds, NBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.nbc
news.com/news/us-news/number-abortions-u-s-drops-lowest-they-became-legal
-nationwide-n1055726 [https://perma.cc/3RSU-W7MG] (“The report from the
Guttmacher Institute, a research group that supports abortion rights, counted
862,000 abortions in the U.S. in 2017.”).
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
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document, an unconditional legal respect for the lives of every person
within it. No one in American history understood this principle of justice
better than did Abraham Lincoln. In the wake of a Civil War during which
he commanded the armed forces that ended slavery, the American people
enshrined in their Constitution the requisite root principle of justice: “No
state”—and by implication, not the federal government, either—“shall
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws,”40 including, most importantly, those against homicide.
The text of the Fourteenth Amendment alone strongly suggests that
the term “person” is an unqualified reference to some natural kind or class
of beings. After all, it says: “any person” (semantically equivalent to “all
persons,” or “every person”).41 Anyone concerned about justice within the
human community who reads those words would presume that its meaning
incorporates a moral reality, namely, all those who truly are human
persons. The structure of the amendment reinforces this reading-at-aglance. The plain inference drawn from the whole Fourteenth Amendment
would be that, because Americans were concerned to forestall anything
like the chattel slavery that they had just so violently slain, they were
amending the Constitution to block any future treatment of powerless
individuals (such as had been African Americans) as sub- or non-persons,
with only those rights and immunities that the master class found it
acceptable to recognize. The non-negotiable demands of genuine human
rights went out of the picture.
The historical record confirms the expansive reference that these
textual and structural considerations indicate.42 Ohio Representative John
Bingham sponsored the Fourteenth Amendment in the House of
Representatives. During debate over what is now Section One—the “any
person” guarantees of due process and equal protection—Bingham

Id.

40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The full text of Section 1 reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. The historical materials touched on in this and the following paragraph
are covered in greater detail in Gerard V. Bradley, Constitutional and Other
Persons, in REASON, MORALITY, AND LAW: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN FINNIS 247
(John Keown & Robert P. George eds., 2013).
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described its coverage as “universal.”43 It applied, he said, to “any human
being.”44 Bingham’s counterpart in the Senate, Senator Jacob Howard,
emphasized that the amendment applied to every member of the human
family.45 Addressing a large crowd on July 18, 1866, Indiana Governor
Oliver Morton declared that Section One “intended to throw the equal
personal and proprietary protection of the law around every person who
may be within the jurisdiction of the state.”46 Senator Howard stated that
“[i]t establishes equality before the law, and it gives to the humblest, the
poorest, the most despised of the race the same rights and the same
protection before the law as it gives to the most powerful, the most
wealthy, or the most haughty.”47 He told the Senate that Section One did
“away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not
applicable to others.”48
Newspaper coverage of the debate over the Amendment included such
paraphrases for the reference to “person” in Section One as “all men” and
“all men as equals before the law of God and man.”49 The New York
Times opined that the “equal protection of the laws is guaranteed to all,
without any exception.”50 This prevailing spirit of inclusion is succinctly
captured in an Iowa judicial opinion handed down in 1868, the year the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. The state supreme court said that the
common law is “to be commended, for its all-embracing and salutary
solicitude for the sacredness of human life and the personal safety of every
human being.”51 The court wrote that “[t]his protecting, paternal care,
envelop[s] every individual like the air he breathes,” and it “not only
extends to persons actually born, but, for some purposes, to infants en
ventre sa mère [in a mother’s womb].”52
This historical evidence could be multiplied.53
43. Id. at 264.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 265.
47. Id. at 264.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 265.
50. Id.
51. State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 135 (1868).
52. Id.
53. See the research reported in, for example, James S. Witherspoon,
Reexamining Roe: Nineteenth Century Abortion Statutes and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 17 ST. MARY’S L. J. 29 (1985), and Joshua J. Craddock, Protecting
Prenatal Persons: Does the Fourteenth Amendment Prohibit Abortion?, 40
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 539 (2017).
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This whole project would be subverted if “any person” was limitable
to those admitted to membership in the protected class, just as it suited the
people in charge, some master class whose asserted control over the fates
of putatively sub- or non-persons was, for some reason, regarded as
controlling. This was essentially Ronald Dworkin’s argument in his book
Life’s Dominion.54 Treating “personhood” as an intra-systemic riddle, to
be solved by a feat of technical legal reasoning—as if the law were as
impervious to the reality of persons as Chancery was to justice in Jarndyce
v. Jarndyce—would be just as calamitous.55
In light of the historical evidence about the expansive reference of the
term “person,” lawyers for Texas naturally argued in Roe v. Wade that the
word in the Fourteenth Amendment included the unborn because they are,
in truth, persons.56 The Court readily acknowledged this to be the decisive
question. Justice Blackmun wrote for the Roe majority: Texas “argue[s]
that the fetus is a ‘person’ within the language and meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at length and in
detail the well-known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of
personhood is established,” he wrote, the abortion-rights case “of course,
collapses, for the fetus’ right to life would then be guaranteed specifically
by the Amendment,” a “collapse” that (Blackmun noted) even the lawyers
for Jane Roe conceded.57
The Roe Court met Texas’ dispositive claim with the zeal of a clerk
and the compassion of a highwayman. To resolve Texas’ challenge,
Blackmun turned the Court’s gaze, not outward toward a moral claim
about persons, but inward to the conventional meaning of a legal term of
art. Blackmun catalogued in Roe the 22 or so usages of the word “person”
in the entire Constitution. (These included, for example, stipulations about
the minimum age for various political offices and about runaway convicts
and fugitive slaves.) Blackmun then wrote for the Court that, “in nearly
all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has application only
postnatally. None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible
prenatal application.”58
54. See Gerard V. Bradley, Life’s Dominion: A Review Essay, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 329 (1993).
55. See generally CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1853).
56. See Gerard V. Bradley, The Future of Abortion Law in the United States,
NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS QUARTERLY 633, 650 (Winter 2016).
57. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–57 (1973).
58. Id. at 157 (emphasis added). Blackmun added that “throughout the major
portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than
they are today.” Id. at 158. He said that his conclusion in Roe against the
Fourteenth Amendment “personhood” of the unborn “is in accord with the results
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Those 20-odd usages do indeed have no such “applications.” Fetuses
do not, for example, run for president, and the Constitution says that they
may not. But that exclusion does not render them non-persons, any more
than it renders anyone who is foreign-born, or who is not yet 35 years old,
or who has not lived in America for 14 years, a non-person.59 Nor does the
fact that fetuses cannot be extradited: neither an unborn child nor any other
child can commit a crime. No youth can therefore become an interstate
fugitive, and so be liable to extradition. Yet, the reality that the
Constitution’s extradition clause60 does not apply to, say, an eight-yearold does not mean that the child is not a “person.” Blackmun’s other
“applications” similarly have no tendency to define “person” or to
establish when any “person” begins. Besides, the question in Roe was
limited to when “persons” begin when it comes to the equal protection of
state laws against homicide. And Blackmun’s opinion for the Court surely
recognized that that had potential “application” prenatally. The crucial
question in Roe was whether it in fact does have “application” before birth,
a question that the Justices “answered” by compiling a constitutional index
of “person.”
Roe v. Wade has raged like a firestorm through American
constitutional law ever since the Court handed it down in 1973. No
decision of the Court since Dred Scott v. Sandford 61 has been so
bitterly criticized.62 None—with the possible exception of Brown v.
reached in those few [recent; that is, post-1960] cases where the issue has been
squarely presented.” Id.
59. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen,
or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution,
shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to
that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been
fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.”).
60. Id. art. IV, § 2. (“A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or
other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on
Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered
up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.”).
61. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
62. The tone of criticism was set by Justice White in his Roe/Doe dissent
(joined by Justice Rehnquist):
I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support
the Court’s judgments. . . . As an exercise of raw judicial power, the
Court perhaps has authority to do what it does today; but in my view its
judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of
judicial review that the Constitution extends to this Court.
410 U.S. 179, 221–22 (1973). The most important of the early scholarly criticisms
was no doubt that of John Hart Ely, then perhaps the leading academic
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Board of Education 63—has so shaped American political life in its
wake.64 Yet no constitutional conservative on the Court has disputed
the Roe Court’s conclusion that the unborn do not count as “persons”
guaranteed the equal protection of the laws. None has ever engaged in
judicial writings with the overwhelming evidence of text, structure,
and history that “person” refers to a moral reality. This is not to say
that conservatives have asked about that reality and come away with
the wrong answer. It is that conservatives hold exactly what Harry
Blackmun held: the truth of the matter about when persons begin is
irrelevant to the meaning of the constitutional guarantee of equal legal
protection against being killed.
No conservative on the Court, including several whom it could be
safely supposed hold pro-life convictions, has pointed out the
elementary errors of legal reasoning in Blackmun’s method. These
errors include the decisive one, which is that his constitutional index
of “person” has no tendency whatsoever to settle when people begin.
“Applications” are not “definitions.” Stipulations about what some
“persons” may or may not do imply nothing about when persons begin.
The term “person” in Blackmun’s catalogue is almost always qualified by
constitutional lawyer in the country and one who described himself as, politically,
pro-choice. Ely nonetheless wrote in the Yale Law Journal that Roe is not
constitutional law and gave no indication that it was trying to be. John Hard Ely,
The Wages of Crying Wolf, A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 920,
(1973).
63. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The long, and long overdue, social conflict over
desegregation of public facilities touched off by the Brown decision is chronicled
in R. Kluger’s Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and
Black America’s Struggle for Equality (1975).
64. Conservatives in past decades have highly prioritized the goal of
reversing Roe, and left-leaning commentators also recognize this possibility that
grows more plausible each time a new conservative is confirmed at the U.S.
Supreme Court. This apprehension is evident in articles commenting on the
confirmation process of recent Supreme Court nominees. See Corey
Brettschneider, Gorsuch, Abortion and the Concept of Personhood, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/opinion/gorsuch-abortion
-and-the-concept-of-personhood.html [https://perma.cc/XV7Y-U77N]; Charlie
Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Newly Revealed Emails Raise Fresh Objections
to Kavanaugh Confirmation, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/09/06/us/politics/kavanaugh-confirmation-hearings.html [https://per
ma.cc/T3KG-CPYU]; Adam Liptak, Barrett’s Record: A Conservative Who
Would Push the Supreme Court to the Right, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/amy-barrett-views-issues.html [https://perma.c
c/DAZ4-9YRY].
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some attribute, status, or achievement, such as being “free” (not enslaved)
or as “holding an office,” or having arrived at a certain age. Only in the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses does the term “person” appear
in its full extension. In every other instance examined by Blackmun,
“person” is accompanied by an adjectival or adverbial predicate. None is
used in Section One; there it is: “person” simpliciter.65 No
accomplishment or exercisable capacity or adjective or adverb is needed
for any person to be a beneficiary of a right not to be unjustifiably killed.
Roe nowhere referenced the Court’s own confident conclusion five years
earlier that “illegitimate children are not “nonpersons” because “[t]hey are
humans, live, and have their being,” and so “are clearly ‘persons’ within
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”66 According to these criteria in light of uncontroversial
biological data67 about the distinct individuality of the embryo from the
moment of its inception, the unborn are just as surely “persons.”
Constitutional conservatives have taken up none of these criticisms.
They have instead taken on board Blackmun’s fatally mistaken
methodology. The standard conservative critique of Roe is that the
majority Justices imagined themselves to be Platonic Guardians who
would rule the people wisely, in disregard of the plebeian task of
legal interpretation of the Constitution. The basis for this charge,
however, is scarcely evident from an opinion that is so attentive to
text, history, and precedent. The Roe opinion’s aversion to philosophy
(Platonic or otherwise) is plainly visible. Justice Blackmun wrote: “When
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus [about when people begin],
the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s knowledge, is not
in a position to speculate as to the answer.”68 The Justices therefore would
“not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.”69 This is exactly
what constitutional conservatives maintain.
Justices White (nominated by John Kennedy) and Rehnquist (a Nixon
appointee) dissented in Roe. But neither resisted the Court’s indifference
to who really is a “person.” All the other Republican appointees sitting

65. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
66. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968).
67. For a compelling argument that persons begin at fertilization, see ROBERT
P. GEORGE & CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFSEN, EMBRYO: A DEFENSE OF HUMAN LIFE
(2008).
68. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
69. Id.
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in 1973 joined the Blackmun opinion in Roe.70 Conservative
constitutionalists since have lambasted Roe, not for its cadaverous refusal
to face the reality of when persons begin, but rather for the creativity with
which Blackmun and the Court discovered, within an already suspect
constitutional right of privacy, a heretofore undetected right to abortion.
The Roe court did not find a right to abortion, however, in any
speculative exploration of privacy in any of its senses. Blackmun
found abortion in the commonplace trials of parenting. The Court
listed some of these “detriment[s]” (the Court’s word) in the opinion.71
Against these challenges of (chiefly) being a mother (though not, for
the most part, of pregnancy or childbirth) stood, as some Justices
described the alternative in their internal correspondence, an abstract,
speculative possibility, some concept of “potential” or inchoate life
about which there was assertedly no truth available to human reason,
and about which there was no consensus of opinion in society. 72
70. Besides Justice Blackmun, Republican-appointed Justices joining the
majority opinion in Roe included Justices Burger, Brennan, Stewart, and Powell.
71. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy
may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the
woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be
imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There
is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child,
and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this
one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood may be involved.
Id.
72. While Roe was being considered, Brennan wrote in a memorandum
to Douglas that “moral predilections must not be allowed to influence our
minds in setting legal distinctions,” here quoting Tom Clark, who quoted
Oliver Wendell Holmes. “The law deals in reality not obscurity —the known
rather than the unknown. The law does not deal in speculation.” See Bradley,
supra note 42, at 253 n.17. The Roe Court concluded that the state may not
“by adopting one theory of life . . . override the rights of the pregnant
women that are at stake.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
John Jeffries clerked for Justice Lewis Powell the term after Roe, and
describes in his excellent biography of that Justice how the
idea that a fertilized embryo was a fully recognized human life
would always seem to [Powell] unacceptably remote from ordinary
experience. That this belief was closely associated with the Catholic
Church only made it easier for him to dismiss. No argument would
have persuaded Powell that the disturbing realities of unwanted
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There are sound bases for criticizing the Roe Court here, not least that
Blackmun established not so much a right to abortion as a parental license
for infanticide. Excessive philosophizing is not one of them.73 In fact,
constitutional conservatives have steadily maintained that the Constitution
throws its weight behind neither the abortion-seeking pregnant woman nor
her unborn child.74 The matter is left entirely to the states: if California
wants to have abortion-on-demand, Californians are at liberty to have it.
If Alabamans want to have no legal abortion, so be it. “Reversing” Roe for
constitutional conservatives since 1973 means no more, though no less,
than that.
Justice Blackmun got one thing right in his opinion for the Roe Court.
He wrote that “the Constitution does not define ‘persons’ in so many
words.”75 The Constitution does not define “persons” in any words at all.
The Fourteenth Amendment, considered without reference to some extraconstitutional, independently established grounds for delimiting the class
of persons, would not provide equal protection of the laws to anyone.
Many constitutional conservatives disagree. They think that the first
words of the Fourteenth Amendment (“All persons born or naturalized in
the United States . . . .”) at least stipulate (even if they “define” nothing)
that all humans are “persons” once they are born. Justice Potter Stewart at
one point during the Roe oral argument flatly declared that the Fourteenth

pregnancy and back-alley abortion should be subordinated to
religious dogma.
JOHN JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS POWELL: A B IOGRAPHY 350 (2001).
73. Some courts have even established abortion-on-demand as a
metaphysical criterion. They reason that any entity which might be killed without
justification—such as the unborn child by its mother, per the Court’s holding in
Roe—must not be a “person”; otherwise, the holding in Roe would be barbaric.
This inversion of priorities—(misguided) ethics over metaphysical realities—
explains why so many evidently pro-choice people oppose feticide statutes, which
invariably include a carve-out for Roe and so do not impede abortion access at all.
But feticide laws characteristically treat the unborn as persons with the same right
not-to-be-killed as anyone else, except for lawful abortion. The same people
oppose laws requiring humane disposal of fetal remains for the reason that the
requirement implies, or at least strongly suggests, that the unborn are like
everyone else. See, e.g., Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., 139 S. Ct. 1780
(2019).
74. Justice Scalia at the Gregorian University: “Left, Right and the Common
Good, THE TRUTH WILL MAKE YOU FREE (Mar. 6, 2016), http://robertaconnor
.blogspot.com/2016/03/justice-scalia-at-gregorian-university.html [https://perma
.cc/6RDD-A9R2].
75. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
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Amendment “defines ‘person’ as somebody who’s born.”76 But it does no
such thing. Neither there nor elsewhere in the Constitution is there
anything resembling a definition of “person.” Section One of the
Amendment does stipulate that a “citizen” is a “person born or naturalized
in the United States.”77 But this does not supply any definition of “person.”
A law that said that “all persons who step foot on Ellis Island are thereby
citizens of the United States” would not imply that human individuals
swimming nearby are not “persons.” A constitutional clause conferring
“citizen” status according to the location of a “person’s” birth does not
imply that babies born overseas are not persons. Nor does it imply that
babies carried in the wombs of women living in the United States are not
yet “persons.” Those opening words of the Amendment are, moreover,
most naturally read to implicitly recognize that birth is an event during a
“person’s” life, and not the date of its beginning.
Neither text nor history nor structure nor even ordinary canons of
sound reasoning explain conservatives’ refusal to consider whether the
unborn are constitutional “persons.” The root of their refusal is instead
their methodological commitment to philosophical abstinence. That
commitment is, at least in the case of abortion, wistful. It does not
effectively shield conservatives from the truth about when persons begin.
For it is one thing to deny a specifically judicial competence to engage in
moral-philosophical reasoning. It is another thing entirely to impoverish
the Constitution itself with a similar disability. Even if the root of
conservative hesitation is a visceral concurrence in Blackmun’s
agnosticism—since the Constitution does not “define” person, “the
judiciary . . . is not in a position to speculate as to the answer”78—nothing
follows about the meaning of the Constitution. The hesitation establishes
only a specific judicial incompetence. It does not, save upon a radically
unsound equation of constitutional meaning with the institutional
competence of judges, settle anything about the constitutional meaning or
reference of the word “person.” All that follows from the conservatives’
intuitive agreement with Blackmun is, not that the unborn fail to launch as
“constitutional persons,” but that the primary authority to hold states to the
last full measure of equal protection resides elsewhere in the constitutional

76. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(No. 70-18), https://www.supremecourt.gov/pdfs/transcripts/1972/70-18_10-111972.pdf [https://perma.cc/YR69-R5GM].
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
78. Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
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system. That residence would be in Congress, as both the text of the
Amendment (Section Five) and the history of its adoption shows.79
Conservatives’ aversion is wistful also because the truth of the matter
is embedded in ordinary canons of judicial review that neither
conservatives nor their liberal activist brethren question. Any state law
permitting, say, post-viability abortions must—as all laws must in our
constitutional order—satisfy courts that it has a “rational basis.” What
could be the basis in reason for according a newborn exactly the same legal
protection against being killed as that accorded to the newborn’s parents,
but for according it no legal protection at all just one instant earlier? Is it
rational to suppose that any natural class of beings springs into existence
at birth like that, as if ex nihilo? Could any legislature rationally conclude
that a “person” with the full panoply of constitutional rights comes to be
so suddenly, from what was just inches and seconds earlier some sort of
wholly non-personal predecessor with no rights at all?
Any permissive abortion law must pass this elementary rational basis
level of constitutional scrutiny. About any abortion-permissive law, a
court must ask itself: is it rational to judge that there is a substantial change
in the metaphysical status of the unborn, somewhere between the
formation of what biology indisputably establishes is a unique human
individual at the moment of fertilization, and the delivery of that individual
months later? Is it rational to so judge, as the truth about when persons
begin has become more evident and therefore less reasonably deniable
since 1973? Prenatal research, sonograms, and DNA evidence of how the
embryo carries within it all the information needed to direct the tiny
person’s growth throughout life show conclusively the existential
continuity of everyone from fertilization to death. These biological and
other scientific facts very strongly indicate, if they do not simply show,
that each one of us began as a person in a moral sense when our bodies
began. Because our bodies began at conception, then so did we.80
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”); see also
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 110–11 (1988) (explaining that “[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment was understood less as a legal instrument to be elaborated
in the courts than as a peace treaty to be administered by Congress in order to
secure the fruits” of victory in the Civil War).
80. For a compelling argument along these lines, see GEORGE & TOLLEFSEN,
supra note 67. The question of minimum constitutional rationality is all the more
compelling in light of the burgeoning number of convictions in both state and
federal courts of (almost always) young men for killing (usually) their unborn
children, very often for reasons included on Roe’s list of parental “detriments”
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Many constitutional conservatives might still think it is too audacious
to go all the way to full “personhood” for the unborn. It is nonetheless too
late for the standard conservative alternative in constitutional law.
Returning the matter of abortion to the states has become cliché. The
combined weight of conservative respect for precedent, concern for
institutional prestige, worry about social stability, and preference for
distinguishing rather than overruling prior decisions, have by now swung
like a pendulum to some no-man’s land between the sides in our country’s
culture war over abortion. All these costs of “reversing” Roe are increasing
with every passing day. The question now is whether these costs will seem
to conservative constitutionalists to be worth paying, if the point of doing
so is to correct, not a catastrophic injustice, but a jurisdictional mistake.
Or worth the freight to conform the constitutional law of abortion, not to
what those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment enacted, but to a
judicial methodology conceived as a counter-activist strategy nearly five
decades ago.
Constitutional conservatives can see just as easily as anyone else that,
even after a hypothetical “reversal” of Roe, the vast majority of Americans
would still live in states recognizing abortion rights (because such
populous states as California, New York, and Illinois would remain as
“pro-choice” as ever). Conservatives can see the strong possibility that all
Americans would live in such states if the Biden Administration and
sufficient to make a mother’s identical choice a matter of constitutional right.
Although every such “feticide” conviction has been affirmed on appeal, no
appellate court has answered the challenge of a few of these convicted defendants
that it violates the Equal Protection Clause for any state’s laws about justified
homicide to apply fully to him, and not at all to her. See generally Bradley, supra
note 42. Blackmun wrote in Roe that Texas could not constitutionally deny a
pregnant woman the choice to abort by its adoption of a “theory of life.” But no
one is sentenced to prison for denying a theory. These men have been imprisoned
for killing someone not yet born, someone who nonetheless has evidently the
same right to life as the reader, or the writer, of this Article.
The urgency of the issue was heightened by the 2018 Alabama Supreme
Court affirmation of the first capital murder conviction in the United States for
feticide. The opening sentences of that opinion:
Jessie Livell Phillips was convicted in the Marshall Circuit Court of the
capital offense of murder of ‘two or more persons’ for the intentional
killing of his wife, Erica Phillips, and their unborn child (“Baby Doe”)
“by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct.” The jury
unanimously recommended that he be sentenced to death. Following a
sentencing hearing, the trial court accepted the jury’s recommendation
and sentenced Phillips to death.
See Ex parte Phillips, 287 So. 3d 1179, 1185 (Ala. 2018) (citations omitted).
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Democrats in Congress make good on signals that they will “codify” Roe
in federal statutes.81 This very real prospect raises an awkward question
for constitutional conservatives: what if, after 50 years of protracted
political struggle to change the courts, the Supreme Court finally
“reversed” Roe—and it did not matter?
II. MARRIAGE AND FAMILY
No Supreme Court case since Roe v. Wade has been more bitterly
criticized by constitutional conservatives than has the 2015 same-sex
marriage decision, Obergefell v. Hodges.82 Justice White wrote in his Roe
dissent that the Court’s decision there was an “exercise of raw judicial
power.”83 He added that there is “nothing in the language or history of the
Constitution to support the Court’s judgment. The Court simply fashions
and announces a new constitutional right . . . with scarcely any reason or
authority for its action.”84 In Obergefell, Justice Scalia wrote in dissent
that the Court’s decision was a “judicial Putsch,” a “naked judicial claim
to legislative—indeed, super-legislative—power,” one that lacked “even
a thin veneer of law.”85
81. For an example of such a proposed codification, see the Women’s Health
Protection Act of 2019 (S. 1645), which aims to “protect a woman’s ability to
determine whether and when to bear a child or end a pregnancy, and to protect a
health care provider’s ability to provide reproductive health care services,
including abortion services.”
82. 576 U.S. 644 (2015); see also id. at 686–713 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting),
713–20 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 720–36 (Thomas, J., dissenting), 736–42 (Alito,
J., dissenting).
83. Roe, 410 U.S. at 222 (White, J. dissenting).
84. Id. at 221–22 (White, J., dissenting).
85. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 716–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s
dissent (joined by Justice Thomas) was especially caustic. Scalia wrote that the
majority “opinion is couched in a style that is as pretentious as its content is
egotistic. It is one thing for separate concurring or dissenting opinions to contain
extravagances, even silly extravagances, of thought and expression; it is
something else for the official opinion of the Court to do so.” Id. at 719. In the
appended note 22, the Justice added:
If, even as the price to be paid for a fifth vote, I ever joined an opinion
for the Court that began: “The Constitution promises liberty to all within
its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons,
within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity,” I would hide
my head in a bag. The Supreme Court of the United States has descended
from the disciplined legal reasoning of John Marshall and Joseph Story
to the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie.
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It is Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent, however, that articulates in pure
form the conservative constitutionalist critique of Obergefell. “The
majority’s decision is an act of will, not legal judgment,” Roberts, joined
by Justices Scalia and Thomas, wrote. “The right it announces has no basis
in the Constitution or this Court’s precedent.”86 Roberts claimed that the
Court’s decision “rests on nothing more than the majority’s own
conviction that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry.”87
So far, the Chief Justice’s criticisms sound like those of Justices White
and Scalia. Roberts then deployed, however, the mightiest weapon in the
canons of constitutional criticism, save perhaps for the Dred Scott decision
that ignited the Civil War. “[O]nly one precedent offers any support for
the majority’s methodology: Lochner v. New York.”88 He declared that
“[w]hatever force that belief [of the majority that same-sex couples should
be allowed to marry] may have as a matter of moral philosophy, it has no
more basis in the Constitution than did the naked policy preferences
adopted in Lochner.”89 The Chief Justice nailed his Lochner indictment by
likening Obergefell’s sin precisely to that which Justice Holmes cited in
his dissent for the ages in Lochner. Roberts wrote: “As Justice Holmes
memorably put it, ‘The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statics,’ a leading work on the philosophy of Social
Darwinism.”90 Chief Justice Roberts added, “[O]ur Constitution does not
enact any one theory of marriage.”91
The conservative Justices’ criticism of Obergefell was strictly
methodological. It is the same criticism they have long leveled at Roe v.
Wade. Just as it was in Roe, the majority’s mistake in Obergefell was not
that it got the substance of a foundational moral or metaphysical matter
wrong. About that question the conservatives were as agnostic in
Obergefell as they were in, and since, Roe. In this view, the Constitution
knows no more about marriage than it does about when people begin.
Neither a “theory” of life nor a “theory” of marriage is to be found in our
fundamental charter. These matters are all state prerogatives. Chief Justice
Roberts wrote that the “Constitution itself says nothing about marriage,
Id.

86. Id. at 687 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 703 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
89. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). “[T]he majority’s approach has no basis in
principle or tradition, except for the unprincipled tradition of judicial
policymaking that characterized discredited decisions such as Lochner v. New
York.” Id. at 694 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 686 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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and the Framers thereby entrusted the States with ‘[t]he whole subject of
the domestic relations of husband and wife.’”92
The conservatives focused their fire instead on the majority’s
designation of purely companionate monogamy as the Constitution’s
“theory” of marriage. Their criticisms committed them, however, to
rejecting judicial identification of any “theory” of marriage as the
Constitution’s theory, or even as the subject of what every Justice
conceded was a line of unimpeachable precedents recognizing a
“fundamental right to marry.” For these dissenters in Obergefell, neither
procreative marriage nor the majority’s companionate alternative (nor, for
that matter, polygamy)93 was part of constitutional law. On the
92. Id. at 690 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). The Chief
Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Scalia nonetheless affirmed a plenary,
independent federal government authority to define marriage as the that
government sees fit, notwithstanding any state definition to the contrary, in their
dissents in Windsor v. United States, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
93. Chief Justice Roberts’ reductio criticism of the majority’s reasoning
therefore missed its mark. He wrote:
Although the majority randomly inserts the adjective ‘two’ in various
places, it offers no reason at all why the two-person element of the core
definition of marriage may be preserved while the man-woman element
may not. . . . It is striking how much of the majority’s reasoning would
apply with equal force to the claim of a fundamental right to plural
marriage. If “[t]here is dignity in the bond between two men or two
women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to make such profound
choices,” why would there be any less dignity in the bond between three
people who, in exercising their autonomy, seek to make the profound
choice to marry?
Id. at 704 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Roberts charged that Obergefell would make it difficult for the Court in
the future to coherently deny a polygamist’s claim to constitutional protection.
But the majority repeatedly stressed the dyadic quality of the plaintiffs’ same-sex
relationships. The Court held, in other words, that the Constitution knows
marriage and knows that it is monogamous. Although the majority said little
specifically in support of its favorable judgment about monogamy, in fact there
are obvious principled grounds upon which to distinguish polygamy from
monogamy, to the great disadvantage of the former, namely, the impossibility of
mutuality, equality, and reciprocity in plural marriages. In polygamy, for example,
each of a man’s multiple wives has just the one husband, while the one husband
has multiple wives. Each wife’s relationship with the other wives introduces an
additional asymmetry in the “family,” for the wives form a cohort of sorts. The
husband is a solo practitioner. What emerges from Roberts’ reductio is not that
the Obergefell majority would be defenseless against, say, some persons’
conscientious claims that polygamy is essential to their concept of existence. This
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conservative view, if all American jurisdictions adopted same-sex
marriage, there would be nothing constitutionally objectionable about it.94
So, too, evidently, polygamy.95
Any conservative “reversal” of Obergefell would therefore look like a
conservative “reversal” of Roe. The Chief Justice wrote: “The people of a
State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex couples, or to retain
the historic definition.”96 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, added
in his own dissent that the “law can recognize as marriage whatever sexual
attachments and living arrangements it wishes, and can accord them
favorable civil consequences, from tax treatment to rights of
inheritance.”97 He continued, “Those civil consequences—and the public
approval that conferring the name of marriage evidences—can perhaps
have adverse social effects, but no more adverse than the effects of many
other controversial laws.”98 Justice Alito, writing for himself and for

is surely the money line in his reductio, and it reflects the dissenting
conservatives’ exaggeration of the role that the Mystery Passage plays in
Obergefell’s reasoning. It is rather clearer that the dissenters, precisely because
of their inveterate philosophical abstinence, would be unable to find a
constitutional infirmity in state laws sanctioning polygamy.
94. Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) included
several favorable comments about same-sex marriage in the dissent. “Petitioners
make strong arguments rooted in social policy and considerations of
fairness. . . . Th[eir] position has undeniable appeal . . . .” Id. at 686 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting). “[T]he policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex
couples may be compelling.” Id. “Many people will rejoice at [today’s] decision,
and I begrudge none their celebration.” Id.
If you are among the many Americans—of whatever sexual
orientation—who favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means
celebrate today’s decision. Celebrate the achievement of a desired goal.
Celebrate the opportunity for a new expression of commitment to a
partner. Celebrate the availability of new benefits. But do not celebrate
the Constitution. It had nothing to do with it.
Id. at 713 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
95. In his dissent (joined by Justice Thomas) in the 2013 case where the Court
invalidated the federal Defense of Marriage Act’s limitation of “marriage” in all
federal usages of the term to the male-female couple, Justice Scalia wrote: “It is
enough to say that the Constitution neither requires nor forbids our society to
approve of same-sex marriage, much as it neither requires nor forbids us to
approve of no-fault divorce, polygamy, or the consumption of alcohol.” See
Windsor, 570 U.S. at 795 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 686 –77 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 713 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Id. Justice Scalia added, also (I think) gratuitously:
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Justices Scalia and Thomas, added, “The question in these cases, however,
is not what States should do about same-sex marriage but whether the
Constitution answers that question for them. It does not. The Constitution
leaves that question to be decided by the people of each State.”99
The premise underlying all these criticisms—that the Constitution
does not know marriage—is obviously of a piece with the conservative
constitutionalists’ characteristic aversion to philosophizing. That
philosophical abstinence led the Obergefell dissenters, unfortunately, into
a series of grave mistakes and therefore to miss opportunities for cogent
criticism of Kennedy’s majority opinion. The dissenters’ reticence also
caused them to misunderstand the majority’s reliance on the Mystery
Passage.100 The conservatives’ reticence obscured from their view the
dispositive argument made by the Court, upon which the conservatives did
not lay a glove. The conservatives also made several unsound
counterarguments, some of them radically mistaken. They missed their
opportunity to make one argument that would have dramatically reduced
the scope of the majority’s adoption of same-sex marriage, and another
which would have been decisive against it.
That is a pretty long list of conservative miscues. Herewith a bill of
particulars.
First. Although the word “marriage” does not appear in it, the
Constitution certainly requires federal public authorities, including judges,
to reach outside the four corners of it to identify, ratify, and promote real
marriage. The Chief Justice’s summation of the baseline conservative
claim—the “Constitution itself says nothing about marriage, and the
Framers thereby entrusted the States with ‘[t]he whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife’”101—suffers from a certain
constitutional illogic. The Constitution’s literal silence is not decisive. The
word “slavery” is famously absent from the Constitution, yet the concept
and reality of human bondage is surely there. Nowhere does the word

Id.

[I]t is not of special importance to me what the law says about marriage.
It is of overwhelming importance, however, who it is that rules me.
Today’s decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million
Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers on the
Supreme Court.

99. Id. at 736 (Alito, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 662–63.
101. Id. at 690 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
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“church” appear in the First Amendment. Yet one can make no sense of
that provision’s origins or meaning without knowing what a “church” is.102
Besides, what is “entrusted” to the states is not “thereby” entirely
foreign to the national government. Congress and, in subordinate ways,
the federal courts and the national executive, have plenary charge of
domestic relations in the capital district,103 within the military,104 and over
the vast territories that from 1789 have been parts of our nation.105 In all
these contexts the Constitution requires the national government to not
only know what marriage is. Across the whole range of federal powers—
from the “marriage” penalty in the Internal Revenue Code, to the implicit
proviso in the Mann Act prohibition on transporting a female across state
lines for “immoral” purposes, to various anti-nepotism provisions
pertaining to one’s “spouse”—a proper exercise of national authority
depends upon an independent federal understanding of marriage. Our
fundamental law requires federal authorities to identify the nature,
meaning, and value of marriage, and to develop appropriate public policies
toward it in light of that independent account.106
By the late 19th century, the Supreme Court had developed several
doctrines about marriage that penetrated the shell of state sovereignty. The
1894 Act that enabled Utah to enter the Union included the provision that
“polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited.”107 This
commitment to monogamy built upon decades of conflict with Mormons
102. Part V of this Article explores in considerable detail the original
understanding of the Religion Clauses. Here it is worth noting that, although the
word “religion” appears in the text of the Constitution, the Supreme Court long
ago recognized that it is “not defined in the Constitution. We must go elsewhere,
therefore, to ascertain its meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we think,
than to the history of the times in the midst of which the provision was adopted.”
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878). Any such excursion must
sensibly seek to identify a definition of religion that fits within, and makes sense
of, the non-establishment and free exercise norms themselves. Those norms make
no sense whatsoever if “religion” is defined as it is under the aegis of the Mystery
Passage: each one’s tailor-made worldview or spiritual brand. Those norms only
make sense when “religion” is understood to be about organized bodies of
religious believers with doctrines, modes of worship, communal disciplinary
rules, and a governing structure. Those norms make sense, in other words, only if
the concept of churches is understood to be as much a part of the Constitution as
the words of the document themselves are parts.
103. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
104. See id.
105. See id. art. IV, § 3.
106. See also infra note 111.
107. Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 107 (1894).
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over plural marriage, struggles that brought out the strategic constitutional
dialectic between our political institutions (a free people living under a
republican government) and marriage. In 1878, the Supreme Court
declared that “it may safely be said there never has been a time in any State
of the Union when polygamy has not been an offence against society,
cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more or less
severity.”108 Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is
nevertheless a civil contract and usually regulated by law. “Upon it society
may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and
social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily
required to deal.”109 The Court concluded that “according as monogamous
or polygamous marriages are allowed, do we find the principles on which
the government of the people, to a greater or less extent, rests.”110
Even the Obergefell Court paid homage to this vital dialectic between
the legally sanctioned family and our constitutional form of government.
The majority quoted from the 1888 Supreme Court decision in Maynard
v. Hill,111 where the Court explained that marriage is “the foundation of
the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress.”112 Marriage, the Maynard Court said, has long
been “a great public institution, giving character to our whole civil
polity.”113 All testimony of this sort is unintelligible on the contemporary
conservative contention that the Constitution is a stranger to marriage.
For more than 50 years this constitutional definition of marriage has
been sharpened, extended, and emphasized. In Loving v. Virginia, the
Constitution acknowledged that marriage is not the kind of thing that has
any essential racial component; it presupposed that it is simply the union
of two persons, male and female.114 The Constitution also “knows” that
108. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165. In Windsor Justice Scalia wrote (for himself
and for Justice Thomas) of
the Federal Government’s long history of making pronouncements
regarding marriage—for example, conditioning Utah’s entry into the
Union upon its prohibition of polygamy. See Act of July 16, 1894, ch.
138, §3, 28 Stat. 108 (“The constitution [of Utah]” must provide “perfect
toleration of religious sentiment,” “Provided, That polygamous or plural
marriages are forever prohibited”).
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 792 n.4 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.
110. Id. at 165–66.
111. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
112. Id. at 211.
113. Id. at 213 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Noel v. Ewing, 9
Ind. 37, 50 (1857)) (emphasis added).
114. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 239

5/26/21 11:50 AM

1348

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

marriage is potentially procreative, insofar as Griswold established the
married couple’s prerogative to decide about pregnancy by accessing
contraceptives without state interference.115 Again, it is scarcely
intelligible to say, as the conservatives effectively do, that the Constitution
includes a “fundamental right to marry,” where “marry” means nothing in
itself and could be anything a state says it is.116
Second. The conservatives focused their fire on the majority’s use of
the Mystery Passage. The Obergefell Court said that there were “four
principles and traditions” that are “the reasons marriage is fundamental
under the Constitution.”117 After surveying them, these Justices said
through Justice Kennedy that these reasons “apply with equal force to
same-sex couples.”118 Three of the “principles” were pure Mystery
115. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
116. The near unintelligibility of the dissenters’ view that the Constitution
does not know what marriage is, is palpably evident if one tries to make sense of
the Obergefell majority’s unexceptional recitation of settled law, circa 2015, by
inserting a Rorschach inkblot whenever the word “marriage” appears in key
passages from those cases. Consider the following thought experiment, in other
words, bringing to the mind’s eye a total white-out each time the word “marry”
(or cognates) appears. “Although Loving arose in the context of racial
discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right
to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals.” Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978). Long ago, in Maynard v. Hill, the Court characterized
marriage as “the most important relation in life,” and as “the foundation of the
family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress.” Maynard, 125 U.S. at 205, 211. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court
recognized that the right “to marry, establish a home and bring up children” is a
central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). And in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
marriage was described as “fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race.” 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). More recent decisions have established that the
right to marry is part of the fundamental “right of privacy” implicit in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the
Court observed:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than
our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty,
not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (internal citations omitted).
117. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 665 (2015).
118. Id.
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Passage. (The fourth included the just-mentioned citation to Maynard v.
Hill; we shall return to this “principle” later.) The first three were stairstep transformations of the meaning and value of marriage wrought by the
Casey “heart of liberty.” The first was about individual liberty: “the right
to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of
individual autonomy.”119 The second was about the couples’ liberty: the
“right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union
unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.”120 The
third was about that liberty of the family: “Without the recognition,
stability, and predictability marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma
of knowing their families are somehow lesser.”121
In Obergefell, the Court utterly transposed marriage into categories of
the heart or, more accurately, suffused it with the vocabulary and meanings
associated with the fragile psyche, and brittle self-esteem, of persons
inventing their own social world. It was a creative performance indeed.
But this part of Obergefell is not the brazen Lochnerizing that the
dissenters say it is. Kennedy’s claims here do not appeal to any putative
truth about marriage, or “theory” of it assertedly preferred by the majority,
and then muscled into the Constitution by them. These “principles” instead
rely upon the Court’s own recent precedents, on which the majority
performed an elementary logical operation. The cogency of the majority’s
argument depends, in other words, not upon their conviction that same-sex
couples should be allowed to marry, but upon what they say the prior cases
show. They were not right about these cases, but they were not entirely
wrong, for the full-orbed expression of the Mystery-Passage version of
marriage had been a half-century in the making. By 2015, the majority’s
first three “principles” could claim that much respectable pedigree. And
the logical operation—that, given these reasons for constitutionally
treating marriage as fundamental, same-sex couples could benefit by
marrying as much as could anyone else—is sound.
Most simply put: Obergefell did not depend upon the majority
Justices’ philosophical putsch. Their work was innovative, to be sure. But
their invention was not a definition of marriage from speculative wholecloth. The majority’s reliance upon the first three of the “four reasons”
already canvassed was straightforward, and honest, in its way. The
conclusion they drew—namely, that there is nothing essentially
procreative and therefore heterosexual about marriage—followed well
enough from decades of overhauling our constitutional conception of
119. Id.
120. Id. at 666.
121. Id. at 668.
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liberty itself according to the solipsism implicit in the Mystery Passage.
The judicial conservatives’ quarrel is, then, not with Lochner or with any
philosophe. It is with nearly 50 years of their own precedents—a
generation or so before, and a generation or so after—Planned Parenthood
v. Casey.
Third. The conservatives’ main counterargument whiffed.
Chief Justice Roberts asserted that “the marriage laws at issue here do
not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because distinguishing between
opposite-sex and same-sex couples is rationally related to the States’
‘legitimate state interest’ in ‘preserving the traditional institution of
marriage.’”122 The dissenters’ whole argument centered upon what
Roberts called, quite precisely, “the historic definition” of marriage;123 its
qualifications for being so featured consisted, then, of the fact that it had
long been what the states had chosen to do with their (assertedly, per the
conservatives) unfettered constitutional authority over domestic relations.
The majority’s position, though, was that, although “[t]he limitation
of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and
just,” its “inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right
to marry is now manifest.”124 And this “fundamental right to marry” was,
circa 2015, little more than the Mystery Passage at large. Here the majority
could have bluntly confronted the Holmes of Lochner with the Holmes of
The Path of the Law. The latter Holmes declared that it “is revolting to
have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the
time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it
was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past.”125 As far as it goes, this criticism is sound: that
122. Id. at 707 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 687 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 670–71 (emphasis added).
125. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
469 (1897). Other dissenting arguments more specifically reliant upon the
historical circumstances surrounding ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
fare no better. They hanker to be originalist criticisms of the Court’s creative
work. But they founder upon unsound uses of history. Justice Scalia, for example,
wrote that “[w]hen the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868, every State
limited marriage to one man and one woman, and no one doubted the
constitutionality of doing so. That resolves these cases.” Obergefell, 576 U.S. at
615 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is hard to see how this works as a criticism of the
Obergefell Court’s reasoning. The Constitution is not interpreted rightly by
imagining its contemporary meaning to be the contents of a snapshot of moments
frozen in time, especially where it seems that the dominant claim is, as it is here
with Justice Scalia, that the Fourteenth Amendment was not meant to even address
“domestic relations.” It is just as certain that when the Fourteenth Amendment
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a law is old is not itself any reason at all to think that it is either just, or
compatible with an evolving Constitution.
In any event, the conservatives should have rebutted the majority’s
“four principles” strategy more boldly than they did. The right answer to
Kennedy would have been that, while the Court’s identity-reinforcing
account of marriage had gained steam over the last few decades (just as
the Mystery Passage consolidated its hold on “liberty”), that movement
undermines the case for why civil law singles out marriage and makes it
such a focal point for favored treatment and manifold benefits, compared
to non-marital sexual, and other non-sexual relationships. The Obergefell
Court succeeded in reducing marriage’s importance to public order, not in
re-founding it. This response would have cleared the way for the
conservatives to label the majority’s strategy for what it was, namely, a
classic bait-and-switch: the Court blithely transferred the dividends of
Americans’ investment over the centuries in procreative marriage to the
was ratified almost every state banned interracial marriage. Few doubted that the
Constitution permitted such bans. Still, Loving v. Virginia was rightly decided in
1967, and it held such laws to be unconstitutional. The Obergefell majority also
makes a convincing case that marriage today is the predicate of thousands of
government benefits so that its role in personal affairs and social life has
dramatically changed since 1868. The majority could thus reasonably say in
response to Scalia that what might have been tolerable in the legal circumstances
of marriage in 1868 is no longer tolerable. Similar reasoning about public
education allowed the Court in 1954 to hold that segregated public schools
violated the Equal Protection Clause, notwithstanding that, by the Brown Court’s
own admission, the evidence of Fourteenth Amendment framers’ and ratifiers’
intent was inconclusive on desegregated schools.
Justice Thomas in his Obergefell dissent observed:
Laws defining marriage as between one man and one
woman . . . arose . . . out of a desire “to increase the likelihood that
children will be born and raised in stable and enduring family units by
both the mothers and the fathers who brought them into this world.”
Id. at 730 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This is a historical origins story, however,
and has no natural tendency to serve as a contemporary justification for limiting
marriage to the man-woman union. In any event, “laws defining marriage as
between one man and one woman” no doubt instead “arose” from the stable
conviction that it was the truth about marriage, and not from any calculation about
“family units.” Besides, and as the majority said:
If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then received
practices could serve as their own continued justification and new groups
could not invoke rights once denied. This Court has rejected that
approach, both with respect to the right to marry and the rights of gays
and lesbians.
Id. at 671.
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Justices’ new Mystery-Passage account of civil marriage. Obergefell
terminated that marriage, which had truly been the keystone of the nation’s
social order,126 and substituted a counterfeit in its place. Maynard v. Hill
is witness to the crucial societal importance of marriage. Alas, the Court
replaced that marriage with something quite different in 2015.
Fourth. The “four principles” passages form one of two independent
grounds for the holding in Obergefell. The other is sufficient to support
the result. It smacks nothing of Lochner or of the Mystery Passage. The
dissenters do not lay a glove on it.
In this alternative rationale, the Obergefell majority takes the states’
marital legal regimes just as the states’ public authorities made them with
their constitutional power to do as they please about domestic relations,
per the conservative view. The majority Justices then examined critically
the internal logic of those nests of state laws. Their key observation was
that the states do not, as a matter of fact, maintain marriage as a procreative
union. Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority:
An ability, desire, or promise to procreate is not and has not been
a prerequisite for a valid marriage in any State. In light of
precedent protecting the right of a married couple not to procreate,
it cannot be said the Court or the States have conditioned the right
to marry on the capacity or commitment to procreate. The
constitutional marriage right has many aspects, of which
childbearing is only one.127
So, “the right to marry is [no] less meaningful for those who do not or
cannot have children.”128 The majority easily drew the desired conclusion:
“There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with
respect to this principle.”129
The majority is right. Excluding same-sex couples from state marital
regimes so described is arbitrary. That exclusion indeed lacks the “rational
basis” that is the minimum predicate of constitutionality for any state law,
including those governing “domestic relations.” On any understanding of
marriage that strips it of an essential orientation toward procreation, there
is no non-arbitrary basis upon which to say that no same-sex couple may
marry. This is surely the lesson of experience, as what we could call

126.
127.
128.
129.
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“activist” court after court over the last 25 years or so held.130 These courts
all saw that, once the procreative nature of marriage is tossed aside,
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples lacks a “rational basis.”
The conservatives had no answer for this alternative justification for
the majority’s holding. The strongest statement of their only line of
response was probably this carefully constructed statement by Justice
Alito in an opinion that Justices Scalia and Thomas joined: “For millennia,
marriage was inextricably linked to the one thing that only an oppositesex couple can do: procreate.”131 So it was. But this historical claim is also
made by the majority.132 The dissenters fail to dent the majority’s assertion
that state marriage law has in fact moved beyond this early stage of its
development.
Fifth. Finally, here is what appears to be the conservatives’ argument
against the no-rational-basis position. Alito wrote: “Adherents to different
schools of philosophy use different terms to explain why society should
formalize marriage and attach special benefits and obligations to persons
who marry.”133 This could have been the opening move in a critical
engagement with the truth about marriage as procreative. It could have
served as a ventilator to vivify a tradition alleged by the majority to be
moribund, superseded. It was not. For then Alito slipped back into the
customary conservative philosophical abstinence: “Here, the States
defending their adherence to the traditional understanding of marriage
have explained their position using the pragmatic vocabulary that
characterizes most American political discourse.”134 He continued, “Their
basic argument is that States formalize and promote marriage, unlike other
fulfilling human relationships, in order to encourage potentially
procreative conduct to take place within a lasting unit that has long been
thought to provide the best atmosphere for raising children.”135 Alito here
attributes to the states a legitimate interest in promoting a stand-alone state
of affairs—the circumstances most conducive to successfully rearing
children—and then the conclusion that a particular arrangement is the
“best” way to do that.
In this counterargument, male-female marriage is not an alternative
philosophical account of what marriage is. It is not a critically justified
conception of a basic social institution. It is not an argument about basic
130. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. Dep’t
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
131. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 738 (Alito, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 667–68.
133. Id. at 739 (Alito, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id.
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human goods grasped as distinct aspects of human fulfillment. When Alito
says “pragmatic,” he falls into line with the majority’s methodology: the
nature and importance of civil marriage are dependent on extrinsic
considerations. Alito infers from what one could call the “best interests”
of children that states may, not must, limit civil marriage to the union of a
man and a woman.
In Obergefell, Alito was joined by Scalia and Thomas. Their position
goes back at least to 2003. In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Scalia wrote in a
dissent joined by Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist: “[W]hat
justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage
to homosexual couples exercising ‘the liberty protected by the
Constitution’? Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since the
sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.”136 No one on the Obergefell
Court suggested otherwise. Neither the truth that marriage is essentially a
procreative relationship, nor any other putative truth about marriage, is in
the picture. The conservatives would characteristically detour around that
taboo ground and defend marriage on what Alito described as these

136. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
Justice answered his own question about as well as he could, given the premise
which he took on board (that marriage must not be promoted by law for its
procreative orientation). Scalia opined that the “people may feel that their
disapprobation of homosexual conduct is strong enough to disallow homosexual
marriage, but not strong enough to criminalize private homosexual acts—and may
legislate accordingly.” Id. at 604. He added that “‘preserving the traditional
institution of marriage’ is just a kinder way of describing the State’s moral
disapproval of same-sex couples.” Id. at 601. This answer presupposes that legal
access to marriage is within the gift of “the people,” a privilege which might be
rightly withheld or granted according to criteria extrinsic to marriage itself.
But this is a radically unsound understanding of the relationship between
marriage and the civil law. Marriage is a natural institution that the political
community is bound to recognize and promote, not to give and take as it pleases,
according to some external criteria of “disapproval.” Besides, the Justice’s answer
kicks the can of rational justification down the road to a no-man’s-land of opaque
disapproval: upon what reasoned basis would that originating “disapprobation”
rest? Surely not marriage itself as the critical principle of a true sexual morality
which naturally excludes sodomy. For on the view proffered by Scalia,
homosexuals’ and lesbians’ marital disqualification follows from the
“disapprobation.” Is this “disapprobation” based on feelings of disgust? A deepseated animus against certain people? On entirely theological premises? If so, then
in our constitutional system, limiting marriage to the male-female couple really
does lack a “rational basis.”
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“pragmatic” and “reasonable secular grounds for restricting marriage to
opposite-sex couples.”137
This “best atmosphere for kids” rationale is a misstep of the gravest
sort. One reason is that it is not an argument against same-sex marriage at
all. All that it tends to show—and that, clumsily—is that same-sex couples
should not be raising children. That has nothing itself to do with lawful
marriage between persons who are, after all, incapable of procreation.
Besides, Alito’s “best atmosphere” argument centers on social scientific
comparisons of kids in homes headed by same-sex couples compared to
mother-and-father homes. Friends of traditional marriage in the long runup to Obergefell promoted studies that tended to show that there was a
difference in favor of opposite-sex households.138 They argued correctly
that the “no-difference” or “just-as-good” studies of same-sex households
up to Obergefell were so limited in their sample size, or so flawed in other
ways, as to be social-scientifically useless. They pointed rightly to a small
number of reliable studies—most notably by University of Texas scholar

137. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 739 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The
emphasis is added to the text to highlight two deeper flaws flowing from
conservatives’ aversion to philosophical thinking. One is the grim prospect that
the conservative Justices think that the only satisfactory bases for defining
marriage as the procreative union of a man and a woman are religious, which
are—because they are religious—ineligible in proper constitutional argument, at
least according to certain understandings of the First Amendment’s Religion
Clauses. But that ignores the fact that marriage can be and long has been identified
as the male-female union oriented towards having children across cultures and by
religious and non-religious peoples alike. Unaided human reason affirms that it is
a unique and invaluable relationship, the true form of marriage. Another
possibility suggested by Alito’s conclusion is the equation of “secular”
(understood as permissible, non-religious grounds for lawmaking in our
constitutional order) with the “pragmatic,” that is, with social-scientific statistical
reasoning. But there is no good reason to exclude from the proper grounds for
lawmaking under our Constitution the philosophical truth about what marriage is,
and the moral truth that it is the normative context for having sex and for having
kids.
138. See, e.g., Ryan T. Anderson, In Defense of Marriage, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION (Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.heritage.org/marriage-and-family/
commentary/defense-marriage [https://perma.cc/82ZF-S7J9] (“Marriage exists to
bring a man and a woman together as husband and wife to be father and mother
to any children their union produces. Marriage is based on the biological fact that
reproduction depends on a man and a woman, and on the social reality that
children need a mother and a father. And as ample social science has shown,
children tend to do best when reared by their mother and father.”).
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Mark Regnerus—which were probative as social science, and which
indicated better such results in more traditional households.139
The “best atmosphere” argument focuses on sundry indicia of
nonmoral competence and well-being, such as academic achievement,
truancy rates, reported self-esteem, and ability to make friends. These are
good things. They are not, however, measures of human flourishing in any
morally significant sense. The class valedictorian could be a rotten kid.
Troubled students are often very good people. The most popular girl in the
high school can be the worst brat—and so on. Many children undeniably
do better in same-sex households than do many children raised by their
married, biological mother and father. Many of the former are simply
better parents than many of the latter, measured by such metrics as truancy,
self-esteem, and so on. The precise takeaway from the “best atmosphere”
argument then would be, not that no gay or lesbian couples may marry,
but that some should not be raising children—just as some opposite-sex
couples should not be raising children. Yet no one seriously suggests that
certain opposite-sex cohorts, say, couples without any college attendance
or where one has a criminal conviction or where each is a child of divorced
or alcoholic parents, not be permitted to marry because statistically such
couples turn out more maladjusted kids than, for example, an educated
same-sex couple. Why should the state vet only same-sex couples, one by
one?
The truth is that, if two men or two women can really marry, then the
state would act unjustly if it prohibited them from doing so, even if some
cohort of which they are members bears a slight statistical deficit
according to certain metrics of psychological or emotional well-being for
any children who come to the union. On the other hand, if two men or two
women cannot really marry, that is why the law should not permit them to
do so. For permitting them to marry would not be a more or less harmless,
numerically minor addition to the roster of legally married couples. It
would instead be an unprecedented redefinition of marriage for everyone.
That new understanding of “marriage” would be as the companionate
relationship of two adults who might (or might not) decide to have or
acquire children. The psychosocial prospects for children—whatever they
are—play no role in a sound approach to what the state should understand
marriage to be.140
139. See, e.g., Matthew J. Franck, Mark Regnerus and the Storm over the New
Family Structures Study, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (Oct. 30, 2012), https://www
.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/10/6784/ [https://perma.cc/2XBR-JCCL].
140. The Obergefell majority stated an objection to its position that was in the
neighborhood of sound arguments against recognizing same-sex marriage. But
neither the majority nor the dissenters provided the philosophical ballast needed
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Sixth. It is of course true that, according to American law, the sterile
and the elderly are allowed to marry. They always have been, even in
polities and institutions, such as the Catholic Church, that have
unwaveringly held that marriage is a procreative union of man and
woman.141 This fact should probably have made the conservative Justices
pause. So, too, their generally modest requirements of coherence in
legislation. It is easy to imagine Justice Scalia, for example, observing that
marital access for the sterile owes to counterpressures upon a procreative
definition of marriage exerted by concern for bodily and medical data
privacy—and that access for the elderly owes to lobbying by the AARP.
Justice Scalia, among others, nonetheless evidently supposed that
linking marriage to procreation implies or entails that infertile or elderly
opposite-sex couples need be barred from legal marriage, on pain of a
constitutionally fatal contradiction between the stated aim of the marriage
law (to promote it as a procreative union) and its operational coverage.142
This practically perfect fit between legislative purpose and the practical
coverage of a law is not required in any area of our constitutional law.
Nothing like it is required with regard to any other essential features of
marriage. Those who would define marriage as the lasting, intimate,
loving, mutual commitment of any two partners—as the Supreme Court
did in Obergefell—never suggest that public authority must interrogate
engaged couples to be certain that they really love each other, truly will
to make this objection cogent. “The respondents also argue allowing same-sex
couples to wed will harm marriage as an institution by leading to fewer oppositesex marriages. This may occur, the respondents contend, because licensing samesex marriage severs the connection between natural procreation and marriage.”
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 679. Of course, the working premise of the Court’s
thinking in Obergefell was that the “connection” had been already “severed.” The
force of the “harm” evidently in view depended upon circling back to the
contested question about “best atmosphere”: if children do as well in same-sex
households, how would expanding marriage to include those domiciles “harm”
children? The Court had an additional reply: “[W]ith respect to this asserted basis
for excluding same-sex couples from the right to marry, it is appropriate to
observe these cases involve only the rights of two consenting adults whose
marriages would pose no risk of harm to themselves or third parties.” Id. The real
“harm” of requiring equal treatment of same-sex and opposite-sex relationships
as “marriages,” however, is that it falsely teaches that marriage is, as such, a sterile
relationship. To see the “harm” here, though, requires allowing the truth about
marriage to surface in legal arguments.
141. 1983 CODE c.1055, reprinted in NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF
CANON LAW 1240 (John P. Beal et al. eds., 2000).
142. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604–05 (2003); Obergefell, 576 U.S.
at 665–66.
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provide mutual support, genuinely intend to stay together permanently, or
ever intend to have sex with each other. Why should it be so very different
when it comes to procreation?
In any event: how would the law identify couples as fit for the
procreative aspect of marriage, other than by requiring them to be one male
and one female? Should engaged men and women have to submit to the
medical tests necessary to ascertain, to a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty, that each is in good working order? Should couples be required
to affirm under penalty of perjury that they intend to procreate? If so, is
there to be a date certain for the happy event, after which their marriage
license is revoked? Is revocation required, too, for married couples who
try to have kids, but cannot do so because of infertility arising or
discovered after their wedding? What about an engaged couple who says
that they are “uncertain” about kids? Or that they “would like” to have
some? May they marry, or not? As the Minnesota court in Baker v Nelson
(the 1972 decision affirmed summarily by the U.S. Supreme Court, but
overruled in Obergefell) wrote, any such regimen is bound to be both
“unrealistic” and “offensive,” and would likely invade couples’
constitutionally protected privacy.143
Another entrance requirement for marriage on almost any account of
it is that the persons marrying possess the maturity and character needed
to consent to a lasting, life-defining commitment. But no state apparatchik
in America demands that an engaged couple prove that they possess the
requisite maturity. Civil authorities instead presume that men and women
over a certain age are up to the task. In truth, getting a marriage license is
no more complicated than registering a car. In each case you just need to
be 18, willing, and have a few dollars to spend.
Common sense and justice thus exclude any state-instigated, case-bycase sorting of opposite-sex couples from the banns of matrimony. The
Baker court rightly said that “the classification is no more than
theoretically imperfect. . . . ‘[A]bstract symmetry’ is not demanded by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”144 When all is said and done, it is plainly the
case that conscientious legislators who believe that marriage is essentially
oriented to procreation would do exactly what our laws have always done,
namely, limit it to consenting men and women.
Seventh, and last. If the conservatives had not conceded as early as
2003 the point fatal to their position, they could instead in 2015 have built
upon it a more cogent version of the “best atmosphere” argument. This
second meaning of “best atmosphere” is morally normative.
143. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971).
144. Id.
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It is how Justice John Harlan in 1961, for example, described marriage
and its strategic place in the law, in his Poe v. Ullman dissent:
[T]he very inclusion of the category of morality among state
concerns indicates that society is not limited in its objects only to
the physical well-being of the community, but has traditionally
concerned itself with the moral soundness of its people as
well. . . . The laws regarding marriage which provide both when
the sexual powers may be used and the legal and societal context
in which children are born and brought up, as well as laws
forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual practices which
express the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to
lawful marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the
substance of our social life that any constitutional doctrine in this
area must build upon that basis.145
Harlan rightly observed that marriage had long been—and still was,
in the mid-20th century—the morally normative context for having
children and for having sex. The law recognized and enforced this
understanding of marriage as morally sound, and promoted it for the sake,
too, of the political community’s flourishing—the keystone in the arch of
our social order.
Justice Alito could have built well upon Harlan’s foundation—itself
no more than the distillation of Americans’ belief and practice of marriage
over the centuries—and said that each child has a profound interest in, and
natural right to, being conceived and nurtured by a man and a woman
whose causative intercourse expressed their commitment to cooperate as
father and mother in his or her gestation, nurture, care, and education
through to adulthood. Marriage is the social institution that is
systematically set up to give effect to that profound interest and right. For
when the spouses’ marital acts bear the fruit of children, these children are
perceptively called in the law “issue of the marriage.”146 “Issue” has long
145. 367 U.S. 497, 545–46 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Roberts in his Obergefell dissent tellingly replaced the references to “adultery,
fornication and homosexual practices” with ellipses. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 702
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Justice Harlan explained that ‘laws regarding
marriage which provide both when the sexual powers may be used and the legal
and societal context in which children are born and brought up . . . form a pattern
so deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis.’”).
146. See, e.g., Barnes v. Jeudevine, 718 N.W.2d 311, 314 (Mich. 2006) (“We
recently reemphasized that ‘[t]he presumption that children born or conceived
during a marriage are the issue of that marriage is deeply rooted in our statutes
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been a term of art in legal accounts of the family, especially when it
concerns inheritances and wills. This term signals the truth that children
embody or actualize their parents’ marriage. Just as the married couple is
two-in-one-flesh, so too each child is the two-of-them-in-the-one-flesh.
The child comes to be as their marriage. He or she is their union. Each of
their offspring is the marriage of its mother and father—extended into
time and space, and thus into human history and into the human
community.147
Children come to be not only on terms of equal dignity with their
parents. They come to be on similar terms with each other as well. Because
all the married couple’s children come to be in and through the same act—
the marital act—separated only by time, all the children are equally and
wholly the image (the embodiment, the expression) of their parents’
unique union. The siblings’ family identity is just that: a matter of identity.
All the children are equally and wholly the offspring of the same parents;
mother and father are equally and wholly parents of each child, in whom
they see (literally) so many unique, yet related and, in a sense, identical
expressions of their own union. For each child is their flesh, their marriage.
Each child is them.
This web of familial equality, mutuality, and common identity is the
wellspring of the love, duty, and loyalty that we see, and that we expect to
find, among siblings. It is vital to emphasize here the complex matrix of
connectedness, where biological unity yields a metaphysical oneness for
the parents, whose two-in-one-flesh communion opens up to the gift of
children, whose identities and status cement the sublime unity of that
family. This unity includes the various moral duties that each family
member owes to the others. It also includes something else that even
shirkers can never escape, namely, their identity as son or daughter of this
mother and this father, and as sister or brother to these siblings with whom
one shares relatives, memories, a life. My brothers and sisters are like
me in a way in which no other human person could be like me. My siblings
are more than close friends with whom I have shared many experiences.
and case law’” (quoting In re KH, 677 N.W.2d 800, 806 (Mich. 2004))). For
Justice Alito’s views on the institutions of marriage and the family, see United
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The family is an
ancient and universal human institution. Family structure reflects the
characteristics of a civilization, and changes in family structure and in the popular
understanding of marriage and the family can have profound effects.”).
147. For a development and further defense of the position articulated in the
text, see, for example, SHERIF GIRGIS, RYAN T. ANDERSON & ROBERT P. GEORGE,
WHAT IS MARRIAGE? MAN AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE (2012); John Finnis,
Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good, 91 THE MONIST 388 (2008).
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They are part of me. We are each one of us imprints (actualizations) of the
same unique marriage.148
This radical equality, mutuality, and identity shared by family
members is not mysterious or dreamily metaphysical. These are not
metaphors. They are not symbolic ways of indicating the presence of
emotional ties. The family matrix is as real as anything social scientists
could measure, and much more sublime. The lifelong and unbreakable
cords of fealty and identity that family members possess for each other,
and which even distance and alienation never quite erase, depend on this
biological matrix.149

148. Much of the above three paragraphs are reproduced from Gerard V.
Bradley, The Family Matrix, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (May 7, 2014), https://www
.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/05/13063/ [https://perma.cc/7J6N-2KSM].
149. Someone might object that so much “idealism” about marriage and the
family would “stigmatize” so many ad hoc family units in our society. The reply
is in several parts. First, due respect for and, in a certain sense of the term,
affirmation of everyone is morally required in public deliberations about family
matters, as it is required throughout political life. But it is gravely mistaken to
install (as those propagating the Mystery Passage would) what many mean by
“equal respect” and “affirmation” for each person as the principle of the
authoritative meaning of marriage and family, namely, endorsing whatever one
imagines marriage (for example) to be by dint of respect for the person doing the
imagining. Second, no one seriously maintains that such “equality” of esteem is
more than notional, or that it is a desirable ideal—as anyone who believes in
polygamy, arranged marriages, or child brides in our country today would report.
In other words, “equal affirmation” would abolish all normativity in legal
regulation of domestic relations, an entailment which no one embraces. Lastly,
any serious legal account of the family is limited (so to speak), and for that reason
must accept, as a foreseeable collateral consequence, that it (the account) excludes
and “stigmatizes.”
No normative account of marriage and family could possibly establish a
wholly conforming population. Every such account must include a sensitive—yet
frank—moral evaluation of all those who care for children not born to their marital
union. Step-parents, adoptive parents, aunts, uncles, grandparents, foster parents,
neighbors, institutional workers—all these persons (and more) are
characteristically dedicated and loving. They often provide loving and heroic
service under difficult circumstances. They should be regarded accordingly. There
is compelling reason, nonetheless, to express the regard due to these good people
without implicitly denying that these arrangements, though invaluable, welcome
and needed, are less than ideal.
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III. PUBLIC MORALITY
In his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia identified the ominous
implications of the majority’s reliance in that case on the Mystery Passage.
Joined by Justices Thomas and Rehnquist, he wrote:
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and
obscenity are . . . sustainable only in light of . . . laws based on
moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into
question by today’s decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin
the scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding.150
Scalia explained how the Court’s reasoning in Lawrence was so
forbidding. “The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its
citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are ‘immoral and
unacceptable.’”151 Scalia noted correctly that 17 years earlier, in Bowers v.
Hardwick, the Court held that this was a “legitimate” state interest.152 The
Court in Lawrence reached the opposite conclusion. The majority Justices
wrote that the Texas anti-sodomy law “furthers no legitimate state interest
which can justify its intrusion into the individual’s personal and private
life.”153 Scalia asserted that the Court “embrace[d] . . . Justice Stevens’
declaration in his Bowers dissent, that ‘the fact that the governing majority
in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.’”154
Scalia worried that this embrace “effectively decrees the end of all
morals legislation.”155

150. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 599 (internal citation omitted).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 560.
154. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Id. Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion in Lawrence in which
she said:
[W]e have never held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted
state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause
to justify a law that discriminates among groups of persons. Moral
disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest
under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications must not
be “drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the
law.” Texas’ invocation of moral disapproval as a legitimate state
interest proves nothing more than Texas’ desire to criminalize
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The Lawrence Court placed a bullseye on the laws Scalia listed. By its
own force, Lawrence invalidated not only the anti-sodomy law implicated
there, but also anti-fornication laws and, possibly, laws against adultery as
well.156 That case also proved to be a crucial premise in the run-up to
Obergefell, just as Scalia (against the majority’s denials)157 said it would
be. Justice Scalia saw that Lawrence raised the question of whether the
Constitution permits (as the Court there phrased it) “punishing consenting
adults for private acts.”158 The Court asked “whether the majority may use
the power of the State to enforce [its moral convictions] on the whole
society through operation of the criminal law.”159
Lawrence answered the question forthrightly: the answer in our
constitutional order is no. For support, the Court relied strategically upon
the Mystery Passage, which in Lawrence it recited in full.160 These Justices
noted “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters
pertaining to sex.”161 Lawrence installed consent as the principle of
constitutional sexual morality, finally replacing (in constitutional law)
marriage as that principle.162

homosexual sodomy. But the Equal Protection Clause prevents a State
from creating “a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake.”
Id. at 582–83 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
156. The complicating factor is that adultery is not only a “victimless” sexual
immorality, indicating conduct that, even if it is supposed to be genuinely
immoral, involves harm to the character only of those adults who freely consent
to engage in it. Adultery is different. It also involves breach of trust between the
spouses and misfortune to any children in the home.
157. The majority wrote that its holding “d[id] not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Justice Scalia repeated this
passage in dissent. Then he warned, “Do not believe it.” Id. at 604 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). It was sound advice.
158. Id. at 570.
159. Id. at 571.
160. Id. at 574.
161. Id. at 572.
162. In no case prior to Lawrence had the Court held that non- or extra-marital
sexual relations enjoyed constitutional protection. Even in liberalizing cases such
as Griswold and Eisenstadt, the Court had expressly affirmed that fornication and
adultery (and by implication homosexual sodomy) were “evils” that the states
were empowered under the Constitution to treat as crimes. These cases remained,
in other words, securely in orbit around Justice Harlan’s account of the whole
tradition in Poe v. Ullman.

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 255

5/26/21 11:50 AM

1364

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

Of course, many indisputably sound laws—including those against
treason, trespass, and theft—are based on moral choices. Every lawmaking
act is a moral choice: a choice because there are always reasonable
alternatives in front of the lawmaker (to enact a different law or none at
all) on offer, and a moral choice because the lawmaker’s selection is
governed by what is good for the people. Many laws are laden with mindnumbing detail, data analysis, and technical refinements. These acts of
lawmaking include much merely instrumental reasoning and some
nonmoral evaluative decisions. But even the lawmaker’s selection of this
set of technical prescriptions rather than that set is guided by moral criteria.
All lawmaking is finally justified by considerations of the polity’s
common good, a complex but nonetheless fundamentally moral reality
comprised most importantly of persons’ genuine flourishing.
Scalia did not exaggerate in Lawrence. The Court’s arguments there
threatened to knock down all laws prohibiting immoral conduct that does
no apparent harm to anyone save to the character of those who choose to
engage in the immoral activity, as if they were dominos. This is the
problem often described as legal regulation of “self-regarding” or
“victimless” immoralities. Sexual immoralities have long been the central
case of these laws, and the subject-matter of most debates about them.
Justice Scalia’s list was comprised entirely of them.
It is easy to see how the Lawrence Court could deploy the Mystery
Passage as an existential threat to these laws. It is not exactly that the
Mystery-Passage-guided Justices promulgated a new morality of sex or of
anything else. It is that the Mystery Passage’s Copernican turn, in which
the self-defining person elbows objective morality from center stage,
effectively hollows out the “morals” in morals laws. All that is left then is
the choosing, acting individual, fortified by a morality of consent.
Before the Court distilled that breathtaking liberty in 1992,
homosexual sexual conduct and pornography trafficking had been the key
focal points of not only academic debate, but of concrete political contest
over morals laws for decades.163 The Supreme Court’s first modern
“obscenity” opinion, Roth v United States, came down in 1957,164 the same
year that Britain’s Wolfenden Commission famously recommended that
“homosexual behaviour between consenting adults in private should no
163. For the debates about pornography, see Gerard V. Bradley,
Prolegomenon on Pornography, 41 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 447 (2018). For
one account of the debates over legal tolerance of homosexual acts, see ROBERT
P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY Ch.
2 (1993).
164. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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longer be a criminal offence.”165 For many years thereafter it was generally
assumed, even by those favoring decriminalization of homosexual
behavior, that the question was about the scope of legal tolerance for what
was (again) generally taken to be a real immorality, albeit arguably a
“victimless” one. Protracted arguments in and out of court about
pornography were about how to define the contraband matter, and so about
whether a particular work (say, a nudist colony brochure or the Beat poem
“Howl”) was or was not legally actionable “obscenity.” Almost no one
doubted, though, that “obscenity” enjoyed no First Amendment protection
and could be prosecuted.
The arguments adduced across those mid-century years in favor of
decriminalizing “victimless” sexual immoralities were, as a matter of fact,
mostly second-order, political-moral considerations, such as the limits of
criminal law and its enforcement, doctrines about government antipaternalism, and the perils to a free society of government censorship. To
these concerns, liberationist writers added social-scientific worries about
the undesirable side effects of enforcing morality through law. In
constitutional law affecting pornography, moreover, Supreme Court
Justices confronted intractable challenges defining “obscenity.”166 The
upshot of these arguments was not that sodomy or masturbating to
pornography was a good thing to do. The takeaway was that these were
regrettable, and probably immoral, actions.167
The conclusion to these arguments was not that anyone had a right to
do a moral wrong. No one said that anyone should define himself or herself
in relation to, say, pornography, or by having homosexual sexual relations.
Much less did anyone maintain that society owed errant souls who
nonetheless dared to engage in these acts a positive endorsement. The
165. COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTITUTION, REPORT,
1957, at 25 (UK).
166. See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging that defining hard-core pornography is difficult but
offering that “I know it when I see it”).
167. Herald Price Fahringer was a prominent, self-described First Amendment
“absolutist” who enjoyed considerable success in the 1970s and 1980s defending
pornographers against criminal prosecutions, largely in and around New York
City (where he faced no scarcity of potential clients). He voiced a common, and
quite naïve, prediction among progressive elites of those years when he wrote in
the N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change that “[o]bscenity breeds and
multiplies in the dark crevices of a frightened society preoccupied with a sense of
self-censorship. Once pornography is exposed to the strong sunlight of a
completely free and uninhibited people, its appeal will surely diminish.” Herald
Price Fahringer, If the Trumpet Sounds an Uncertain Note . . ., 8 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 251, 253 (1978).
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issue in these debates was whether the political community should leave
certain misbehaving people alone.168 It was at least tacitly accepted by
168. Important to any history of the Court’s sustained campaign against morals
laws is the fact that the liberal Justices most keen to do away with morals laws
were, in their own minds, anti-elitist—and much less racist—than were the
promoters of morals laws. Justice Tom Clark wrote, “We are in the midst of a
worldwide movement to make ‘the pill’ and abortion available in the slums as
well as on Fifth Avenue.” Tom C. Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A
Constitutional Appraisal, 2 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 6 (1969). Clark highlighted a
recurring Warren Court theme that scholars have neglected: “morals laws” were
one means by which the hypocrites on Fifth Avenue kept poor folks down. This
was thought to be true of gambling prohibitions (elites wagered among themselves
at their posh clubs or traded with respectable bookies, while ghetto numbersrunners got busted, or had to pay off crooked cops to avoid arrest), some sex
offenses, and vagrancy laws. In the 1968 Levy v. Louisiana Court decision, which
established “illegitimacy” as a quasi-suspect class, dissenting Justice John Harlan
sympathized with some state efforts to promote marriage and stable family life by
requiring, for example, that a biological father acknowledge and thus “legitimate”
a “bastard” child to trigger certain inheritance rules. The majority Justices
brusquely denounced these laws as nonetheless punishing innocent babies for the
“sins” of their parents. See generally Gerard V. Bradley, Roe v. Wade at 40, 3
CLAREMONT REV. OF BOOKS (Fall 2013), https://claremontreviewofbooks.com
/roe-v-wade-at-40/ [https://perma.cc/C7AN-QY5F].
Anti-elitism was the sources of the liberals’ (White, Blackmun, Stevens,
Marshall) dissent in the 1991 Barnes v. Glen Theaters case, where the Court
upheld Indiana’s ban on public nudity, as applied to “erotic” dancers at South
Bend’s Kitty Kat Lounge. The dissenters said that:
While the entertainment afforded by a nude ballet at Lincoln Center to
those who can pay the price may differ vastly in content (as viewed by
judges) or in quality (as viewed by critics), it may not differ in substance
from the dance viewed by the person who . . . wants some
“entertainment” with his beer or shot of rye.
501 U.S. 560, 594 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Even the pseudo-scientific-sounding key term in Roe v. Wade sprang
forth from similar class considerations. As Clarke Forsyth shows in his superb
history of the decision (Abuse of Discretion: The Inside Story of Roe v. Wade),
the Justices early in their consideration of Roe (which was first argued on
December 13, 1971, and reargued on October 11, 1972) quickly concluded that
abortion should be legal during the first three months of pregnancy, so as to
equalize access to it for those folks who lacked the resources of the uptown gentry.
The Court was moved to go beyond three months, Forsythe shows, when the
Justices came to believe that a more educated, well-off woman would typically
understand that she was pregnant, take stock of her situation, and decide for or
against abortion, all within 90 days. Poorer, less-schooled women with limited
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nearly all public disputants that marriage was the constitutional principle
of sexual morality. The opinions in the contraception cases (Griswold and
Eisenstadt) are remarkable for the care with which the Justices avoided
even implicit derogation from that principle.169 Indeed, the Supreme Court
did not hold that anyone had a constitutionally protected right to engage
in sexual intercourse outside of marriage until 2003, in Lawrence v.
Texas.170
The point is that, even as the Justices through the mid-20th century
liberalized the morals-law regime they inherited, the reasons they publicly
offered for change were often not frankly moral. These Justices often
detoured around the first-order moral questions, such as: is contraception
truly immoral?, and rested their opinions on sideways considerations of
class and racial equality, as well as broad structural considerations of what
a free and democratic society looks like. In Griswold, for example, the
Court’s conclusion in favor of access to contraception steered clear of
morally judging that practice. The Court finally depended for judgment
instead upon its observation that a criminal law against using
contraceptives invited police intrusion into the marital bedroom, which
would potentially harm marital life more than would tolerating married
access to good medical advice, the jurists further thought, would often need more
time. And so “viability”—the term Roe made famous but which before 1973 had
almost no standing in either law or medicine—became the criterion determining
the legal status of abortion. “Viability” became a cause célèbre in American
constitutional law, but it was never the result of careful biological or medical
investigation. It simply was a convenient way to say that six months was enough
time for any woman to make up her mind about getting an abortion. See generally
Bradley, supra note 42.
This social-class and racial component to the Supreme Court’s anti-morals
laws campaign was no doubt sincerely motivated, and not entirely without
foundation in fact. But it was no doubt most powerfully promoted by the ebbing
conviction on the part of some Justices about the genuine immorality of
“victimless” sex acts or about the social importance of legal concern with them,
or both. Even so, it is crucial to bear in mind that not until 2003 did the Court
establish consent as the constitutional principle of any “morals laws” regime. In
both Griswold and Eisenstadt, for example, the Court explicitly affirmed that both
fornication and adultery were “evils” that government could make criminal.
Sodomy, of course, was potentially criminal under the Constitution up to
Lawrence. Thus, marriage remained the principle of constitutional sexual
morality until then; states were free up to 2003 to make all non- and extra-marital
sexual activity crimes.
169. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972).
170. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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couples’ use of contraceptives. The Court extended this access to
unmarried persons in 1972 in Eisenstadt v. Baird.171 It did so, however,
without
affirming
anything
more—morally
speaking—about
contraception than did Griswold. Eisenstadt was an equality case:
whatever access to contraceptives the Constitution protected for married
couples had to extend to those who are unmarried. The Court affirmed Roe
in 1992, moreover, precisely upon a basis rooted in women’s equality, that
is, upon their ability to participate equally in the nation’s economic and
social life, so long as abortion was legally available in cases where
contraception failed.172
Shards of this older type of arguments persist today. Widely expressed
fear of “censoring” the internet for pornography is perhaps the most
prominent of the survivors. They have all been eclipsed, though, by the
Mystery Passage. The beating heart of today’s liberty denies to the
community any authority to settle what is genuinely immoral, at least
when it comes to sexual matters where there is no obvious injustice done
to a non-consenting party. The Mystery Passage instead distributes
authority over such judgments to the self-defining individual. Sexual
“identity” and sexual “health” have lately emerged as assertedly vital
aspects of human well-being. Each person now apparently requires ready
access to a menu of exploratory sexual options as he develops his own
healthy “sexuality.” What used to be a matter of prudent tolerance within
a morally ordered culture is now all about rights essential to everyone’s
basic well-being, in a culture bereft of an overarching account of what is
good. One is tempted to say that what used to be immunities of sorts for
self-regarding immoral conduct has become instead a straightforward
constitutional right to do a moral wrong. Except that the concepts of
“moral right” and “moral wrong” have lost all traction on the question.
171. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The relevant part of the opinion was this:
If, under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons
cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would
be equally impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy
in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an
association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Id. at 453.
172. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 533 U.S. 833, 843–911
(1992) (joint opinion of Kennedy, Souter, and O’Connor).
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Constitutional conservatives seem to instinctively sense the
contribution of laws enforcing traditional moral norms pertaining to sex to
the overall common good of our political community. It is a bit of a puzzle
why they do. Constitutional conservatives do not say that they value them
as aids to the upright self-constitution of persons, by and through their free
choices of what is genuinely morally worthwhile. At least as
constitutionalists, their methodology blocks the foundational prerequisite
of this possible defense, namely, that the prohibited acts truly are
destructive of moral character. Conservatives do not rely upon the
conservatism famously championed by Lord Patrick Devlin in his debates
with H.L.A. Hart over the legal enforcement of morality. In those
exchanges, Devlin relied upon the social cohesion that, he maintained, was
incidental to legal enactment of a people’s moral beliefs about private
sexual activity, whether or not those beliefs were true or false.173 Although
some of them may in fact hold Devlin’s opinions, America’s constitutional
conservatives have not advanced publicly any such theory of community.
The conservatives’ case for morals laws is strictly constitutional. It is
really their aversion to critical moral reasoning in constitutional cases, in
two steps. The first move is to charge liberal majorities such as that in
Lawrence with inserting their preferred theory of sexual morality into the
Constitution—where, properly interpreted, there is none. Second,
conservatives say that the Constitution leaves legislative majorities free to
judge putatively immoral sexual conduct as they wish and prohibit it as
they please, unless there is a plain constitutional impediment to their doing
so.174
173. See GEORGE, supra note 163, at 48–71.
174. In his 1991 concurring opinion in Barnes v. Glen Theater, Justice Scalia
anticipated his 2003 position in Lawrence, and in both places stated the basic
conservative position succinctly:
Our society prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain
activities not because they harm others but because they are considered,
in the traditional phrase, “contra bonos mores,” i.e., immoral. In
American society, such prohibitions have included, for example,
sadomasochism, cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use, prostitution,
and sodomy. . . . [A]bsent specific constitutional protection for the
conduct involved, the Constitution does not prohibit them simply
because they regulate “morality.”
501 U.S. 560, 575 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). The
Justice in that case characterized Bowers v. Hardwick as a case “upholding
prohibition of private homosexual sodomy enacted solely on ‘the presumed belief
of a majority of the electorate in [the jurisdiction] that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable.’” Id. In Barnes, he wrote that the “purpose of the
Indiana statute, as both its text and the manner of its enforcement demonstrate, is
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We have seen in the first two parts of this Article that there is less to
the first charge than conservatives maintain. The pathway from the first
awakenings of a right to sexual privacy cum autonomy in the Griswold
case, through Roe and Lawrence and on to Obergefell, is less the Lochneresque substantive moral coup than conservatives think it is. The more
liberationist Justices re-founded these cases along the way upon an
interpretation of the constitutional term “liberty” in Casey. That bold move
involved the judgment that what counts as moral value in anyone’s
conduct is not so much the values of the ends sought or in the means
chosen. It is rather the authenticity, and thus self-definition, involved in
the acting itself.
As a matter of meta-ethical value theory, this move is mistaken. In
other words, it is not in fact true that the freedom (or “autonomy” or
alleged “authenticity”) exercised or entailed by choosing constitutes the
sole or even the decisive value of morally significant choice. It is instead
true that, although freedom is essential to self-constitution, freedom is
itself a dependent variable when it comes to the moral worth of our
choices: the freedom exercised in making a morally bad choice (say, to
murder someone) is bad; the freedom exercised in making a morally good
choice (say, saving someone’s life) is good.175 Constitutional
conservatives are not built, however, to argue about matters such as
abortion and marriage on so lofty a basis. Liberal accounts of
constitutional civil liberties are now powerfully supported, too, by
philosophical arguments about the equal personal dignity of everyone,
regardless (it is asserted) of sex, gender, or gender identity, of a sort
generally supported by the Mystery Passage—as these pages show.
Refuting these arguments—as these pages also show—requires resort to
objective moral accounts of human well-being, of a sort which
constitutional conservatives have eschewed.176
Besides, the aggrieved protagonists in Roe, Casey, Lawrence,
Obergefell, and the emergent darling of tomorrow’s constitutional civil
liberties—the misunderstood transgender teen we shall meet in this
to enforce the traditional moral belief that people should not expose their private
parts indiscriminately, regardless of whether those who see them are disedified.”
Id.
175. For a cogent argument in support of the assertions about the value of
freedom in the text, see GEORGE, supra note 163, at 173–82.
176. For example: the only way to refute the Obergefell-ian argument that
denying them the opportunity to enter civil marriages renders same-sex attracted
people second-class citizens begins by showing that it is not that the state would
exclude such persons from a valuable opportunity but that, given what marriage
is, they are intrinsically unable to marry.
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Article’s next section—all make credible claims that the law is visiting
substantial harm upon them. From the Roe Court’s catalogue of
“detriments” imposed by the state where abortion is unavailable, to the
“stigma” and “humiliation” imposed by traditional marriage laws upon
same-sex couples, and on (as we shall shortly see) to the suicidal ideation
afflicting transgender students denied access to the restroom of their
choice:177 all these suffering plaintiffs ask that the civil law remove its
knee from their necks. Neither constitutional conservatives nor anyone
else can plausibly deny that these cited challenges are experienced as real,
and debilitating.
At the psychological level, there is little prospect of defeating the
constitutional arguments built upon these experiences with an alternative
body of psychological evidence.
The only promising path for conservatives to take is one lit by moral
truth. To the Roe plaintiffs, for example, the reply (at least in significant
part) could be: even so, abortion amounts to killing someone, and no one
is, all things considered, better off for killing one’s child in utero, just as
no one is genuinely better off for killing anyone else without justification:
doing so is a morally culpable form of homicide.178 But this reply is

177. See, for example, Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 593
(4th Cir. 2020), where a natal girl presenting in school as male rejected the option
of using a unisex single-stall bathroom at school because it caused “suffer[ing]
from stigma, from urinary tract infections from bathroom avoidance, and from
suicidal thoughts that led to hospitalization.” In the same case, concurring Circuit
Judge Wynn wrote that:
it is important to note that the harm arising from the policy’s message—
that transgender students like Grimm should exist only at the margins of
society, even when it comes to basic necessities like bathrooms—
although foreign to the experiences of many, is not hypothetical. Nor
does the policy merely engender discomfort or embarrassment for
transgender students. Instead, the pain is overwhelming, unceasing, and
existential. In an experience all too common for transgender individuals
(particularly children), early in his junior year at Gloucester High,
Grimm was hospitalized for suicidal thoughts resulting from being in an
environment of “unbearable” stress where “every single day, five days a
week” he felt “unsafe, anxious, and disrespected.”
Id. at 625.
178. For a cogent argument that abortion amounts to homicide, see
CHRISTOPHER KACZOR, THE ETHICS OF ABORTION: WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN
LIFE, AND THE QUESTION OF JUSTICE (2010). For the best argument available that
abortion kills a human person, see PATRICK LEE, ABORTION AND UNBORN HUMAN
LIFE (2d ed. 2010).
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impossible for conservatives who declare that the Constitution is utterly
indifferent to abortion.
In any event, constitutional conservatives have mounted an especially
inept case for moral laws. Conservatives have salvaged some for the time
being, most notably those against obscene pornography179 and against
public nudity even where it is part of a bar-room erotic dance.180 But
prosecutions for obscenity have gone the way of the dodo bird. The last
federal indictment for trafficking adult-actor “obscenity” was originally
handed down in 2007.181 State prosecutions are rare.182 One reason is likely
that there is nothing in any of the Court’s conservative decisions on
“obscenity” which shows that there is anything wrong with it. The Court’s
affirmation in Barnes of Indiana’s ban on nude go-go dancing owed,
moreover, not to anything about the immorality of women dancing naked
to get money from sexually aroused male customers.183 The result in
Barnes rested instead upon considerations of public indecency. The law in
that case would have banned skinny dipping and breast-feeding in public,
neither of which is typically immoral nor meant to be a sexual act at all.
Urinating in public is “indecent,” because it is the kind of thing which
ought to be done privately. The conservatives in Barnes did not identify
anything wrong with nude erotic dancing, save that it, too, involved public
display of what ought to be kept private.184
Prosecutions for trafficking in and even for private possession of child
pornography are numerous. The penalties after conviction are severe.185
179. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
180. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
181. See Indictment, United States v. Isaacs, No. 2:07-CR-00732 (C.D. Cal.
July 24, 2007).
182. See Gerard V. Bradley, The Role of the Criminal Law in Regulating
Pornography, in CRIMINAL LAW AND MORALITY IN THE AGE OF CONSENT:
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 323(Aniceto Masferrer ed., 2020).
183. Barnes, 501 U.S. 560.
184. Id.
185. There was a strong investigative and prosecutorial presence against child
pornography even in the 2000s as law enforcement recognized the ubiquity of a
variety of types of pornography found online. See Melissa Wells et al., Defining
Child Pornography: Law Enforcement Dilemmas in Investigations of Internet
Child Pornography Possession, 8 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 269, 271 (2007) (“In the
USA, law enforcement agencies arrested an estimate 1,713 offenders for Internetrelated crimes that involved the possession of child pornography during the 12
months starting July 1, 2000”); see also Elizabeth Williams, Construction and
Application of United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2G2.1 et seq., Pertaining to
Child Pornography, 145 A.L.R. Fed. 481 (1998); Citizen’s Guide to U.S. Federal
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The Court gave these cases the constitutional green light starting in New
York v. Ferber,186 though without reliance upon any adverse moral
judgment of gazing at erotic images of the pre-pubescent in order to
achieve sexual satisfaction. Ferber relied exclusively upon the sexual
abuse of children involved in the production of child pornography.187
Suppressing the market for it by arresting even those who consume it
downstream in private was constitutionally permissible, as accessory to
the child abuse.188 The gross immorality of pedophiliac sexual appetites
had nothing to do with it, as one can easily grasp by taking into account
the Supreme Court’s emphatic holding that traffic in computer-generated
and “Lolita” pornography—works which are indistinguishable from
felonious child pornography and coveted by consumers for that reason, but
which in fact rely upon life-like avatars or youthful looking actors over the
age of consent—is not child pornography. It thus enjoys First Amendment
protection.189
Constitutional conservatives like Antonin Scalia have been
nonplussed at least by the antinomian, centrifugal forces unleashed by the
Mystery Passage. They have surely cleaved more than its devotees to the
steadying centripetal forces of public morality. But they have nonetheless
failed to make sound arguments for the positions they favor. The central
deficit in their arguments is their chronic allergy to relying upon critical
moral judgments, even when it comes to such low-hanging fruit as
voyeuristic pedophilia. Conservatives evidently think that they can make
their case for judicial abstention in favor of legislative choice about morals
laws without reliance upon critical morality. They cannot.
Conservative constitutionalists rely instead upon the pluripotency of
what they call “majoritarian morality.” They say that “‘the fact that the
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice
as immoral is . . . a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice.’”190 It is not.
Let me explain.

Law on Child Pornography, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (May 28, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/citizens-guide-us-federal-law-child-porno
graphy [https://perma.cc/2MLE-W4ZD].
186. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
187. See id.
188. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
189. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008).
190. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(internal citation omitted) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216
(1986) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
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Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence said that “Texas’
invocation of moral disapproval as a legitimate state interest proves
nothing more than Texas’ desire to criminalize homosexual sodomy. But
the Equal Protection Clause prevents a State from creating ‘a classification
of persons undertaken for its own sake.’”191 Note the assertion that morals
laws are simply expressive; that is, their alpha and omega point is the same
“moral disapproval” of, for example, sodomy or consuming pornography:
“disapproval” “for its own sake.” This introduces nothing of critical moral
evaluation into the argument. Instead, the sociological fact of some
effective political force—almost invariably described as a “majority”—
becomes the weight-bearing premise.
Conservatives have accepted battle on these terms. They have
defended in season and out of season the constitutionality of morals laws
as expressions of “majority disapproval.” Although conservatives do not
always say it, they almost invariably mean that a majority morally
disapproves; that is, a lot of people hold that a particular action (sodomy,
prostitution, and so on) is immoral. It is rarely clear, though, whether this
asserted disapproval is a feeling (of disgust or repugnance) or a conviction.
It is also unclear in this line of conservative constitutional reasoning
whether, if the people hold a conviction, it is a conviction held as selfevidently true or on religious grounds or on the basis of reasons accessible
to anyone. In any event, this report or claim of “majority (moral)
disapproval” comes to the courtroom in an opaque condition. It is a fact to
some people, a brute conclusion. It is never transparent for the antecedent
reasons, if there are or were any, for why these people hold what they do.
Judges and justices who rely upon this “transparency” deficit pivot
upon a surely correct judgement: the fact that anyone or everyone holds a
particular moral view—say, that using pornography is bad for persons—
is not yet a reason for action, apart from the reasons why one holds the
view to be true.
Indeed, almost no one says: “I am opposing this practice because it is
my view that I am opposing this practice.” People say instead: “I am
opposed because it is wrong in the following way, and that is my moral
conclusion.” Many people who say that prostitution, for example, is wrong
mean that it is wrong for everyone, that it is objectively and categorically
immoral. This view could be false. If it is, its falsity is sufficient reason to
discard the judgment and everything it might entail. Saying that a negative
judgment about sodomy is “just your view and it would be unfair to impose
your view upon someone who does not share it would be wrong” evades
the matter asserted: sodomy is wrong simpliciter, for you and me and
191. Id. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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everybody. Saying “it’s just your view . . .” is also self-refuting, for the
judgment that imposing one’s view on others is “wrong” is, one could just
as well say, merely your view of justice—and it would be wrong for you
to impose it on me.
The fact that a lot of people hold a negative view of some sexual
practice needs to be made transparent for the reasons why those people (a
“majority”) disapprove. Otherwise, it cannot begin the work of giving a
“rational basis” for a morals law. That is just the first step. Besides a
“rational basis” for judging an act to be truly immoral, our constitutional
law requires some showing of publicly cognizable “harm,” lest sundry
immoralities, such as ignoring one’s obligation to say thank you after
receiving a gift, become grist for criminal lawyers. Establishing that
anyone’s conduct is genuinely immoral does not, in other words, rebut the
charge that it may still be none of the state’s business. It will not do for
conservatives to stand with President Nixon’s Attorney General John
Mitchell, who opposed relaxation of laws against “obscenity,” without
knowing why. He asserted that “pornography should be banned even if it
is not harmful.”192
Now, there is a place in constitutional reasoning by judges for
deference to popular lawmaking bodies. There is an important sense in
which the “will of the legislator” is the reason of the law. But neither of
these adages can overcome the impotence of simply declaring “majority
disapproval” a sufficient reasonable basis for any law’s constitutionality.
The truth is that such unadorned appeals to conventional (or
“majoritarian”) morality are inert. Asserting the content of any such
alleged consensus without more, in order to justify the community’s
decision to punish one of its members, does not do the job. The critically
justified conclusion that distributing pornography to willing customers
(for example) is immoral is a necessary condition for legally prohibiting
it.193
The limitations of conservatives’ defenses of morals laws are most
vividly illustrated in their keystone pornography opinion, Paris Adult
Theater v. Slaton.194 A companion case to the Miller case in which the
Court promulgated the still settled three-part test for identifying
192. Christopher Lydon, Doubts on SST Rising in Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
26, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/08/26/archives/doubts-on-sst-risingin-senate-nixon-adds-to-fears-of-us-flights.html [https://perma.cc/9LTF-5943].
193. Even laws against distributing obscenity do, for the constitutional test in
Miller merely identifies it; that test does not supply any account about why it
should be suppressed. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Thus, there needs
to be a “rational” basis for judging that the prohibited conduct actually is immoral.
194. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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“obscenity,”195 the conservative majority in Slaton meant it to be a fullorbed apologia for the legal regulation of morals. With the look and feel
of a scholarly essay more than that of a legal opinion, Slaton sought to
establish the distinctively public harm of pornography, that is, what
justifies criminal laws about pornography, other than what the Justices
believed to be an anti-constitutional, paternalistic state effort to “control[]
a person’s private thoughts,” as the Court once put it.196
The companion Miller opinion needed the assistance. Its criteria for
distinguishing “obscene” pornography from unpleasant but
constitutionally protected smut was evaluative, to be sure. But it was not
morally evaluative. The Miller test explicated a concept—“obscenity”—
that history, not critical moral judgment, persuaded the Supreme Court to
place outside First Amendment protections.197 The Miller three-part test
remains to this minute the constitutional metric for identifying unprotected
“obscenity.” It traffics in negative-sounding descriptors, such as “prurient
interest,” “patently offensive,” and “lacks serious artistic” value.198 But
195. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 21.
196. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969). There was no recorded
dissent from the majority’s assertion of the proposition in the text, but three
Justices concurred in Stanley on entirely Fourth Amendment grounds. The
majority further explained its (again, uncontradicted) account of the public
interests served by anti-obscenity laws in footnote 8:
Communities believe, and act on the belief, that obscenity is immoral, is
wrong for the individual, and has no place in a decent society. They
believe, too, that adults as well as children are corruptible in morals and
character, and that obscenity is a source of corruption that should be
eliminated. Obscenity is not suppressed primarily for the protection of
others. Much of it is suppressed for the purity of the community and for
the salvation and welfare of the “consumer.” Obscenity, at bottom, is not
crime. Obscenity is sin.
Id. at 565 n.8 (citing L. Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of
Obscenity, 63 COL. L. REV. 391, 395 (1963)). Stanley held that, even assuming
that the materials were “obscene” and thus unprotected by the First Amendment,
a state could not make private possession of it in one’s home a crime. In the course
of a rambling opinion for the Court, Justice Marshall refuted the purpose that he
attributed to Georgia (to “control the moral content of a person’s thought”), saying
that:
“This argument misconceives what it is that the Constitution protects. Its
guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional
or shared by a majority. . . . And, in the realm of ideas it protects
expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.”
Id. at 566.
197. See Bradley, supra note 163, at 476–77.
198. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
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none of these is a moral judgment. The test for “obscenity” overall has no
built-in tendency to identify the intelligible harm pornography does.
Applying it successfully to a given work marks the work as “obscene.”
Applying it successfully nonetheless implies no more than that it is, well,
trashy. Whether it is the kind of thing that is immoral to produce or to
consume is entirely beside the exercise.
Pornographers and libertarian lawyers have largely accepted this
designation. They often describe works without apology as harmless
amusement, neither edifying nor destructive. The morality they put on
offer is based upon consent, and the derivative policy is about preference
satisfaction. They say that pornography is about taste and is thus not for
everybody. Those who do not like it should avoid it, and just laws make
doing that possible. But those who are repulsed by pornography have no
right to deny effective access to it to those so desiring. The Constitution
blocks any legally operational judgment that pornography is morally bad,
simpliciter.
A great deal was riding on Slaton. The issue joined there was precisely
whether there was any public interest in regulating pornography other than
to adjudicate satisfaction of the preferences of equal citizens. The
pornographers’ first move was predictable: “[P]etitioners argue that
conduct which directly involves ‘consenting adults’ only has, for that sole
reason, a special claim to constitutional protection.”199 The Slaton Court
dealt brusquely with this objection in a footnote, appealing as Scalia later
would in dissent to an ambient moral sensibility: “[S]tate statute books are
replete with constitutionally unchallenged laws against prostitution,
suicide, voluntary self-mutilation, brutalizing ‘bare fist’ prize fights, and
duels, although these crimes may only directly involve ‘consenting
adults.’ Statutes making bigamy a crime surely cut into an individual’s
freedom to associate.”200 The Slaton Court was confident that this picture
of falling dominoes would resonate. “[F]ew today seriously claim such
statutes violate the First Amendment or any other constitutional
provision.”201 Tomorrow it would be a different story.
Then the Court got down to business. “Although we have often
pointedly recognized the high importance of the state interest in regulating
the exposure of obscene materials to juveniles [deemed incapable of
governing themselves in the matter] and unconsenting adults, this Court
has never declared these to be the only legitimate state interests permitting

199. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 68.
200. Id. at 68 n.15.
201. Id.
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regulation of obscene material.”202 The Court added that “states have a
long-recognized legitimate interest in regulating the use of obscene
material in local commerce and in all places of public accommodation.”203
The Court identified this public interest with the feel of public spaces. “In
particular, we hold that there are legitimate state interests at stake in
stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity.”204 The relevant sphere of
interest was “local commerce and in all places of public
accommodation.”205 Those “interests” were said to be “‘the quality of life
and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great
city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself”—all on the view that
there is an “arguable correlation between obscene material and crime.”206
These concerns are worthy and even important. But they do not pertain in
any direct way to the “moral soundness” of the people. They rather attempt
to manage common spaces with a decent regard for the aesthetic and moral
sensibility of everybody. This management so far described is consistent
with the pornographers’ anthem: consent is the norm.
The Slaton Court then turned to what it described as “one problem of
large proportions aptly described by Professor Bickel: . . . ‘the tone of the
society, the mode, or . . . the style and quality of life.’”207 But even
Professor Bickel located the sphere of regulation in the “market” and
“public places.”208 This too was about cleaning up Times Square (and other
“combat zones” and “red-light districts”), so that these municipal
amenities could be welcoming to modest citizens. Of course, anyone can
see how the invisible transmission of pornography through the atmosphere
from laptop to laptop batters this already wobbly defense of antipornography initiatives.
What explained and justified that “legitimate interest”? Here the
Slaton Court sputtered. “The issue in this context goes beyond whether
someone, or even the majority, considers the conduct depicted as ‘wrong’
or ‘sinful.’”209 By “beyond,” did the Justices mean “in addition to,” or did
they mean “instead of”? It would seem to be the latter.

202. Id. at 57 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court clearly
intended to do more than just call balls and strikes between groups of competing
preferences.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 58.
207. Id. at 59 (internal citation omitted).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 69.
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The States have the power to make a morally neutral judgment
that public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such
material, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, to
endanger the public safety, or to jeopardize, in Mr. Chief Justice
Warren’s words, the States’ “right . . . to maintain a decent
society.”210
The Court’s scare quotes around “wrong” and “sinful” signal their intent
to keep the critical moral viewpoint at arm’s length. So, too, the almost
unfathomable claim of moral neutrality, when asserting that there has been
a communal injury or a danger to public safety.
Slaton’s “legitimate” “public” interests were contingent, secondary,
and unrelated to sexual morality. The Court conceded that “there is no
conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene
material.”211 The Constitution did not prohibit Georgia (or any other state)
from acting on what the Court recurrently described as “unprovable
assumptions” about the connection.212 The Court adduced several
examples of legislation founded upon such “unprovable assumptions,”
including “imponderable aesthetic assumptions” presupposed by
environmental regulations to preserve national parks and the “unprovable
assumption that a complete education requires the reading of certain
books.”213 Clearly the Court is not supposing that there is anything wrong
with obscenity itself. This is where then Attorney General John Mitchell
ended up: pornography may be banned even if there is nothing wrong with
it, and even if it cannot be shown to cause any harm at all!
The Supreme Court has not since 1973 advanced anything like the allout effort in Slaton to describe a trans-consensual basis for antipornography laws. Later Courts have from time to time recited that case’s
vague generalizations about the relevant state interests. Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the majority in the nude dancing case in 1991, for
example, that the state’s interest “in order and morality” sufficed.214 Even
before that, however, the Court had abandoned its tentative steps it took in
1973. In 1982, a Court comprised of Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell, Rehnquist, White, and O’Connor conceded the pornographers’
point in Slaton. In this first confrontation with child pornography, the
Court read the Constitution to permit states to prosecute images and works
210. Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).
211. Id. at 60–61.
212. See id. at 61.
213. Id. at 62–63.
214. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (internal citation
omitted).
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which would not be “obscene” according to the three-part Miller test.215
They wrote that the “Miller standard, like its predecessors, was an
accommodation between the State’s interests in protecting the
‘sensibilities of unwilling recipients’ from exposure to pornographic
material and the dangers of censorship inherent in unabashedly contentbased laws.”216
The conservative case for controlling obscene pornography remains
stuck in the quick-sands of contending private sexual appetites and
emotional aversions, with the law sent into the thicket to neutrally—
morally speaking, that is—arbitrate fairly among all the clashing
sentiments. No adverse moral judgment of pornography or of masturbating
to it is in view. Or welcome. Or, given the commitments of constitutional
conservatism, possible.
American law and culture have abandoned in considerable part the
tradition Justice Harlan affirmed, the tradition grounded in marriage as the
constitutional principle of sexual morality in Poe v. Ullman.217 It is
nonetheless a bit surprising that constitutional conservatives seem to have
forgotten it as long ago as 1973. Experience of the last half-century
strongly suggests, moreover, that there is no practically stable or morally
coherent middle-ground between marriage, on the one hand, and consent
on the other as the constitutionally cognizable principle of sexual morality.
Experience of the last quarter-century shows that consent has married
itself to an ethic of self-definition and identity. Experience of the last
decade or so with defining sexual harassment to include “unwelcome”
attention or contact, for example, suggests that this “consent” is fragile,
and may be unable to do the work that our society presently assigns to it.
That work is chiefly to somehow arbitrate and govern sexual negotiations
between consenting adults who are not expected to recognize any truth
about the morality of sexual acts, save that of some hypothesized
“consent” to them. A strategic opportunity to promote the genuine “moral
soundness” of the people is at hand, if only constitutional conservatives
could be made bold enough to seize it.
IV. GENDER IDENTITY
A federal trial judge in early 2019 described the harrowing experience
of some Illinois high-school students. Judge Jorge Alonso wrote in
Parents for Privacy v. High School District 211 that several high-school
215. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
216. Id. at 756.
217. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 272

5/26/21 11:50 AM

2021]

MORAL TRUTH

1381

girls were “startled, shocked, embarrassed and frightened by the presence
of a male in the girls’ restroom,” most especially when a female student
was “exposed to Student A’s penis.”218
This naked man was no streaker. He was a fellow student. The school
did nothing to discipline him. In fact, school authorities welcomed him to
the bathroom, under what the court called a “compelled affirmation
policy” governing transgender students’ access to intimate school
facilities—bathrooms, locker rooms, showers.219
The Ninth Circuit in early 2020 described the plight of several highschool boys in Dallas, Oregon. They experienced “embarrassment,
humiliation, anxiety, intimidation, fear, apprehension, and stress,” because
they had to change clothes for their gym class in the presence of a female
student, albeit one who identified as a transgender boy.220 These worried
boys were compelled to endure the indignity. The court noted that physical
education was “a mandatory course for two or more years of school, and
students must change into and out of clothing appropriate for PE class at
the beginning and end of each PE class.”221 The court further said that
“[s]tudents who opposed the Student Safety Plan attempted to circulate a
petition opposing the policy, but the high school principal confiscated the
petitions and ordered students to discontinue doing so or face disciplinary
action.”222
The Ninth Circuit described in terms typical of the cases what was at
stake for the transgender student. “Compelled affirmation” would create
“a safe, non-discriminatory school environment for transgender students
that avoids the detrimental physical and mental health effects that have
been shown to result from transgender students’ exclusion from privacy
facilities that match their gender identities.”223 The Dallas schools’
“Student Safety Plan” was studiously named and it had (so far) just one
reported beneficiary. Not only have the transgender students in this
litigation reported felt dangers; in these cases, mental health professionals
testified to the prevalence of “suicidal ideation” among students who are

218. Students & Parents for Priv. v. Sch. Dirs. of Township High Sch. Dist.
211, 377 F. Supp. 3d 891, 894–95 (N.D. Ill. 2019). “Student A,” in the court’s
schema, is the male student who was granted access to the girls’ locker room.
219. See id. at 895.
220. See Parents for Priv. v. Barr, 949 F.3d 1210, 1218–19 (9th Cir. 2020).
221. Id. at 1218 n.4.
222. Id. at 1219.
223. Id. at 1217.
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not led by the authorities to the “safety” of restrooms that correspond to
the student’s transgender identity.224
Over and against this threat to some teens’ psychological and physical
well-being, attorneys for objecting students have mustered some
repugnant feelings and naked preferences. Complaining “offended”
students, we are told, do not want to “see or be seen by someone of the
opposite biological sex while either are [sic] undressing or performing
bodily functions in a restroom, shower, or locker room.”225 Their objection
was all about “cisgender boys’ fear of exposing themselves to
[transgender] Student A.”226
Attorneys for these offended students say that there is a constitutional
right “to be free from government-enforced, unconsented risk of exposure
to the opposite sex when they or members of the opposite sex are partially
or fully unclothed.”227 This is true enough, as far as it goes. The problem
begins with their sputtering answers to the question: why. The
conservatives claim that there is a constitutional right to be free of the
224. An Idaho federal court observed in 2020 that “[t]ransgender individuals
may experience ‘gender dysphoria,’ which is ‘characterized by significant and
substantial distress as result of their birth-determined sex being different from
their gender identity.’” Hecox v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 945 (D. Idaho 2020).
According to the Eleventh Circuit, a transgender youth felt “‘alienated and
humiliated’ every time he ‘walk[ed] past the boys’ restroom on his way to a
gender-neutral bathroom, knowing every other boy is permitted to use it but
him.’” He believed the bathroom policy sent “a message to other students who
saw [him] use a ‘special bathroom’ that he is different.” Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St.
Johns Cnty., 968 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2020).
These psychological traumas functionally weaponize the transgender
plaintiff just as similar feelings (of being different and lesser, of being
“stigmatized” and “demeaned”) weaponized same-sex couples in Obergefell.
Ironically, the diagnosis which gave rise to the conservative counter-strategy of
originalism was that liberals (Warren, Brennan, and their successors) were guilty
of importing a philosophy of progressive idealism into constitutional law, the
antidote to which would be a methodology nearly allergic to critical moral
reasoning. It is not so; the fertile disciplines external to law is not so much
philosophy or political theory. They are more social science and especially
psychology. What counts as “idealism” is principally that individual psychic wellbeing is the summum bonum. Adverse moral judgment is the tactical enemy;
strategically, it is the resulting psychic and emotional effects of those judgments
that counts.
225. Parents for Priv. v. Dallas Sch. Dist. No. 2, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1099
(D. Or. 2018).
226. Parents for Priv., 949 F.3d at 1218.
227. See, e.g., Students & Parents for Priv. v. Sch. Dirs. of Township High
Sch. Dist. 211, 377 F. Supp. 3d 891, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
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opposite-sex in the locker room because of felt discomfort and “privacy”
concerns. But “privacy” is no totem or alchemist’s dream. It has many
meanings. None of them is self-evident, or of such weight as to sweep
away contrary interests without breaking a sweat. The meaning, value, and
weight of “privacy” must be tested in the transgender cases against the
professionally verified threats to the health, and even the life, of a suffering
transgender student who wants “privacy,” too. After all, he or she wants
to use the restroom stall with a certain self-respect (one might say), and in
peace.
The Ninth Circuit said that the school district faced “the difficult task
of navigating varying student (and parent) beliefs and interests in order to
foster a safe and productive learning environment, free from
discrimination, that accommodates the needs of all students.”228
The counterarguments against transgender bathroom access so far
advanced have failed; that is, in none of the cases discussed in this section
did those who complained in court about the presence of a “transgender”
student in the bathroom or other intimate facility, prevail. That is not
surprising. They lack necessary components that only a resort to critical
moral truth can supply. The needed amendments are not exogenous to a
properly legal argument, as if they would be abstract speculations alien to
real lawyering. The truths that must be added simply answer the decisive
legal question that the courts are already asking: what is the “harm” to
those girls “alarmed” by the naked boy in their locker room?
Complaining parents of the witnesses in the Ninth Circuit case
asserted that:
the privacy protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause also encompass a “fundamental right to
bodily privacy” that includes “a right to privacy of one’s fully or
partially unclothed body and the right to be free from Statecompelled risk of intimate exposure of oneself to the opposite
sex.”229
But what is the precise harm in doing so? They further asserted that
“[f]reedom from the risk of compelled intimate exposure to the opposite
sex, especially for minors, is a fundamental right deeply rooted in this
nation’s history and tradition and is also implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.”230 Perhaps so. But what is the live and lively present basis for
affirming that tradition as more than a relic of a benighted past? The
228. Parents for Priv., 949 F.3d at 1217.
229. Id. at 1222.
230. Id.
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complaining parents also urged that the district’s Student Safety Plan
infringed these rights by “requir[ing] Student Plaintiffs to risk being
intimately exposed to those of the opposite biological sex . . . without any
compelling justification.”231 This is just to re-state the question.
The best effort of this sort so far is probably the recent dissent from
the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in favor of transgender male Gavin Grimm by
Circuit Judge Niemeyer.232 Niemeyer rightly set the basic structure of that
argument: the reasons why Title IX (and common sense and equal
protection principles, until very recently) makes explicit provision for
separate restrooms and other intimate facilities according to “sex” are the
same reasons why Gavin Grimm is rightly regarded as a biological female
(notwithstanding a male gender identity), when it comes to restrooms. In
addition to a sensible reliance upon common usage of the term “sex,” when
Title IX was enacted, as a matter of being biologically male or female,
Niemeyer wrote that the “privacy concerns” behind sex-segregated
intimate spaces require treating Grimm as a female.233
But what are these “privacy concerns”? Niemeyer wrote: “An
individual has a legitimate and important interest in bodily privacy that is
implicated when his or her nude or partially nude body is exposed to
others. And this privacy interest is significantly heightened when persons
of the opposite biological sex are present, as courts have long
recognized.”234 Niemeyer further stated that “these privacy interests are
broader than the risks of actual bodily exposure. They include the intrusion
created by mere presence. In short, we want to be alone — to have our
privacy — when we ‘shit, shower, shave, shampoo, and shine.”‘235
Indeed. But, again, what is that “privacy interest”? Niemeyer, again:
[A]ll individuals possess a privacy interest when using restrooms
or other spaces in which they remove clothes and engage in
231. Id.
Plaintiffs do not allege that transgender students are making
inappropriate comments, threatening them, deliberately flaunting nudity,
or physically touching them. Rather, Plaintiffs allegedly feel harassed by
the mere presence of transgender students in locker and bathroom
facilities. This cannot be enough. The use of facilities for their intended
purpose, without more, does not constitute an act of harassment simply
because a person is transgender.
Id. at 1228–29.
232. Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 627–37 (4th Cir.
2020) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 633–34.
234. Id. at 633.
235. Id. at 634.
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personal hygiene, and this privacy interest is heightened when
persons of the opposite sex are present. Indeed, this privacy
interest is heightened yet further when children use communal
restrooms and similar spaces, because children, as the School
Board notes, “are still developing, both emotionally and
physically.”236
Just so. But, now for the last time, what is this “privacy” interest?
Niemeyer is as capable as anyone now sitting on the federal appellate
bench. So, when he succeeds only in kicking the can down the road to a
terminal point in the argument without getting anywhere, one reasonably
asks: why is there no there, there? Is it that there is a hole in conservative
constitutionalism?
Judicial descriptions of cisgender students’ resistance to sharing
locker rooms with persons of the opposite sex center upon adverse
emotional reactions, in terms typical of what the law generally calls
“emotional distress.” These feelings of repugnance are not legally inert;
one can successfully recover damages for the unjustified infliction of
“emotional distress” in some circumstances, usually involving what is by
any standard of decorum or decency someone else’s outrageous
conduct.237 But the key to recovery for “emotional distress” is that the
person who caused it acted wrongly, that is, unjustifiably, without
236. Id. at 636.
237. Though there are slight regional variations in semantics, the overall
logical progression of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
is fairly consistent. In Illinois, for instance, a plaintiff must prove the following
three elements to succeed in her IIED claim:
(1) that the defendant's conduct was truly extreme and outrageous, (2)
that the defendant either intended that his conduct would cause severe
emotional distress or knew that there was a high probability that his
conduct would do so, and (3) that the defendant's conduct did in fact
cause severe emotional distress.
Taliani v. Resurreccion, 115 N.E.3d 1245, 1254 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (citing
McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988)). If the plaintiff proves each
of the three elements, then she may be entitled to a remedy, typically money
damages (which for emotional distress are notoriously difficult to calculate
accurately and consistently). Daniel Givelber also notes that IIED as a tort “differs
from traditional intentional torts in an important respect: it provides no clear
definition of the prohibited conduct.” Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum
Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 51 (1982).
This particular feature of the tort renders it susceptible to malleable standards (if
not outright subjectivism) not often seen in the law to this degree.
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adequate reason. This is the weakness of conservative constitutionalism
at work in these cases. In the transgender student scenario, the conflict is
between the transient unpleasant, if not intolerant, feelings of some teens
over and against the psychological and emotional well-being and,
possibly, the survival of a classmate. Who is unjustifiably causing distress
to whom?
The complaining students’ reactions could be described exactly the
same way if, say, they walked in and saw a naked classmate of the same
sex, washing his or her hair in the bathroom sink. These witnesses would
then be startled, and maybe shocked. Their reaction might be the same as
it was to the opposite-sex intrusion if a same-sex classmate were instead
openly doing something (urinating in a sink, for example) that is properly
done in a stall. In these cases, the offender would be guilty of a simple
indiscretion. He or she would be rude and unfeeling, perhaps, but guilty of
no greater wrong. This impolitic behavior could well be justified: perhaps
the water has been turned off at home, and there is no place else to wash,
or all the stalls are occupied, and someone really had to go. No aspect of
the basic well-being of any offended student would be in play.238
The Oregon plaintiffs made a Free Exercise claim that pushed the ball
forward a bit.
[M]any Student Plaintiffs and some Parent Plaintiffs “have the
sincere religious belief” that children “must not undress, or use the
restroom, in the presence of a member of the opposite biological
sex, and also that they must not be in the presence of the opposite
biological sex while the opposite biological sex is undressing or
using the restroom.” Because the Student Safety Plan permits
transgender students who were assigned the opposite biological
sex at birth into their locker rooms, the Plan “prevents Student
Plaintiffs from practicing the modesty that their faith requires of
them, and it further interferes with Parent Plaintiffs teaching their
children traditional modesty and insisting that their children
practice modesty, as their faith requires.”239
238. It is a bit impish to put it this way, but the teenagers’ reactions upon which
the conservative arguments depend (“startled, shocked, embarrassed”) would fit
just as well if instead some “cisgender” students walked into the bathroom at
school, and there they saw a naked zebra, sitting there in the middle of the floor.
Whether the zebra is male or female does not affect my point, which is that feeling
offended has no necessary connection to anyone else’s moral fault, or to
immorality at all. And the genuine harm of being offended is shallow, and
transitory.
239. Parents for Priv., 949 F.3d at 1234.
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Here, “modesty” is a promising turn. But it, too, is a tease.
The Ninth Circuit rejected all these arguments, saying that “there is
no Fourteenth Amendment fundamental privacy right to avoid all risk of
intimate exposure to or by a transgender person who was assigned the
opposite biological sex at birth.”240 The court also held that the “potential
threat that a high school student might see or be seen by someone of the
opposite biological sex while either are undressing or performing bodily
functions in a restroom, shower, or locker room does not give rise to a
constitutional violation.”241 So far described, these holdings are not
240. Id. at 1217.
241. Id. at 1223. The Ninth Circuit disposed of the plaintiffs’ Title IX sexual
harassment claim on unconvincing grounds. The court wrote that the plaintiffs:
argue that the Ninth Circuit in York, 324 F.2d at 455, recognized the right
to bodily privacy when it commented that “[t]he desire to shield one’s
unclothed figure from views of strangers, and particularly strangers of
the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal
dignity.” The problem with this argument is that York addressed an
egregious privacy violation by police and recognized a much more
specific and limited Due Process privacy right than Plaintiffs claim here.
As noted, York involved a male police officer who coerced a female
assault victim to allow him to take unnecessary nude photographs of her,
which he later distributed to other officers.
Id.
The court’s attempt to distinguish York failed. “York did not recognize a
more general right to be free from alleged privacy intrusions by other nongovernment persons, or a privacy right to avoid any risk of being exposed briefly
to opposite-sex nudity by sharing locker facilities with transgender students in
public schools.” Id. at 1224. There is no reason whatsoever for suggesting that
being forced to strip by a police officer is categorically distinct from being forced
to strip by the school principal. Nor is there any reason to suppose that brevity is
the distinguishing criterion, or to assert that regularly stripping just to change for
gym class is necessarily brief.
The Ninth Circuit also said:
Plaintiffs do not allege that transgender students are making
inappropriate comments, threatening them, deliberately flaunting nudity,
or physically touching them. Rather, Plaintiffs allegedly feel harassed by
the mere presence of transgender students in locker and bathroom
facilities. This cannot be enough. The use of facilities for their intended
purpose, without more, does not constitute an act of harassment simply
because a person is transgender.
Id. at 1228–29. But this is to say that because the transgender student is not guilty
of sexual assault there is no sexual harassment—and that is false. Lastly, the court
notes, “Plaintiffs do not allege that transgender students are taking nude
photographs of them or purposefully taking overt steps to invade their privacy for
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obviously mistaken. The court rejected the Free Exercise claim on
doctrinal grounds supplied by Oregon v. Smith.242 This too might be
correct.
The whole “privacy” argument is indeterminate. It needs to be spelled
out in relation to some intelligible (non-emotional) aspect of the cisgender
students’ well-being.
The argument made so far against transgender bathroom access needs
major surgery. That needed revision includes an intelligible, compelling
moral basis for the cisgender students’ shock and fear. The better argument
displaces repugnant feelings entirely. It identifies the grave moral wrong
done to these girls and boys regardless of their bad feelings. According to
the amended argument, a girl who was nonplussed by, or a boy who
welcomed, a naked person of the opposite-sex to the locker room would
be harmed just the same as anyone who was uncomfortable at the sight.
Why should young people whose sexual urgings are yet to be fully
comprehended and mastered not be forced by public authorities to strip
naked with strangers of the opposite sex? This is to ask why we have sexsegregated intimate facilities in the first place. It is not mistaken to say that
the reason is privacy. But it is not enough to say “privacy.” The reason for
closing restrooms (and lockers and showers) to members of the opposite
sex is that it is wrong to make anyone, and young people in particular, the
objects of others’ sexual arousal, and to tempt them into sexual arousal.
Doing that is unfair to all the students because it impedes their attempts to
develop chaste habits. Doing so would be morally akin to requiring highschool students to sit together and watch stag movies every week. Even
adults who have resigned themselves to a certain prevalence of sexual
activity among teens would not facilitate co-ed porn viewing. The
increased vividness accompanying real-time exposure in school makes the
locker-room exposure more corrupting than the movie date, because
students in these cases face the additional complication of having
continuing, regular contact with those of the opposite sex whom one has
seen—and by whom one has been seen—naked.
Now, at least one judge who backed school administrators’
“compelled affirmation” policies, or who have required them where
schools demurred, makes a de minimis, arithmetic argument.243 They
assert that transgender students are rare. They ask what the big deal is
no legitimate reason.” Id. at 1224. Again, to say that “compelled affirmation”
involves no “upskirting” or the production of child pornography is not to say that
it is not and cannot be sexual harassment.
242. Id. at 1233–39.
243. See, e.g., Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 276 F. Supp. 3d 324 (E.D.
Pa. 2017).
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about just one child being accommodated. Everyone needs to relax a bit
and show some compassion, they effectively argue.244
It is not just one student. It is true that the lawsuits involve just one
gender-dysphoric party. But plausible estimates of the number of selfidentified transgender students in high schools across the country range up
to two percent.245 It is also reasonable to expect that, as “compelled
affirmation” policies and the wider elite-cultural promotion of transgender
identity proliferate, so too will the number of gender-dysphoric highschool students. Copy-cat sexual identity “questioning” is already a
documented phenomenon.246
The arithmetic does not matter. The harms visited upon students by
this enforced nakedness are not arithmetical. The good end that stands
behind and explains sensible sex-segregation policies consists of the
serenity and security born of the presence of a no-exceptions, categorical
rule, backed up by earnest enforcement: no boys in the girls’ restroom.
This good is defeated where it is the case instead that, at the door to the
girls’ showers, the sign says: “Ordinarily there are only girls present
inside, and there are never a lot of boys. You can be sure that you will see,
and be seen by, no more than a couple of naked men. Have a good day.”
Would anyone seriously say it is fine if only boys who promised not
to stay long were admitted to the girls’ showers? Or that boys are generally
not permitted in the girls’ lockers, save for the captain of the football team
and his best friend? Or that the boys’ basketball team shares changing
rooms with the girls’ team, but only during home games?
The foregoing argument based upon true sexual morality and
correlative virtues does not depend for its cogency upon a diagnosis of
gender dysphoria, its proper treatment, or anything else about the
psychology of a transgender student. The argument’s force comes from
the fact that a high-school student, “Angela,” born male and still possessed
of an anatomically male body, looks just like any other boy does when he
244. See, e.g., id. at 397 (noting that plaintiffs could point to only a single
instance in which they viewed a transgender student in a locker room or bathroom
and concluding that “[b]ased on their testimony, none of these plaintiffs were
subjected to pervasive sexual harassment in regard to their actual interaction with
transgender students in the privacy facilities at [their school]”).
245. See Ben Kesslen, Two Percent of High School Students Identify as
Transgender, CDC Report Finds, NBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.nbc
news.com/feature/nbc-out/two-percent-high-school-students-identify-transgendercdc-report-finds-n962526 [https://perma.cc/Q2S3-TMFV].
246. See Lisa Litman, Parent Reports of Adolescents and Young Adults
Perceived to Show Signs of a Rapid Onset of Gender Dysphoria, 13(8) PLOS ONE,
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202330 [https://perma.cc/AP5A-EMLZ].

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 281

5/26/21 11:50 AM

1390

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

(she) is naked. That this male, unlike the boys whom he resembles
unclothed, fervently believes himself to be a girl trapped in a male body
does not affect the wrongfulness of forcing sexual gazing, objectification,
and occasion for arousal upon a student population.
*********************************
Conservatives so far have tried unsuccessfully to refute “affirming”
policies without reliance upon truths about sexual morality and modesty.
In none of them, moreover, has any conservative constitutionalist (at
bench or bar) explicitly refuted the implication in many of the protransgender access arguments, namely, that one’s body and one’s self can
be divided—that some people are indeed “trapped in the wrong body.”
The Eleventh Circuit, for example, wrote in 2020:
Drew Adams is a young man and recent graduate of Nease High
School in Florida’s St. Johns County School District. Mr. Adams
is transgender, meaning when he was born, doctors assessed his
sex and wrote ‘female’ on his birth certificate, but today Mr.
Adams knows with every fiber of [his] being’ that he is a boy.247
Even where the assertion is not so explicitly made as this, the claim that
persons such as Adams are much more male than female and that they
would therefore benefit enormously by being treated as if she were a boy
is central to the appeal of all transgender plaintiffs. It is why judges seem
intuitively to side with the transgender youth; at least the courts in the
cases discussed in this section all found in favor of the transgender party.
Is it true that someone can be “trapped in the wrong body”? This is
neither a psychological nor a legal question. It is a metaphysical query,
and it deserves a suitably metaphysical answer. The truth is no boy is
trapped in a girl’s body, and no girl is trapped in a boy’s body.248 Each one
of us is our body. Sex is innate.249 It is also immutable: being male or
247. Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., 968 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2020).
248. “The hypothesis that gender identity is an innate, fixed property of human
beings that is independent of biological sex—that a person might be ‘a man
trapped in a woman’s body’ or ‘a woman trapped in a man’s body’—is not
supported by scientific evidence.” Lawrence S. Mayer & Paul R. McHugh,
Sexuality and Gender: Findings from the Biological, Psychological, and Social
Sciences, 50 NEW ATLANTIS 1, 8 (2016).
249. “The existence of two sexes is nearly universal in the animal kingdom,”
a realm which includes us, the species homo sapiens. See Bronwyn C. Morrish &
Andrew H. Sinclair, Vertebrate Sex Determination: Many Means to an End, 124
REPRODUCTION 447–57 (2002). In the biological sciences as well as in medical
research and practice, the term “sex” refers precisely to the two halves of any
species, male and female. The two halves result from the binary division of all
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female is an indelible sexual identity inscribed in every one of the billions
of cells in each of our bodies.250 Surgical intervention can somewhat alter
members, according to whether any individual is suited to play one, or the other,
of the two roles in reproduction. “The essential purpose of sexual differentiation,
the development of any male- or female-specific physical or behavioral
characteristic, is to equip organisms with the necessary anatomy and physiology
to allow sexual reproduction to occur.” Dagmar Wilhelm et al., Sex Determination
and Gonadal Development in Mammals, 87 PHYSIOLOGICAL REVS. 1 (2008). This
structural difference for the purpose of reproduction is the only “widely accepted”
way of classifying the two sexes.
This definition of sex is clear and stable. It does not require any arbitrary
measurable or quantifiable physical characteristics or behaviors to apply. It
requires instead a basic understanding of the reproductive system and the
reproduction process. The division of human beings into male and female
according to reproductive function possesses the solidity and transparency needed
to serve as an explanatory variable in rigorous scientific experimentation and
medical research.
Human beings are either male or female. This characteristic is innate.
“[I]n mammals the sexual fate of the organism is cast at fertilization . . . .” Id. at
1. The decisive event is the contribution by the father of an “x” or a “y”
chromosome: an “X-carrying sperm produces a female (XX) embryo, and a Ycarrying sperm produces a male (XY) embryo. Therefore, the chromosomal sex
of the embryo is determined at fertilization.” T.W. SADLER, LANGMAN’S
MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 40 (2004). This sexual dimorphism is typically not
apparent to observation until approximately 12 to 14 weeks of pregnancy. The
development of the human beings as specifically male or female nonetheless
begins at the onset of life. Even though the very young embryo carries within it
the primitive structure of both reproductive systems, male embryos secrete
testosterone, which leads to the development of the male reproductive system.
Embryonic and thereafter fetal development as male or female is directed from
within, according to genetic information present in the zygote from the moment
of fertilization.
The ubiquity of sonograms during pregnancy means that now almost
everyone recognizes that the sex of a child can be ascertained before birth. As a
matter of scientific fact, however, sex could be ascertained at fertilization. See
KEITH L. MOORE & T.V.N. PERSAUD, THE DEVELOPING HUMAN: CLINICALLY
ORIENTED EMBRYOLOGY 307 (7th ed., 2003) (“[T]he type of sex chromosome
complex established at fertilization determines the type of gonad that
differentiates from the indifferent gonad. The type of gonads present then
determines the type of sexual differentiation that occurs in the genital ducts and
external genitalia.”).
250. The innate biological differences between male and female go far beyond
external genitalia. In fact, they inhabit every one of the human body’s billions of
nucleated cells. Each cell in our body has a sex—the same sex—male or female.
Sex is in this most profound way indelibly imprinted upon every part of our

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 283

5/26/21 11:50 AM

1392

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

bodies. That sex is binary, innate, and immutable is a complex fundamental reality
that anyone doing basic or applied research in the biological sciences (or who
teaches them), and anyone who practices medicine, including psychiatry (or who
teaches it), presupposes, recognizes, uses, and applies. Keeping up a robust and
uncompromised awareness of sex as binary, innate, and immutable is essential to
successful work in all these areas. Forgetfulness of it is a recipe for failure—as
scientists and doctors.
The reason why this clarity about sex is crucial can be simply stated: each
person’s indelible reality as male or female pervades the body throughout the life
of the individual. Until recently, the role of the chromosomes that determine sex
had been thought to be strictly limited to the development of reproductive tissues
and organs.
Previously consigned to the development of reproductive tissues, the sex
chromosomes were thought to exert any systemic effects solely through
the generation of sex hormones, and all differences between males and
females resulted exclusively from exposure to these hormones. The
growing evidence attests to the fact that sex chromosomes exert their
influence in every cell of the body, and every cell has a sex. The impact
of sex chromosome genes on physiology and human pathophysiology
will only become increasingly important in the future.
Neil A. Bradbury, All Cells Have a Sex: Studies of Sex Chromosome Function at
the Cellular Level, in PRINCIPLES OF GENDER-SPECIFIC MEDICINE: GENDER IN
THE GENOMIC ERA 285 (Marianne J. Legato, ed., 3d ed. 2017).
Now we know better. Each and every cell of a woman’s body is female.
Each and every cell of a man’s body is male. While the commonalities and
similarities of men and women still far outweigh the differences, keeping in mind
the differences is essential to sound research and competent clinical practice.
[I]t is becoming increasing apparent that the effects of sex chromosomes
on cellular physiology can be independent of exposure to gonadal
hormones. Thus, cultured female or male cells, even those derived from
embryos prior to sexual differentiation, differ in gene expression and
such differences persist in primary culture, arguing that the differences
are intrinsic to the cells and not dependent upon external hormone
exposure. Since all cells, whether male or female, express sex
chromosomes it should not be too surprising that expressed genes of sex
chromosomes have the potential to influence cellular biochemical
pathways, cellular physiology, and responses to drugs.
Id. at 271.
In an important 2017 journal article, Tracy Madsen and her colleagues
wrote:
The completion of the human genome project in 2003 also influenced
our understanding of the effects of sex on human biology and disease
through the sequencing of all human genes, including those located on
sex chromosomes. Understanding the location and function of genes
located on sex chromosomes throughout the body’s cells, not just in
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the appearances of some parts of the human body, including that of the sex
organs. But medicine can give no one the functioning sex organs of the

reproductive organs, was critical to understanding that biologic sex not
only affects human health and disease via sex steroids and reproductive
organs but also affects cells in all organ systems.
Tracy Madsen et al., Sex- and Gender-Based Medicine: The Need for Precise
Terminology, 1 GENDER & GENOME 122, 123 (2017).
Epidemiologists now understand that “[s]ex differences are present
across most disease states and organ systems.” Id. “Important features of an
illness, . . . may display meaningful differences across the biological sexes. In this
way, the actual causes of disease can be more effectively targeted on an individual
level.” Nathan Huey, Treating Men and Women Differently: Sex Differences in
the Basis of Disease, HARVARD UNIV. GRADUATE SCH. OF ARTS & SCIS. (Oct. 30,
2018), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2018/treating-men-and-women-different
ly-sex-differences-in-the-basis-of-disease/
[https://perma.cc/KQ6Q-XSMZ].
“Today, the importance of accounting for the variability between male and female
biology in research is widely recognized. There exists a clear contribution of
biological sex to health outcomes across a wide spectrum of conditions.” Id.
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other sex. Medicine cannot make a man into a woman.251 It is impossible
to “change” one’s sex.252
251. Ineradicable sex differences pervade human beings in ways that go beyond
the biology and chemistry of our bodies. Research in and the practice of psychiatry
and psychology depend upon undiminished clarity about the identity of a patient or
a research subject as male or female, unchanged from the moment of conception.
Clarity and consistency about sex is crucial in psychiatry and psychology for two
connected reasons. First, each person’s indelible reality as male or female pervades
the psyche, as well as the body, throughout the life of the individual. Second, there
is overwhelming scientific evidence that men and women are markedly different
across a whole range of cognitive and personality traits, elements of emotional
make-up, and aspects of psychological well-being.
These many differences include but go well beyond the obvious facts that
women are more relational than men, and that men are more reluctant to share their
feelings—such as they are—than women. Many other of these differences are
manifest for all to see. Researchers, most prominently including David P. Schmitt,
have shown that there are significant differences according to sex in other areas,
including sexual arousal patterns, attitudes, and behaviors, among many others. See,
e.g., David P. Schmitt, The Evolution of Culturally-Variable Sex Differences: Men
and Women Are Not Always Different, but when They Are…It Appears Not to Result
from Patriarchy or Sex Role Socialization, in THE EVOLUTION OF SEXUALITY 221,
222 (Todd K. Shackelford & Ranald D. Hansen eds., 2015). Schmitt references, for
example, one comprehensive review essay, which identified 63 “psychological sex
differences discussed that have been replicated across cultures.” Id. at 221 (citing
Lee Ellis, Identifying and Explaining Apparent Universal Sex Differences in
Cognition and Behavior, 51 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 552 (2011).
Of course, cultural patterns and social expectations partly explain some of these
differences. But Schmitt convincingly shows that these many differences cannot be
satisfactorily explained by a patriarchal (or any other) cultural pattern. “In fact,”
Schmitt writes, “most psychological sex differences . . . are conspicuously larger in
cultures with more egalitarian sex role socialization and greater sociopolitical
gender equity.” Id. at 222.
Among the most salient of these sex differences are those pertaining to
sex. The social scientific evidence about frequency of masturbation and
pornography use, see MARK REGNERUS, CHEAP SEX: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
MEN, MARRIAGE, AND MONOGAMY 140 (2017), the number of sexual partners,
see, e.g., Norman R. Brown & Robert C. Sinclair, Estimating Number of Lifetime
Partners: Men and Women Do It Differently, 36 J. SEX RES. 292, 292 (1999),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00224499909551999 [https://perma.cc/33HX-NXDF]
(analyzing why men tend to report more sexual activity than women), as well as
more qualitative research into the nature of male and female sex drive and their
preferred place of sex within the overall pattern of the relationship, see
REGNERUS, supra at 22–23, confirms that nature, and not just nurture or
socialization, explains the differences between men and women that almost
anyone who dated observed from the get-go. That the paraphilias listed in the
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Courts should not hesitate to affirm that each of us is an embodied
rational spirit, that each of us is our body, and that therefore no one is
“trapped” in the wrong one. These are truths no more recondite than the
truth that each of us began when we came to be as a conceptus. In fact,
they are different articulations of the same metaphysical reality. Courts as
well as other lawmakers should therefore reject a premise supporting the
“affirming” apparatus—that 16-year-old Peter, say, could be and is really
a girl. Doing so would practically dispose of cases like Drew Adams’,
where courts appear to have bought the proffered metaphysical mistake.
Doing so would greatly affect all other cases too. A judge or other public
authority could still hold that decent manners and a concern to relieve
psychic distress combine to make “affirming” policies the best way to go.
But affirming the truth of body-self identity would nonetheless deflate the
transgender plaintiffs’ intuitive appeal even in these cases. Affirmation
would also make much more plausible the truth that the better way to treat
the gender dysphoric is to help them align mind to body, as we treat
DSM 5 are, with the partial exception of sadomasochism, almost entirely male
phenomena, is further evidence. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 685–705 (5th ed. 2013). It is
perhaps most striking that pedophiles are almost all men.
These sex differences about sex largely explain the fact commonly
encountered by mental health professionals who treat, say, a transgender person
who has had surgeries and hormone treatments and who currently identifies as a
woman, for sexual behavioral or relationship problems. Unsurprisingly, these are
usually those of a man—because they are.
252. Transgender is not a third or intermediate sex as some advocates contend.
Based on “the neurobiological and genetic research on the origins of gender
identity, there is little evidence that the phenomenon of transgender identity has a
biological basis.” Mayer & McHugh, supra note 248, at 106. There could be some
biologically based influences which, when they interact with particular
environmental conditions, might predispose an individual to develop an “identity”
that is discordant with his or her sex. But this does not mean that anyone is
transgender; that is, a boy trapped in a girls’ body or vice versa.
[T]here are no studies that demonstrate that any of the biological
differences being examined have predictive power, and so all
interpretations, usually in popular outlets, claiming or suggesting that a
statistically significant difference between the brains of people who are
transgender and those who are not is the cause of being transgendered or
not— that is to say, that the biological differences determine the
differences in gender identity—are unwarranted.
In short, the current studies on associations between brain structure and
transgender identity are small, methodologically limited, inconclusive,
and sometimes contradictory.
Id. at 104.
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persons suffering from other delusions about their bodies, such as anorexia
nervosa: we do not “affirm” the delusion that of a slender person that he
or she is in fact overweight. Instead, we seek to bring the anorexic’s mind
into touch with the reality of his or her body and, usually, we try to help
them to gain weight!253
Affirming the truth would also make clearer the harm done to every
student attending a school with mandatory “affirming” policies. Again, the
number of transgender students is immaterial. Everyone in the school is
dramatically affected by “affirming” policies—not just Peter and the
handful of students who encounter him in the girls’ restroom. Wherever
school officials enact a “compelled affirmation” policy, every student’s
understanding of himself or herself as an embodied soul, as male or female
in body and mind, is threatened. Where the school promotes “affirmation,”
each student’s self-understanding as an integrated body-spirit unity is
contradicted. If anyone is trapped in the wrong body, everyone could be:
whether anyone is cisgender or transgender would be wholly a contingent
matter of fact. If Peter could really be a girl trapped in a boy’s body, then

253. For short science-based accounts of diagnosing and treating anorexia,
see, for example, Treating Anorexia Nervosa, HARVARD HEALTH PUBLISHING
(Aug. 2009), https://www.health.harvard.edu/newsletter_article/Treating-anorex
ia-nervosa [https://perma.cc/GSN2-2MAL]; Anorexia Nervosa, MAYO CLINIC,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/anorexia-nervosa/diagnosis-trea
tment/drc-20353597 [https://perma.cc/D6Y5-45M7] (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 288

5/26/21 11:50 AM

2021]

MORAL TRUTH

1397

“affirming” policies ratify and propagate—that is, teach—a false
metaphysical proposition 254 about the human person.255
254. It is of course true that, alongside the universal current appreciation of the
role of sex in understanding the human body and diseases, some say that “gender”
plays a comparable role. Madsen and her co-authors are among those who would
elevate the role of “gender” in science and medicine. Even so, these authors
emphasize that the terms “sex” and “gender” should never be confused with, or
treated as anything but, different names for different realities that can, in different
ways, each be relevant to medical research and practice.
But there is little scientific evidence for the proposition that “gender” or
“gender identity” is or can be a significant variable in research in biology or other
life sciences or in the clinical practice of medicine. Exaggerating the role of
“gender” (or “gender identity”) in science and medicine—and worse, likening its
importance to that of sex—deprecates the vastly more important role of sex as a
variable. It also produces harmful confusion within, and about, science and
medicine, in several ways:
First, “gender” can never be a significant factor in biology and medicine
for the simple reason that it has no biological basis, in the sense that (in the present
state of research), someone may claim to be a woman who has all the biological
and psychic characteristics of a man.
Second, “gender” could never be the factor in scientific research that sex
is because “gender” is multiple and mutable; that is, there are more than two
genders and many persons change their “gender identity” as they go through life.
“Gender” is therefore incapable of supplying the basis for rigorous multivariable
scientific analysis.
Third, “gender” is fluid where sex is not. That is, almost everyone is male
or female from top to bottom, and in every cell of his or her body. “Gender,” on
the other hand, is a malleable and fluctuating social construct which cleaves to
some proto- if not stereotypical conception of how a given culture defines
masculine and feminine. It is likely that, in any given social milieu, most men will
have some “feminine” traits, and most women will have some “masculine” traits.
Some persons will have substantial amounts of both. A few persons may be—in
the relevant sense of the term “gender”—equally male and female. To which
“gender” would they belong?
Fourth, “gender” is a social construct limited to human beings. The rest
of the animal kingdom lacks the rational apparatus to conjure “gender” and
“gender identity.” In fact, the rest of the animal kingdom lacks the wherewithal to
do more than instinctively distinguish male from female. Human beings alone
possess the cognitive and conceptual capacities to do all things, including to
classify the rest of the animal kingdom as male or female and to perform scientific
experiments upon them. The limited but still indispensable and substantial role of
research using non-human subjects in projects designed for the sake of human
patients therefore has no place in it for “gender” specific experiments.
In light of these differences between the two terms and the very limited
utility of “gender” in life sciences research and in medical practice, we question
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whether the increasing prominence of “gender” and “gender identity” alongside
sex specific research and treatments is itself a product of ideology, and not of
science.
255. On June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court decided three statutory
employment discrimination cases, collectively styled Bostock v. Clayton County.
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). One of them involved claims
by an adult transgender female—that is, someone biologically male—who was
fired by the Harris Funeral Home after informing the employer that “she” would
be presenting henceforth at work as a woman. The decision below in favor of the
employee is EEOC v. Harris Funeral Home, 884 F. 3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018). Aimee
Stephens intervened.
Because Harris is a statutory case that was decided according to an
assertedly strict textual analysis of Title VII’s ban on “sex” discrimination, its
salience in this discussion of constitutional conservatism as it bears upon
transgender persons is limited. The arguments addressed in the context of this
Article, moreover, pertain to a different transgender context: that of public
intimate facilities and students.
Even so, courts since Bostock have already exported its reasoning to Title
IX, as if Bostock resolved that statutory question as well as the one concerning
Title VII. See, for example, the Hecox, Adams, and Grimm cases discussed supra.
Because the Equal Protection Clause presumptively also makes “sex”
discrimination unconstitutional, Bostock is likely to soon start figuring in
transgender constitutional analyses as well. Besides, the inclusion of the Chief
Justice as well as Justice Gorsuch in the Bostock majority makes that opinion
worth considering with some care here. Gorsuch wrote that opinion.
The Bostock Court did not take the metaphysical leap, if you will, that the
Eleventh Circuit did in Adams. The Supreme Court did consistently refer to the
male plaintiff by his preferred name, “Aimee” Stephens. Sometimes Bostock
seemed to treat predications of male or female as entirely volitional, as if it is all
about “identifying” and “presenting,” and never about any biological fact of the
matter. In running a hypothetical argument, for example, Gorsuch wrote: “take an
employer who fires a transgender person who was identified as a male at birth but
who now identifies as a female. If the employer retains an otherwise identical
employee who was identified as female at birth . . . .” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741.
The Bostock Court also flirted with the apocalyptic alternative (a “trans woman”
like Stephens really is a woman) when Gorsuch wrote, “When she got the job,
Ms. Stephens presented as a male”—as if Stephens was truly a woman, albeit one
who earlier in life had other ideas. Id. at 1738.
The Supreme Court passed briskly, though without comment, over
“Aimee” Stephens’ psychiatric journey, saying only that “two years into her
service with the company, she began treatment for despair and loneliness.
Ultimately, clinicians diagnosed her with gender dysphoria and recommended
that she begin living as a woman.” Id. That is all.
The Bostock Court never consummated its flirtation with the
metaphysical apocalypse. Instead, through a skein of sophistical reasoning, the
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In other words, then: conservative reliance upon both the moral and
the metaphysical truth in the transgender bathroom cases explodes the
status quo in the courts: the benefits to the transgender of “affirming”
policies would be exposed as, at most, quite modest. And the harm to the
whole student body would be revealed to be enormous.
V. RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
On June 20, 2019, the Supreme Court finally surrendered. After nearly
five decades of fitful combat with its own Establishment Clause doctrine,
the Justices waved the white flag. The “Bladensburg Cross” case was
decided by a badly splintered Court—there was a total of seven
opinions.256 A majority of the Justices agreed, nonetheless, with the
substance of this part of Justice Alito’s plurality opinion: “Lemon [v.
Kurtzman] ambitiously attempted to distill from the Court’s existing case
law a test that would bring order and predictability to Establishment
Clause decisionmaking.”257 Alito understated the verdict: the expectation
of a ready framework “has not been met,” and “[i]n many cases, this Court
has either expressly declined to apply the test or simply ignored it.”258
The truth is less flattering. In American Legion, the Court mercifully
put down Lemon for all challenges to religious monuments and displays.
Beyond that, the reigning chaos continues. In his concurrence, Justice
majority mistakenly concluded that one could not discriminate against a
transgender person without discriminating “on the basis of sex.” The basic
thought seems to be this: you cannot judge that someone is transgender, and be
minded to “discriminate” against him or her, without thinking about their sex and
acting on that thought—which Title VII forbids. This is defective legal reasoning,
to be sure, and Congress never entertained such a thought. But the basic thought,
though quite erroneous, does not touch metaphysics, or whatever one should call
that sector of knowledge that affirms that every person is indelibly male or female
from the moment each comes to be at fertilization.
256. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
257. Id. at 2080. In Lemon, the Court declared that, to pass Establishment
Clause muster, a state act “must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with
religion.’” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–613 (1971) (internal citation
omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). Applications
of the test later in the 1970s (which had to do, as did Lemon, with state aid to
religious schools, the vast majority of which were Catholic), often dropped the
middle-term modifier: an(y) effect that advanced religion sufficed to establish
unconstitutionality.
258. American Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080.
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Kavanaugh said that the Alito opinion “identifies five relevant categories
of Establishment Clause cases,” which Kavanaugh dutifully listed.259 He
then asserted that the “Lemon test does not explain the Court’s decisions
in any of those five categories.”260
This bleak assessment is too generous. Lemon is one of the most
frequently, and most colorfully, derided Supreme Court cases that has
never been overruled (thus sparing Lemon competition with Plessy and
Lochner). The American Legion Court itself cited a huge critical chorus
comprised of scholars and lower-court judges alike.261 Supreme Court
Justices have often chimed in.262 As long ago as 1993, Justice Scalia
lampooned Lemon: “Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly
killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence
once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys.”263 It is so
bad now that one can get a laugh from professional audiences by posing
the question: is the infamous three-part test named “Lemon” due to one
party’s name—or because it works so poorly?
There is no longer anything that one could honestly call
“Establishment Clause doctrine.” There is a history of the relevant
Supreme Court Establishment Clause decisions, to be sure. But that is
259. Id. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Those categories are: “(1)
religious symbols on government property and religious speech at government
events; (2) religious accommodations and exemptions from generally applicable
laws; (3) government benefits and tax exemptions for religious organizations; (4)
religious expression in public schools; and (5) regulation of private religious
speech in public forums.” Id.
260. Id.
261. See id. at 2081 (“The test has been harshly criticized by Members of this
Court, lamented by lower court judges, and questioned by a diverse roster of
scholars.”) (internal citations omitted).
262. See, for example, Justice Alito’s criticism in American Legion. Id. at 2080
(“If the Lemon Court thought that its test would provide a framework for all future
Establishment Clause decisions, its expectation has not been met. In many cases,
this Court has either expressly declined to apply the test or has simply ignored it.
This pattern is a testament to the Lemon test’s shortcomings.”) (internal citations
omitted). In the same case Justice Thomas took over Justice Scalia’s earlier (2005)
criticism of the Lemon test: “‘[S]ince its inception,’” it has “‘been manipulated to
fit whatever result the Court aimed to achieve.’” Id. at 2098 (quoting McCreary
County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Justice
Thomas announced in American Legion that he “would take the logical next step
and overrule the Lemon test in all contexts.” Id. at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring).
263. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398
(1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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genealogy, not law. Alito described the prevailing approach in strikingly
non-doctrinal terms: the Court has “taken a more modest approach that
focuses on the particular issue at hand and looks to history for
guidance.”264 That history-guided focus on case-specific facts has
produced results no more coherent than the shambolic doctrine it would
supplant. Helpful generalization in American Legion got no further than a
self-styled “taxonomy” of Establishment Clause scenarios.265 Justice
Kavanaugh’s attempt to articulate a new synthesis of Establishment
Clause doctrine is nearly heroic; the reader may judge how closely the
heroism resembles that of the Light Brigade.266 It rather looks to me like
one more analytical vivisection of a distended corpus.
The American Legion Court’s mea culpas might lead readers to think
that they are attending Lemon’s funeral. In one of the first post-American
Legion monument decisions, the Eleventh Circuit pronounced that
“Lemon is dead.”267
“Well, sort of,” that court wrote in Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola.
“It’s dead, that is, at least with respect to cases involving religious displays
and monuments—including crosses.”268
264. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2087.
265. See id. at 2081 n.16.
266. Kavanaugh wrote:
[E]ach category of Establishment Clause cases has its own principles
based on history, tradition, and precedent. And the cases together lead to
an overarching set of principles: If the challenged government practice
is not coercive and if it (i) is rooted in history and tradition; or (ii) treats
religious people, organizations, speech, or activity equally to comparable
secular people, organizations, speech, or activity; or (iii) represents a
permissible legislative accommodation or exemption from a generally
applicable law, then there ordinarily is no Establishment Clause
violation.
Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). “That is not to say that challenged
government actions outside that safe harbor are unconstitutional. Any such cases
must be analyzed under the relevant Establishment Clause principles and
precedents.” Id. at 2093 n.*.
267. Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola, 949 F.3d 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2020).
268. Id. Proof of life includes the district court decision in an (in part)
Establishment Clause challenge to the University of Notre Dame’s decision to
charge students a co-pay for their contraceptives, in formal disregard of the HHS
mandate binding upon most secular employers to do otherwise. In Irish 4
Reproductive Health v. United States, Judge Simon wrote:
The test under the Establishment Clause, as first articulated in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, requires that government actions (1) have a “secular
legislative purpose,” (2) have a “principal or primary effect” that “neither
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The American Legion Court refused to kill this Lemon.
It is not that Lemon is no longer worth overruling, as if it is so hemmed
in now by later decisions that there is scarcely a lively precedent left to
jettison. Lemon’s doctrine—its infamous three-part test—is battered. But
the case’s principle stands tall; that is, although the Lemon test is battered,
it survived a near-death experience in American Legion. It also stands for
a principle that is a supremely important norm of American public life,269
one that has considerable downstream effects upon the way that critical
morality informs constitutional law and ordinary lawmaking.270 Lemon
made secularism the master principle of Establishment Clause law.
advances nor inhibits religion,” and (3) do not “foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion.” If the governmental action fails
any of the three parts of this test, it violates the Establishment Clause.
Although the Lemon test has been much criticized, the Seventh Circuit
continues to faithfully apply it.
I think the allegations are sufficient at this juncture to allege that the
[federal government exemption] Rules and [the United States’]
Settlement Agreement [with religious employers, including Notre
Dame] both impermissibly advance religion. “The secular purpose
required has to be genuine, not a sham, and not merely secondary to a
religious objective.” While a secular purpose may have been to settle
litigation, I’m not so sure these measures do not also have a principal
effect of advancing religion. Plaintiffs claim the Settlement Agreement
and Rules “have the primary purpose and principal effect of promoting,
advancing, and endorsing religion” . . . .
Irish 4 Reprod. Health v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Hum. Servs., 434 F. Supp. 3d 683,
709 (N.D. Ind. 2020) (internal citations omitted).
269. See, for example, how secularism is an overriding theme of President
Biden’s 2021 Inaugural Address, in Gerard V. Bradley, President Joe Biden’s
Blue America, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REGISTER (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.nc
register.com/commentaries/president-joe-biden-s-blue-america [https://perma.cc
/S98S-C6TG].
270. Among these downstream effects is not only the privatization of religion
(discussed further infra) but also the health of civil society. Especially as the
Mystery Passage takes deeper hold of that “morality” that public authorities—
large and small—are permitted by the Constitution to presuppose or endorse, the
eligibility of religious and religiously inspired educational, health, and social
service agencies to partner with government for the common good is seriously
compromised. Pending before the Court in early 2021 is one such case, which
involves Philadelphia’s termination of contractual relations with the Catholic
Archdiocese’s foster care service because of the Church’s refusal to service samesex couples in ways identical to married opposite-sex couples. See Fulton v. City
of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (Feb.
24, 2020) (No. 19-123).
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Lemon decreed that all public authorities—from the U.S. Congress
down to the humblest rural school board—must be neutral, not just among
religions, but about religion; that is, between religion and what the Court
often calls “irreligion”271 but which Justices sometimes refer to as “nonreligion.”272 This “neutral” ground is a secularized public realm, which
implies the privatization of religion. So, Chief Justice Burger wrote for
seven members of the Lemon Court that “the Constitution decrees that
religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the
institutions of private choice, and that while some involvement and
entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn.”273
This bold, privatizing imperative is encoded in Lemon’s twin
requirements that every public act have a “secular” purpose and that no
such act have the (primary or principal or just the) effect of “advancing”
religion.274 Lemon established—and the Court has since held—that
government efforts to promote religion, even where there is no coercion
or favoritism among the religions, lacks the requisite “secular” purpose.275
The Lemon Court presumed that government efforts to promote religion
even in the private sphere (say, by funding, without discrimination,
denominational schools) lacked the required “secular” purpose.276
The Supreme Court has not abandoned its Lemon-esque secularist
commitments, even though it is almost 30 years since the Court’s more
religion-friendly Justices began walking back some of Lemon’s privatizing
271. See, for example, Bd. of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687 (1994), where the majority stated that “government should not prefer
one religion to another, or religion to irreligion.” Id. at 703.
272. In Lee v. Weisman, Justice Souter wrote that “the State may not favor or
endorse either religion generally over nonreligion or one religion over others.”
505 U.S. 577, 627 (1992) (Souter, J, concurring). The most recent in a string of
high-court declarations to the same effect is by Justice Kagan, writing for Justices
Breyer and Sotomayor as well, in the February 5, 2021 decision in South Bay
United Pentecostal Church v Newsom. 141 S. Ct. 716, 720 (2021) (Kagan, J,
dissenting) (“We have held time and again that the First Amendment demands
‘neutrality’ in actions affecting religion. A government cannot put limits on
religious conduct if it ‘fail[s] to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers’ the
government’s interest ‘in a similar or greater degree.’”) (quoting Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 543 (1993)).
273. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
274. Id. at 612–13.
275. See supra notes 270–74 and infra notes 276–80 and accompanying text,
which illustrate precisely how the Court has creatively detoured around precisely
that constraining norm, in order to uphold against constitutional challenge various
sorts of government favor towards religion.
276. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
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effects.277 These results are welcome. The route to them was unfortunately
circuitous, detouring around Lemon’s secularist master principle rather
than rejecting it. The hodge-podge results are splayed across the pages of
American Legion.
In 1993, in Lamb’s Chapel, the Court first turned to free speech
doctrine to protect believers’ access to (in that case) public-school meeting
spaces.278 The key constitutional norm was a ban on discrimination
between religious speech and non-religious speech, at least with respect to
“viewpoints” on the same “subject.”279 Rosenberger two years later
continued this initiative by requiring a public university to treat a religious
student newspaper the same as its “secular” counterparts were treated, at
least when it came to funding.280 The Court has since sustained more overt
governmental religiosity, such as legislative prayer,281 Ten
Commandments plaques,282 and crosses on public land,283 over strenuous
objection by Justices keen to scrub government spaces of religion. But
religion-friendly (or, as you please, less secularist) Justices bled religion
out of these practices in order to save them. Religious monuments and the
like survived because conservatives adopted secular characterizations of
them, or by attributing to government an interest in some welcome secular
effects of religion. Legislative prayer was said to “solemnize the occasion”
or settle people down to serious business by a verbal formula which most
would associate with a sober frame of mind.284 The Court upheld
inanimate monuments by associating them, not with anything divine, but
with our country’s formerly more religious character, or by saying that
their surface religious connotations have been lost in the long march of
secularism through American history.285
277. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819 (1995); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Zelman v. SimmonsHarris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
278. See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. 384.
279. Id. at 393–94.
280. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
281. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
282. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
283. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2081 (2019).
284. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 583.
285. See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 690 (“Of course, the Ten
Commandments are religious—they were so viewed at their inception and so
remain . . . But Moses was a lawgiver as well as a religious leader. And the Ten
Commandments have an undeniable historical meaning, as the foregoing
examples demonstrate.”).
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This is precisely the path to American Legion. Justice Alito wrote:
Even if the original purpose of a monument was infused with
religion, the passage of time may obscure that sentiment. As our
society becomes more and more religiously diverse, a community
may preserve such monuments, symbols, and practices for the
sake of their historical significance or their place in a common
cultural heritage.286
Alito approvingly cited Justice Brennan’s opinion in Schempp: “[The]
government may originally have decreed a Sunday day of rest for the
impermissible purpose of supporting religion but abandoned that purpose
and retained the laws for the permissible purpose of furthering
overwhelmingly secular ends.”287 Alito added that, with “sufficient time,
religiously expressive monuments, symbols, and practices can become
embedded features of a community’s landscape and identity. The
community may come to value them without necessarily embracing their
religious roots.”288
To say that there is an Establishment Clause crisis would understate
the matter. A Court majority now needs only to breathe heavily on this
rotten door of doctrine to crash it in. The only way back to the
Constitution’s original public meaning is an unequivocal rejection, not just
of the Lemon test, but of the secularist principle which that test
operationalizes. That is a step that constitutional conservatives have been
unwilling to take.289
The American Legion Court refused to apply Lemon because doing so
would have put the Court at odds with the whole pre-1970 constitutional
tradition.290 The Court came face to face in American Legion with the truth
that Lemon’s secularizing impetus was ill-suited to the governance of (as
Justice Douglas once wrote) a “religious people whose institutions

286. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2083.
287. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 264–65
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
288. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2084.
289. In American Legion, only Justice Thomas would have (in his words)
“take[n] the logical next step and overrule[d] the Lemon test in all contexts.” Id.
at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Gorsuch seemed poised
to do so; he described the “now shelved” Lemon test as a “misadventure” and said
that the plurality had rightly repudiated it. Id. at 2101–02 (Gorsuch, J., concurring
in the judgment).
290. Id. at 2081
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presuppose a Supreme Being.”291 The Lemon test’s “shortcomings,” the
Court wrote, could be traced to the:
great array of laws and practices [that] came to the Court, [as] it
became more and more apparent that the Lemon test could not
resolve them. It could not “explain the Establishment Clause’s
tolerance, for example, of the prayers that open legislative
meetings . . . certain references to, and invocations of, the Deity
in the public words of public officials; the public references to
God on coins, decrees, and buildings; or the attention paid to the
religious
objectives
of
certain
holidays,
including
Thanksgiving.”292
The Court’s conservatives in American Legion saw plainly what they
had noted elsewhere when the Court upheld public religiosity (such as
legislative prayer, Ten Commandments displays, and the like).293 Religion
in America and in American constitutional law has long been an
irreplaceable public as well as private good.294 The Founding is
unfathomable without taking on board this commitment of those who
wrote and those who later ratified the Constitution. Lemon is incompatible
with our political and constitutional history. Anyone who is even a
lukewarm originalist cannot subscribe to Lemon.
As a matter of historical fact, public religion was strategically essential
to the Constitution’s successful operation. Public religion was comprised
of two main interlocking and mutually reinforcing components. Neither
was what might later be called a “civil religion,” that is, a synthesis of
history, extant religious references, and hagiographic pictures of key
political institutions, all meant to provide the polity with a sacred patina.295
James Madison expressed one of American public religion’s
components succinctly in Federalist 55.296 “[T]here is a degree of
depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection
and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a
certain portion of esteem and confidence.”297 America’s republican form
291. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
292. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080–81.
293. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); Am.
Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2081.
294. See generally GERARD V. BRADLEY, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2008).
295. See infra text accompanying notes 296–311.
296. THE FEDERALIST No. 55 (James Madison).
297. Id.
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of government “presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher
degree than any other form.”298 But, if free government depends upon an
especially virtuous citizenry for its survival, how would the citizens—
consistent with their eschewal of the chains of despotism—be made and
kept virtuous?
According to John Adams, “religion and virtue” were the only
foundations, not only of republicanism, “but of Social Felicity under all
Governments and in all the Combinations of human Society.”299 Our first
President said that of “all the dispositions and habits which lead to political
prosperity, Religion and Morality are indispensable supports.”300
Washington added, in his Farewell Address: “And let us with caution
indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without Religion.
Whatever may be conceded of the influence of refined education on minds
of peculiar structure; reason and experience both forbid us to expect that
national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.”301
Reverend Isaac Backus was perhaps the most influential member of the
Protestant clergy during the Founding years. He opined that religion
keeps alive the best sense of moral obligation . . . The fear and
reverence of God and the terrors of eternity are the most powerful
restrains upon the mind of men. And hence it is of special
importance in a free government, the spirit of which being always
friendly to the sacred rights of conscience; it will hold up the
Gospel as the great rule of faith and practice.302
Even the Founding era’s most prominent skeptic of revealed religion saw
it as an essential asset to the polity. Thomas Jefferson said in 1781 that
American liberty depended on a popular perception that it was the gift of
God, and he thought it politically beneficial if Americans privately decided
that there was “only one God, and he all perfect” and that there was a
future state of rewards and punishments.303
Probably the most perspicuous statement in early American history of
this complex of ideas is in the Northwest Ordinance, a territorial
298. Id.
299. 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 635, 636 (C. Adams ed. 1854) (letter of
Adams to Benjamin Rush of Aug. 28, 1811).
300. 35 WRITINGS OF WASHINGTON 229 (United States George Washington
Bicentennial Commission ed. 1940).
301. Id.
302. ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM 353 (W.G.
McLoughlin ed. 1968).
303. See W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 31 (1976).
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organizing act passed first by the transitional Confederation legislature
and reiterated by Congress several times thereafter:304 “Religion, Morality,
knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of
mankind, Schools and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged.”305 In other words, they are necessary to both the public and
personal flourishing.306 Private virtue is essential to public well-being.307
This organic act of territorial governance was not guilty of idle opining.
To put its resources behind its thoughts, the national government reserved
304. After ratification of the Bill of Rights, Congress endorsed the 1787 action
in its entirety. During the incumbencies of Adams and Jefferson, Indiana (1800),
Michigan (1805), and Illinois (1809) territories were organized by re-enactment
of the Northwest Ordinance. President Madison signed the bill organizing
Missouri territory on basically the same footing.
305. Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 52 (1789).
306. Confirmation of this broad consensus is supplied by two superb scholars,
the historian of American religion R.L. Moore and the (late) political philosopher
Isaac Kramnick, in their sympathetic study of American atheism, Godless Citizens
in a Godly Republic. Moore and Kramnick wrote:
[Religious Americans] argue that they are uniquely equipped to bring
moral principles to America’s public square. It’s a claim with a lineage
stretching back to the country’s founders. Our forebears believed that the
novel experiment of a democratic republic could not function without a
consensus around moral principles rooted in theistic religion. Whatever
their disagreements about the content of religion, they were united in
their conviction that a heavenly Creator had laid down a plan for virtuous
living which democratic citizens could discover by reason, or faith, or a
combination of the two. Given this historically grounded belief—and it
amounts to far more than a ceremonial deism, a phrase that would have
meant nothing to our founders—it’s worth dwelling on the question of
what exactly people who dismiss the idea of a heavenly Creator can offer
a democratic society.
R.L MOORE & ISAAC KRAMNICK, GODLESS CITIZENS IN A GODLY REPUBLIC 96
(2018).
307. The ubiquity of this conviction that personal piety and rectitude were
necessary to the commonweal is demonstrated by a glance at the first constitutions
of the thirteen original states. They are replete with unequivocal statements of the
commitment. See I FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS,
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (Poore 2nd ed. 1972). This
vital connection was buttressed by the widespread but not nearly ubiquitous belief
that God’s Providence was such that the Almighty might punish the entire
political community for the backsliding of many, or even just some—as the
Israelites were often reminded. See Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test
Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of
Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 685 (1987).
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real estate in township then and thereafter being platted for settlement to
schools and to churches.308
Why, then, are conservatives unwilling to act boldly to take back this
part of church-state constitutional law from judicial activists? Why do the
Court’s conservatives evidently prefer a soft (or porous) secularism to
originalism? Why do they not reject outright the latter-day privatization of
religion?
There is a second vein of evidence running through American history
that compounds this mysterious conservative reticence. In the beginning,
American governments—federal, state, territorial—forthrightly affirmed
the truths of natural religion: the “Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”
emboldened the revolutionaries in Philadelphia, as did their belief that
everyone was “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights.”309 Before and after the Founding, civil governments in America
affirmed truths such as God’s eternal existence and creation of all there is;
God’s providential care for humankind, including promulgation of moral
law for guidance of human affairs; and some form of afterlife in which the
guilty suffered and the virtuous prospered, or what was often called,
compactly, a “future state of rewards and punishments.”310
Owen Anderson aptly wrote: “The United States was founded on
natural religion.”311 In the Declaration of Independence, our Founders
declared: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”312
Nearly two centuries later, in School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp, the Supreme Court said that the “fact that the Founding Fathers
believed devotedly that there was a God and the unalienable rights of man
were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their writings, from the
Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself.”313
308. 1 Stat. 52 (1789).
309. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
310. James H. Hutson, “A Future State of Rewards and Punishment”: The
Founders’ Formula for the Social and Political Utility of Religion, in FORGOTTEN
FEATURES OF THE FOUNDING: THE RECOVERY OF RELIGIOUS THEMES IN THE
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1–44 (James H. Hutson ed., 2003).
311. Owen Anderson, The First Amendment and Natural Religion, in THE
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 15,
16 (Breidenbach & Anderson eds., 2020).
312. Id.
313. School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213 (1963).
Attorney General William Barr delivered a speech at the Notre Dame Law School
on October 11, 2019, in which he gave voice to the perennial American tradition
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Where public authority affirms that there is a God, as in the National
Motto, the Pledge of Allegiance, and as Lincoln did in his Second
Inaugural, lawmakers did not abandon a proper concern for the common
good for evangelization or religious opining. If anyone today asserted that
these affirmations lack a “secular” purpose, the Founders would be
puzzled. They did not use the term “secular” when they talked about
religion and the polity. For them, governmental care for the common good
included care for religion as part of that common good, even as the
distinctive beliefs and practices of the sundry particular churches and sects
were considered (in our parlance more than theirs) to be “private.” If the
Founders were pressed further to articulate this arrangement, they likely
would have said that, while religion was undeniably a distinct and
incommensurate part of human experience which could be distinguished
from other human goods (such as life itself, knowledge, and morality), the
common good of the political community included religion, which public
authority had a limited but still important duty to foster. 314
Public hosannas did not drift away into the mists of American history
with the Founders’ passing. The 1950s were as a matter of fact a time of
profound ressourcement, a return to the religious sources of the republic
evidenced chiefly by the resurgence of government affirmation of truths
about divine maters accessible to, and affirmable on the basis of, unaided
human reason. Notable examples of that revival included Congress’s
addition in 1954 of “under God” to the Pledge of Allegiance and
of thought about religion and our free republic, a tightly bound nest of convictions
into which any originalist account of constitutional doctrine must coherently and
comfortably fit. In a characteristic excerpt, Barr said:
From the Founding Era onward, there was strong consensus about the
centrality of religious liberty in the United States. The imperative of
protecting religious freedom was not just a nod in the direction of piety.
It reflects the Framers’ belief that religion was indispensable to
sustaining our free system of government . . . In short, in the Framers’
view, free government was only suitable and sustainable for a religious
people – a people who recognized that there was a transcendent moral
order antecedent to both the state and man-made law and who had the
discipline to control themselves according to those enduring principles.
As John Adams put it, “We have no government armed with the power
which is capable of contending with human passions unbridled by
morality and religion. Our Constitution was made only for a moral and
religious people. It is wholly inadequate for the government of any
other.”
William Barr, Attorney General, Remarks to the Law School and de Nicola
Center for Ethics and Culture at the University of Notre Dame (Oct. 11, 2019).
314. See BRADLEY, supra note 294, at 7–21.
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establishment of our national motto (“In God We Trust”) in 1956.315 These
actions faithfully reflected the Founders’ worldview, with the important
qualification that by the 1950s a broad Judeo-Christian ethic had
supplanted the Founders’ more frankly Christian foundation. Presidentelect Dwight Eisenhower said, at the Waldorf Astoria hotel on December
22, 1952, that “our form of government . . . has no sense unless it is
founded in a deeply felt religious faith, and I don’t care what it is. With us
of course it is the Judeo-Christian concept but it must be a religion that all
men are created equal.”316 Here Eisenhower echoed the Supreme Court
declaration earlier that year that “[we] are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”317
All these principles of natural religion were sharply contrasted by the
Founders, and by generations following them, to the particularities of the
various “sects.”318 Before and after the Founding, anyone could see that
the various churches and religious groups were distinguished one from the
other mainly by what each added to natural religion. Some of these
additions were matters believed to be revealed. Others were humanly
established conventions and rules, accoutrements of religious living, both
solo and in community. One could and the Founders did contrast,
therefore, “natural religion” with “revealed” and “positive” religion. The
latter matters were vitally important to believers (including leading
national political figures). Denominations often bitterly split over finer
points of doctrine or worship, for instance.319
The Founders wisely judged that their polity could flourish without
enforced unanimity about, or a top-down settlement of, these questions.
The common good did not require, for example, government favor towards
a particular form of liturgy. Nor did it necessitate authoritative adoption of
any one church’s creed. Theologians might contend over the details of
faith and worship. To the statesman, they could nevertheless be matters of
opinion. The lawmaker labored under an authoritatively stipulated
incompetence when it came to matters of religious doctrine, church
discipline, modes of worship, and manner of a religious community’s
internal governance. The truth or falsity of these matters, even recognizing
315. See 68 Stat. 249 (1954); 70 Stat. 732 (1956).
316. MARK SILK, SPIRITUAL POLITICS: RELIGION AND AMERICA SINCE WORLD
WAR II 40 (1988).
317. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (emphasis added).
318. See Gerard V. Bradley, The Challenge Ahead: Reconnecting Religion,
Reason, and Truth, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 311, at 438–40.
319. See GERARD V. BRADLEY, ESSAYS ON LAW, RELIGION, AND MORALITY
121–40 (2014) (Ch. 7, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause).
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that they were the kinds of things that could be true or false, was strictly
beyond the ken of public authority.
This was non-establishment.320 It is the meaning of the justly famous
(because thematic of our constitutional settlement) Watson v. Jones
anthem: “The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no
dogma, the establishment of no sect.”321 This mandate that government be
neutral about doctrine, discipline, worship, and polity—and, in that
manner, that it maintain a strict neutrality among the religions, thereby
treating them equally—has not atrophied with time or evaporated with the
proliferation of religious beliefs. It is still the cornerstone of church-state
constitutional law, including the Establishment Clause.322

320. See GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA
(1987); ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL
FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1988).
321. 80 U.S. 679, 728 (1871) (emphasis added). This passage indicates that
the state’s incompetence is limited to matters or revealed and positive religion.
322. The line of successor cases to Watson v. Jones, which is the line of
“church autonomy” decisions (mostly about intra-communal property disputes),
culminates in the Court’s most recent, Jones v. Wolf. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). It is
also the heart of Free Exercise doctrine. In Employment Division v. Smith, the
Supreme Court wrote that:
It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point),
that a state would be “prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]” if it
sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for
religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display.
It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting
of “statues that are to be used for worship purposes,” or to prohibit
bowing down before a golden calf.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990). The Smith Court did not use the original
vocabulary—of doctrine, discipline, worship, church polity. Its holding
nonetheless tracked closely the Founders’ stipulated incompetence. Smith stands
for the proposition that, where a government action is judged to depend upon—
presuppose, imply—the lawmaker’s disapproval or opposition to a church’s
manner of worship (to use the Court’s example), the lawmaker has violated the
Free Exercise Clause. In none of these categories of church-state cases, however,
does the constitutional abstinence necessarily breach the Lemon secularist
command that religion be private. Much of the impetus of the “church autonomy”
holdings has been to keep courts (and other public authorities) from picking
winners and losers within churches on any ground touching religion itself. Where
states or the federal government have accepted the Court’s invitation in Smith to
exempt believers from burdens imposed by general laws, the rationale is that the
excusing government entity is removing some burden it imposed on believers and
thus re-introducing the “neutral” attitude proper to government, or it is
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No sitting Justice but one is on record as disagreeing with the Court’s
declaration in 1947 that the “‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion . . . or prefer one religion over another.”323
Several Supreme Court decisions have rested upon this core
understanding of the Establishment Clause. Larson v Valente is probably
the most prominent of them.324 It held that the “clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another.”325 This norm of no-preference among
the religions is often the basis of dissents by separationist stalwarts on the
Court. Justice Kagan’s opinion in Town of Greece v. Galloway is one
recent example.326
All of the present Justices hold, however, that there is more to the
doctrine of the Establishment Clause. For all of them, it is the original and
still foundational neutrality about doctrine, discipline, worship and
polity—plus! All of them still hold that the “plus” includes a principled
commitment to secularism, as the ellipsis in the Everson quotation, which
was filled with the words “aid all religions,” indicated.327

controversial, arguably a violation precisely of the Lemon requirement that
government be “neutral” between religion and non-religion.
323. Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). Justice
Thomas joined opinions by Justice Scalia in which Scalia asserted that the
Establishment Clause permits the government to promote religion over nonreligion, and even to promote and prefer monotheism to non-monotheistic
religions. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 401 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (religion in general);
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 899–900 (2005) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (monotheism). To my knowledge, Justice Thomas has not
reasserted this position since 2005, despite a manifest willingness to write
separately in defense of his view of the Establishment Clause. Whether he stands
by the views Scalia asserted in these opinions the latest of which was penned 15
years ago is not entirely clear. In the remainder of my treatment of the sitting
Justices, therefore, I qualifiedly include Justice Thomas among those who do not
challenge Everson’s master principle of secularism.
324. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
325. Id. at 244.
326. See 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
327. Thus, the full quote: “The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another.” Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (1947).
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This does not mean that there are no important differences among the
Justices. In the last 50 years, however, only three Justices plainly called
for a return to the original meaning: then Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Wallace v. Jaffree,328 and Justices Scalia and Thomas in Lamb’s Chapel
and McCreary County.329 Only Thomas remains on the Court. He has not
revisited that declaration of support since 2005, notwithstanding his
willingness to defy Establishment Clause conventions in his bold call to
undo the “incorporation” effected by judicial fiat of the Court in the 1947
Everson case.330
Thomas most recently has championed an “actual coercion” test as the
sect-equality plus factor. Justice Thomas wrote in the Bladensburg Cross
case that the sort of “coercion that was a hallmark of historical
establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of
financial support by force of law and threat of penalty,” citing a dissenting
opinion by Justice Scalia in Lee v. Weisman, from 1992.331
In the face of powerful historical evidence of the Establishment
Clause’s original public meaning, and in light of the whole Court’s
embrace of that original meaning, why has not so much felt dissatisfaction
with the status quo led at least five Justices to simply abandon Lemon?
Why do the Court’s constitutional conservatives cling to the “plus,”
especially when they cannot agree on what the “plus” factor is, and can
scarcely conceal their contempt for the results the “plus” hath wrought?
328. 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The Establishment
Clause did not require government neutrality between religion and irreligion nor
did it prohibit the Federal Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to
religion.”).
329. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 400 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also supra note 323.
330. See, e.g., Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 604. (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining that the text and history of the
Establishment Clause resist incorporation against the states). There is a case to be
made for disincorporation, along the lines indicated by Justice Thomas. It is
nonetheless a position destined to attract no additional support.
331. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2096 (2019)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Thomas’s position is mistaken. A legal
arrangement in which, say, only the Anglican Church could legally incorporate
and where its marriages were automatically registered as public acts, and where
its vestrymen served by dint of ecclesial office as local distributors of aid to the
poor, would surely be an “establishment,” though its privileged position would be
“coercive” in only the very attenuated sense that any legal arrangement does a
certain amount of line-drawing (inclusion and exclusion), which in turn is backed
finally by coercive sanctions. Such an arrangement need not involve any
“coercion” of belief or of financial support of anyone disinclined to give it.
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The distinction between natural and revealed religion that underwrites
the original understanding is scarcely a challenge to grasp, even for an
unbeliever. It is the difference between those propositions about divine
realties that can be affirmed by unaided human reason, and those that can
be affirmed only by aid of revelation, including the information
transmitted in texts regarded by believers as divinely inspired.
Incorporating the distinction into a working judicial repertoire, however,
is an additional task, a job that runs against the grain of contemporary
constitutional conservatism. For doing so depends upon a robust
willingness to not only reject secularism. It depends, too, upon an embrace
of critical reason, along with a willingness to declare that unaided human
reason can affirm as true certain propositions about divine realities. But
conservatives seem no more willing to reintroduce, and then to rely upon,
this crucial distinction than are even the most secular-minded members of
the Court.
Why not? One reason is likely that these Justices have been ill-served
by scholarship about religion, the Founding, and the First Amendment.332
Most of the many historical essays offered by members of the Court,
starting in Everson in 1947, have peddled an imagined past suited to
current secularist preoccupations.333 Much Establishment Clause
scholarship bears the same defect. There are many examples of sound
judicial essays, however, most notably including Justice Rehnquist’s
dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree.334 The historical fictions
produced by Justices Black, Rutledge, and Frankfurter in Everson were
powerfully rebutted within a year by a learned historical brief filed for the
religion-permissive school district, in the McCollum case.335 Much equally
sound scholarship on religion and the Founding has long been available,
too.336 Any Justice who clings to a secularized narrative about the
Establishment Clause does so in the face of compelling contrary
evidence.337
332. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Review of The Establishment Clause:
Religion and the First Amendment by Leonard W. Levy, 29 J. CHURCH & STATE
535–36 (1987); Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the
Siren Soong of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1991).
333. See, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, Imagining the Past and Remembering the
Future: The Supreme Court’s History of the Establishment Clause, 18 CONN. L.
REV. 827 (1986).
334. See 472 U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
335. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
336. See, e.g., BRADLEY, supra note 320; CORD, supra note 320.
337. Indeed, the Court’s June 30, 2020 opinion in Espinoza v. Montana, where
a majority comprised of the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch,

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 307

5/26/21 11:50 AM

1416

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

and Kavanaugh invalidated the operation of Montana’s “Blaine Amendment,”
indicates ignorance of this indispensable distinction. The Chief Justice wrote in
the opening paragraph of the Court’s opinion that the Montana constitutional
provision barred public aid to any school “controlled . . . by any ‘church, sect, or
denomination” (emphasis added). Neither the word “religion” nor cognates (such
as “religious”) appear anywhere in the text of the state law. The Court and each
of the Justices who wrote separately nonetheless treated the text as if it said
“religion”, instead of “church, sect, or denomination.” “Religion” and
“denomination” evidently are synonyms, as far as the Court is concerned. In fact,
they are not. And they surely were not used as synonyms by those 19th century
public figures whose actions the various Justices examined at length in their
Espinoza opinions.
In general (and here quoting from historian Elwyn Smith’s fine work,
Religious Liberty in the United States), “sect” was then predominantly used with
respect to the various divisions within Christianity. It referred to “the spirit of
quarrelsomeness and schism, precianism in theology, and refusal to collaborate in
in common evangelical enterprises.” “Sect” was almost synonymous with
“denomination,” and it indicated the differences between, say, Presbyterians and
Methodists. Any doubt that Catholicism was included within language like
Montana’s—doubt arising from, among other sources, that Church’s refusal to
consider itself a “sect” or a “denomination”—was removed by including the word
“church.”
Saying that a school controlled” by a “sect,” “denomination,” or “church”
was ineligible for state aid did not, therefore, amount to saying—as the Espinoza
Justices assumed that it did—that “religious” or “religiously-affiliated” schools
were ineligible. Indeed, one intended effect of “Blaine Amendments” such as
Montana’s was to stymie aid to Catholic schools (which were indeed “controlled”
by that “church”) while permitting it to “non-denominational” (that is: Protestant)
private schools “controlled” by a board of directors which probably included a
few ministers and some others among the “best men” of the locale. The nondenominationally Protestant public schools carried on unmolested by Blaine
Amendments, too.
A glance at the proposed Blaine Amendment to the national Constitution
confirms all this. The original version introduced by Congressman James G.
Blaine in the House in December 1875 stated that “no money raised by taxation
in any state for the support of any public schools or derived from any public fund
therefore, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of
any religious sect.” [Emphasis added here, and hereafter.] The version passed in
the House of Representatives (by a 180–7 margin, with 98 abstentions) stated in
relevant part: “under the control of any religious or anti-religious sect,
organization, or denomination, or wherein the particular creed or tenets of any
religious or anti-religious sect, organization, or denomination shall be taught”.
The final sentence of this version stipulated, however, that “[t]his article shall not
be construed to prohibit the reading of the bible in any school or institution.”
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Another part of any answer to that question lies in conventional legal
reasoning as generally practiced by the Court’s conservatives. This
defining commitment makes them averse to a large-caliber about-face in
an area so important as that concerning church and state. The
conservatives’ indifference to the question of constitutional personhood
for the unborn is another example of this same reticence. So is the fact that
there is no appetite among the Court’s conservatives to revisit the basic
holding in Obergefell, notwithstanding their loud protests in that case that
the majority’s decision altogether lacked the indicia of constitutional law.
Still another part of an answer to the mystery of conservative
reluctance to embrace originalism and the Establishment Clause is that
applying the original meaning cuts a certain equality among religions.
Among the matters that distinguish the various religious groups are their
claims about natural religion. The religions differ in sometimes dramatic
ways about what humans can reasonably affirm about God by dint of
reason, and what can only be known through revelation. Religious skeptics
and atheists fall outside the margins. “Skeptics” characteristically hold that
no putative truth about divine things can confidently be asserted. The latter
typically hold that we can know that there is no God. This pluralism blocks
judicial resort to a least common denominator or a hypothesized Esperanto
as the measure of constitutionally required “neutrality” among the
religions. For anyone can see that the only way to avoid contradicting one
or more of these viewpoints is to say nothing at all about divine things.
Hence, the religiously bare public square.
The constitutionally required “neutrality” is a rather critical kind. It
involves critical reasoning about which propositions about religious
matters human persons can affirm without the aid of revelation or
authoritative religious texts, and which propositions can only be affirmed

A different version barely failed to attract the necessary two-thirds votes
in the Senate. (The tally was 28–16 in favor.) New Jersey Senator Freylinghuysen
explained how the distinction which the Court missed was central to the whole
enterprise:
Institutions supported by the money of all persuasions…are not to be
made schools for teaching presbytrianism, or catholicism, Unitarianism,
or Methodism, or infidelity, or atheism, and this article says so. But this
article goes no further. There is nothing in it that prohibits religion as
distinguished from the particular creeds or tenants of religious and antireligious sects and denominations being taught anywhere.
A broad national movement against “sectarianism” in education was accompanied
by a re-emphasis upon the essential role that religion played in any sound
educational program.
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(or denied) based upon access to revelation. There is no evident interest in
this exercise among the courts’ constitutional conservatives.
There is one more possible basis for conservatives’ reluctance to
overthrow Lemon’s privatization project. It is the thought that,
notwithstanding the carnivalesque results which that project so often
produces, it might be sound: religion is and ought to be private. The main
supposition here would be that religion is really a matter of individual and
group “identity.” The Supreme Court began installing this thought in our
fundamental law more than a half-century ago. It found anthem-like
expression in the Mystery Passage. Now religious liberty is in peril of
collapsing into an aspect of the single constitutional liberty to define
oneself and one’s universe. The question is whether constitutional
conservatives will stymie its progress before our culture is “all one thing.”
Originalism, in partnership with critical reasoning about divine realities,
provides the tools needed to do so.338
VI. JUSTICE SCALIA’S PREDILECTIONS
Constitutional conservatism was conceived under duress of what was
diagnosed as Warren- and early Burger-era activism.339 Originalism is part
of that reaction. But it is quite distinct from conservatism’s characteristic
moral abstinence. The two have long existed in tension. The abstinence
lately eclipsed the originalism. It is time to consider the judicial approach
of the last half-century’s greatest Supreme Court Justice. Antonin Scalia
maintained a distinctive and immensely influential version of
contemporary constitutional conservatism. This Part of the Article takes a
critical look at it.

338. It is true that religions include subjective experiences, as well as stories
and prescriptions that are historical and contingent. But religions are more. They
are more or less reasonable accounts of reality in all of its breadth, including its
furthest reaches, visible and invisible. The indispensable criterion of a religion’s
value is whether it is true. The central value of religious liberty is the protection
it offers to those who seek the truth about the cosmos and who resolve to live their
lives in accord with what they believe to be the truth about all that there is. Sever
it from this fountainhead in the search for the truth about all that there is, and
religious liberty simply becomes something radically different than it was for the
Founders, and for the many generations of Americans thereafter who held the faith
of the fathers.
339. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Towards a Jurisprudence of Original Intent,
11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 5 (1988); ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA (1990).
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“I take the need for theoretical legitimacy seriously,” Scalia wrote in
a 1989 law review article,340 explaining why he approached constitutional
law the way that he did. The “main danger in judicial interpretation of the
Constitution,” he asserted, is “that the judges will mistake their own
predilections for the law.”341 We have no reason to consider Scalia’s usage
to be anything but standard: “predilection” means predisposition, what the
Oxford-English Dictionary defines as “a preference or liking for
something; a proclivity; the fact of having such a liking or preference.”342
It is either close to or the same thing that Holmes famously described as a
man’s “can’t helps.”343 Note that “predilections” so understood make no
claim to be true, or to be sound or valid in any useful sense of those
evaluative terms. They are rather facts about certain people; in this
instance, about judges. We have no reason to doubt, though, that what
Scalia personally held about value and morality, he held to be true. When
presented to the mind of Scalia, the Article III judge in a constitutional
case, however, even those truths would count for him as suspect biases—
as his “predilections”—against which the strictures of his constitutional
conservatism equally applied.
In the same essay, Justice Scalia expressed another worry about the
legitimacy of judicial review. This one he described as “central.” It was
“the perception that the Constitution, though it has an effect superior to
other laws, is in its nature the sort of ‘law’ that is the business of the
courts—an enactment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the
usual devices familiar to those learned in the law.”344 This second worry
leads straightaway to judicial interpretation of the Constitution by and
through conventional legal reasoning. To highlight the peculiar
temptations of judging in constitutional cases, Scalia wrote that “the main
danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution—or, for that matter, in

340. Scalia, supra note 27, at 862.
341. Id. at 863.
342. Predisposition, OXFORD-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 2020).
343. See Adam J. White, ‘Oliver Wendell Holmes’ Review: The Maximal
Minimalist, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/oliverwendell-holmes-review-the-maximal-minimalist-11558707999 [https://perma.cc
/D79H-U43R] (citing a letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to the philosopher
William James in which Holmes said, “All I mean by truth is what I can’t help
thinking”). Later in the essay Justice Scalia seems to use the term “judicial
personalization of the law” as a synonym for “predilection” or, perhaps, as the
inevitable effect of it. Scalia, supra note 27, at 863.
344. Scalia, supra note 27, at 854.
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judicial interpretation of any law—is that the judges will mistake their
own predilections for the law.”345
Scalia’s “main” worry comes into clearer view when it is silhouetted
against an appeal to evolving societal notions of morality.346 Scalia
asserted that “nonoriginalism” like Brennan’s is “incompatib[le] with the
very principle that legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality.”347
“[E]ven if one assumes (as many nonoriginalists do not even bother to do)
that the Constitution was originally meant to expound evolving rather than
permanent values,” Scalia added, “I see no basis for believing that
supervision of the evolution would have been committed to the courts.”348
Scalia offered two reasons to welcome the absence of a basis. One is
that elected legislatures are better able to enact “current values” into law
than are judges.349 The other reason is that it forestalls judicial assumption
of an always-fraught task. “It is very difficult for a person to discern a
difference between those political values that he personally thinks most
important, and those political values that are ‘fundamental to our society,’”
he wrote, referring to one badge of judicial activism, namely, judges’
identification, not of their own, but of the system’s “fundamental”
values.350 Justice Scalia emphasized that “[a]voiding this error is the

345. Id. at 863 (emphasis added). Robert Bork expressed a very similar worry
in a 1982 National Review essay: “The truth is that the judge who looks outside
the Constitution always looks inside himself and nowhere else.” The precise
meaning intended by Bork could be debated. But his comments provoke wonder
about whether only judges are so prone to this crude skepticism (even solipsism),
or whether other lawmakers—if not everyone—are as well. Is genuine moral
knowledge (as opposed to “can’t helps”) possible for anyone? The central position
of constitutional conservatives seems to be that, as an axiom of constitutional if
not of all legal reasoning, one should presume that skepticism is inescapably the
case. To finish off their point about “legitimacy,” conservatives then typically rely
upon a crude theory of democracy under our Constitution: popular and legislative
majorities have plenary authority to do something which judges should never do,
namely, enact their “can’t helps” into law and impose them upon everybody else,
save where the Constitution’s plain meaning denies them that authority.
346. The schematic text is William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the
United States: Contemporary Ratification”, 43 GUILD PRAC. 1 (1986), reprinted
(along with Meese, supra note 339), in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove, ed. 1990).
347. Scalia, supra note 27, at 854.
348. Id. at 862.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 863. “If the Constitution were not that sort of a ‘law,’ but a novel
invitation to apply current societal values, what reason would there be to believe
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hardest part of being a conscientious judge.”351 He cautioned that
“[n]onoriginalism, which under one or another formulation invokes
‘fundamental values’ as the touchstone of constitutionality, plays precisely
to this weakness.”352
Justice Scalia’s contrast between what he calls “permanent” and
“evolving” values invites a close look. The words he used could by
themselves bear a reading which aligns his thought closely with the theses
of this Article, namely, that critically justified moral and metaphysical
truths (permanent values?) are part of the Constitution, and these vital
elements are not to be confused with “evolving” or “current” values
(which are in any event facts about social consensus or convention). On
this view, Scalia might be saying that, although the engagement may
invariably be perilous and must always be done with exquisite care, judges
are sometimes obliged to engage critically with the normative world
outside the Constitution, if they are to faithfully apply the Constitution at
all. In other words, Scalia might be saying what this Article maintains,
which is that the right legal answer to a constitutional question sometimes
depends upon the right philosophical answer to a question raised but not
resolved by the constitutional text or structure or the history of its
adoption. The first five parts of this Article supply examples of this
recurring challenge.
In fact, this is not what Justice Scalia is saying. His positions on the
examples explored in the first five parts of this Article show that it is not.
It is apparent, too, from the context of his remarks in “Lesser Evil” that he
is referring to a different dyad. He has in mind the contrast between those
value judgments which were included in the Constitution and, for that
reason, count as “permanent,” and those which are not in the Constitution
but which have made their way into people’s minds today. It is evident,
too, that the “evolution” Scalia pictures pertains to popular understandings
of certain values, notions that may be reflected in legislation so long as
they do not transgress the “permanent”—that is, fixed, settled, established
minimum—meaning of them in the Constitution.353
that the invitation was addressed to the courts rather than to the legislature?” Id.
at 854.
351. Id. at 863.
352. Id.
353. See, for example, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012), a Fourth
Amendment case about police tracking a car by a GPS device that they
surreptitiously installed on its outside body. It is a good example of this
relationship between history and “permanent” value in Scalia’s jurisprudence. He
wrote there for the Court that “we must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
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This usage is confirmed by how Scalia wrote in 1989 about one of the
most contentious sites of “evolving” constitutional jurisprudence. He
wrote that one could say “it was originally intended that the cruel and
unusual punishment clause would have an evolving content—that ‘cruel
and unusual’ originally meant ‘cruel and unusual for the age in
question.’”354 Scalia contrasted this reference to conventional moral
convictions today, to “cruel and unusual in 1791,” another reference to
convention or consensus, this time to what the ratifying generation as a
matter of fact held.355
Justice Scalia’s “originalism” is secondary to his worry about
“predilections” mistaken by judges for the law. His originalism is the best
suited among available imperfect options to avoid “aggravat[ing] the most
significant weakness of the system of judicial review.”356 This judicial
temptation to import the judge’s predilections into constitutional
adjudication is so strong and pervasive, and threatens constitutional
wounds so serious, that protecting against it is the great desideratum of
any protocol for doing judicial review.357 The heart of Scalia’s
constitutional conservatism is thus a via negativa. It is somehow
adopted,’” citing his prior opinion for the Court in Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27 (2001). Jones, 565 U.S. at 413–14. Yet, in a footnote replying to criticism
by Justice Alito, Scalia wrote that “it is quite irrelevant whether there was an 18thcentury analog. Whatever new methods of investigation may be devised, our task,
at a minimum, is to decide whether the action in question would have constituted
a ‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 414 n.3
(emphasis added).
354. Scalia, supra note 27, at 861.
355. Id. Scalia opined further that “one must not only say this but demonstrate
it to be so on the basis of some textual or historical evidence.” Id. at 862. His
judgment: “I know of no historical evidence for that meaning.” Id. He concluded
his argument with a reductio, the force of which depends upon the correctness of
the value-free judicial methodology the reductio is meant to support: if one is
“willing simply to posit such an intent for the ‘cruel and unusual punishment’
clause, why not for the due process clause, the equal protection clause, the
privileges and immunity clause, etc.?” Id. I do not know whether the reductio is
circular, but it is on its face unpersuasive, given the presence of the term “unusual”
in the Eighth Amendment.
356. Id. at 863.
357. I do not pursue here deeper potential sources of the Justice’s
constitutional conservatism in, for example, his occasional remarks on democratic
theory, see, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Of Democracy, Morality and the Majority,
Address at Gregorian University (May 2, 1996), in 26 ORIGINS 82 (1996), or in
the “Legal Process” thought that was prevalent at Harvard Law School when he
studied there.
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inoculating judicial review against the “inevitable tendency of judges to
think that the law is what they would like it to be.”358 The possibility that
the Constitution depends for its faithful interpretation upon the willingness
of the interpreter to identify moral and metaphysical truths not contained
within it is excluded, it seems, by an overwhelming commitment to
protecting against this mortal sin.
The architecture of Scalia’s constitutional project is designed to avoid
violating this prime directive prohibiting resort to critical truth for fear that
permission will smuggle in the judge’s predilections. Judicial review is
conventional legal reasoning made impermeable, so far as it is humanly
possible to do, to moral and metaphysical truth. Constitutional
conservatives would erect a series of concentric hardened barricades—
reinforcing prophylaxis, if you will—between judges’ “predilections” and
their legal decisions, to make the cardinal error to which judicial review is
susceptible practically impossible to commit.
One obvious problem with this way of thinking is that it protects so
single-mindedly against getting the Constitution wrong that the possibility
of getting it right disappears from view. Another problem is that the actual
Constitution is not even in the picture. Scalia’s arguments about judging
and judges’ temptations have no tendency to establish what the
Constitution says, or even how it ought to interpreted. They pertain to
what a judge who deploys lawyerly skills, and who steers a wide berth
around his or her “predilections” (including what the judge holds critically
to be true about justice and morality), can within these limitations then say
about what the Constitution means. But this opens up a gap, and possibly
a very large one, between what the Constitution rightly interpreted means
and what the judiciary can say that it means.
Justice Scalia from time to time lamented, often pungently but no less
correctly, the baneful role that the progressive ideology embedded in elite
legal opinion plays today by dint of judicial Lochnerizing. He was right
about the effect, if not entirely about the extent, of the Lochnerizing. Were
the Constitution being written today, that fact about elite lawyers’ values
and assumptions would rightly feature in any discussion of how much
authority to assign to the judiciary—just as it is impossible to understand
the debates in Philadelphia about forming our Constitution, for instance,
or its critical exposition and defense in The Federalist, without considering
the Founders’ frank estimations of the character, motives, and opinions of
various cohorts in their society as prospective sharers in political authority.
But Scalia’s often sound criticisms of judicial activism today do not affect
what the document actually, “originally” says and meant.
358. Scalia, supra note 27, at 864.
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There is some historical evidence that the Bill of Rights was originally
conceived to be a statement of principles to anchor a political culture and
to rally a populace, as much or more than it was expected to be a legal
instrument in court. There it might prove in any event to be a “parchment
barrier.” William Nelson, America’s foremost historian of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s adoption, wrote that Congress and not the Courts would
possess primary jurisdiction to enforce that amendment. He explained that
“[t]he Fourteenth Amendment was understood less as a legal instrument
to be elaborated in the courts than as a peace treaty to be administered by
Congress in order to secure the fruits” of victory in the Civil War.359
Indeed, all three Civil War amendments expressly confer the power to
enforce them upon Congress.360 Unsurprisingly, then, it is a late-20th
century innovation to select Supreme Court Justices predominantly from
lower courts, based upon an apparent (or claimed) prowess as an impartial
legal analyst, one who just calls balls and strikes. Before then, it seems, a
grounding in broader constitutional principles and a career in public life
outside the courts was the most desirable set of qualifications for Justices.
Of the five men who were appointed Chief Justice of the United States in
the 20th century before 1970, for example, only one—Harlan Fisk Stone—
was more or less a career jurist. The others were all public men who had
held a variety of elected and appointed political offices. One (Taft) had
been President. Another (Hughes) ran for that office. A third (Warren)
unsuccessfully ran for Vice-President.
Justice Scalia maintained that judges’ supreme prerogative over
constitutional interpretation depended upon their lawyerly skills, and that
the Constitution’s meaning is (must be?) ascertainable by conventional
legal reasoning. (After all, he described “predilections” as great temptation
in “judicial interpretation of any law.”)361 But this is to put the cart before
the horse. The more apt entailment of Justice Scalia’s worries about
judges’ predilections is not that constitutional law be made impervious to
true value but that, if the judiciary is ill-suited to partner with moral and
metaphysical truth, then interpreting the Constitution is a job which
requires judges to partner with institutions that are. To reason as Scalia did
is to amputate parts of the Constitution, supposing them to be potential
sites of future infection by judicial predilections, before getting down to
the business of what the Constitution actually means.

359. William E. Nelson, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 110–11 (1988).
360. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
361. Scalia, supra note 27, at 863 (emphasis added).
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Scalia’s concerns are themselves contingent, time-bound. Where
constitution-writers and jurists inhabited a unified moral and religious
culture which they regarded as aligned with moral and metaphysical truth,
it is scarcely possible to imagine them keeping every man’s
“predilections” quarantined from constitutional law. Indeed, the
“predilections” worry seems to be rooted in the mid-20th century worries
about moral skepticism, or the onset of moral pluralism, or both.
Contemporary constitutional conservatism might be an artifact of the late1960s social revolution, a needed course correction but not an enduring
interpretive philosophy. It is easy to reconstruct the strategic thinking
likely at work then: if constitutional law were opened up to competition
for dominance by the various moral philosophies round and about, the
winning one would surely be that affirmed by those who gave
constitutional law Roe v. Wade. The only available way to stymie further
advances of that sort would be to found judicial review on distinctively,
and relentlessly, non-moral grounds. The argument here is that, even if this
conservative strategy worked for a while, it no longer does. Or can.
The Founders could scarcely have imagined the constitutional law and
the judiciary that we now have. No one can say with confidence what the
Founders would have written into the Constitution if they had anticipated
not only 21st century lawyers’ cosmopolitan values but, more
fundamentally, the incorporation of the Bill of Rights and the judicial
supremacy doctrines ratified in Cooper v. Aaron.362 It is nonetheless a kind
of judicial activism to read the Constitution today as if it was written with
William Brennan or Harry Blackmun in mind. When a longer view of the
Court and its constitutional handiwork becomes possible, it would be no
surprise if contemporary constitutional conservatism were judged to be an
honest, and substantially effective, response to the depredations of activist
judges in the last third of the 20th century. No less, but no more, than that.
CONCLUSION
The Mystery Passage is not yet the “all one thing” of Americans’
constitutional liberty. Its progress towards hegemony has nonetheless been
breathtaking, as the story recounted here reveals. The tactical maneuvers
by which the new conception of freedom has taken hold of our civil
liberties corpus vary. Looking at that question strategically, though, shows
how the subjectivism of the Mystery Passage insinuated itself like a Trojan
Horse into the nested concepts and accumulated authorities defining
362. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (declaring “the basic principle that the federal
judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution”).
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important civil rights and liberties. Once inserted, the foreign body of
thought colonized, and then finally redefined its traditional adversary. The
effect was Copernican: authoritative texts took on a revolutionary
meaning, once the individual’s psyche displaced “nature and nature’s
God” at the center of the universe. This has been the Mystery Passage’s
modus operandi especially with matters concerning marriage and the
family, with religion, and with the religious liberty entailed by the
absorption of religion into the contemporary identity project.
The protagonist of American constitutional law on civil liberties from
World War II up to and through the 1960s was the non-conformist, the
lonely dissenter, the oddball. This cast of characters started with Jehovah’s
Witnesses, when they conscientiously refused to salute our nation’s
flag.363 It included thereafter risqué literati, sundry bohemians,
communists, avant-garde movie directors, atheists, pornographers,
libertines—square pegs all, discomfited by a rigid society’s set menu of
round holes. Even so: the prevailing narrative in civil liberties
constitutional law contained fixed moral reference points. The dominant
theme was probably a “marketplace of ideas,” prized as the best path to
identifying the truth.364 The discontented protagonists often secured a little
more space to be themselves. There was no question of redesigning the
world to fit their peculiarities.
William Brennan was probably this motley crew’s greatest champion
on the Supreme Court.365 It is one of the era’s greater ironies that these
alleged outcasts captured the “heart of liberty” when three Justices
appointed by Republican presidents authored the Mystery Passage in
1992.366
363. See Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); West
Virginia State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
364. See, e.g., G. Michael Parsons, Fighting for Attention: Democracy, Free
Speech, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2157, 2158 (2020)
(citing Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295
(1981)). Parsons explains: “Conceived a century ago by Justice Holmes as the
central “theory of our Constitution” (Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)), the marketplace of ideas metaphor has become
the dominant lens for judicial (and scholarly) free-speech analysis.” Id.
For a fair critique of the image of the “marketplace” for free speech
contexts, see James Boyd White, Free Speech and Valuable Speech: Silence,
Dante, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 51 UCLA L. REV. 799, 812–17 (2004).
365. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73–114 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 47–48 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
366. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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Now the tables are turned. The great dissenters from public orthodoxy
lately are Christian workers such as Jack Phillips of Masterpiece
Cakeshop, and high-school girls who do not want to shower in the
company of members of the opposite sex.367 They do not fit into society’s
newest molds. Their recalcitrance is not labelled subversive or perverted,
as was the non-conformity of the beats and strippers. It is rather that they
are intolerant, bigots. They create spaces which are unsafe. These persons’
evident moral disagreement with another’s choices stigmatizes and
demeans not only themselves (as hateful), but the other as well: those who
choose what until just a short time ago was a legally prohibited immorality,
or assert as an existential inevitability what was until yesterday an
unthinkable metaphysical impossibility. Laws which embody that moral
disapproval (like those failing to civilly recognize same-sex “marriages”),
“put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans
or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied,” according to the
Obergefell Court.368
The Mystery Passage promises a beguiling individual autonomy and
authenticity. It eliminates transcendent sources of human meaning and
value. The only remaining source of meaning and value is the solitary self,
at least in America where there is no real chance that the nation or the Volk
or some other collective could become an idol. What makes any
worldview a valuable exercise of the new “liberty” is precisely that it is
really (deeply, truly) mine, or yours. Here, the lonely soul stands before
the cosmos, seeking meaning in it. Or, more exactly, ascribing meaning to
it.
Except that the cosmos can be stubborn. The real world can
mercilessly contradict one’s imagined alternative to it. Sometimes, it
blocks effective access to the “identity” one “presents.” One variable that
can be controlled and harnessed to the project of sovereign self-definition,
though, is the outward behavior and manifest attitudes of other people.
They might adversely judge, and maybe even “stigmatize,” the “meaning”
one distills from sundry “experiences.” They might even balk at treating
Anthony Stephens as if he is really Aimee Stephens.
In Obergefell v Hodges, the Supreme Court fully weaponized the
anxious solipsist’s distress against the pervasive threat of being made to
“feel different”; that is, to feel bad or insecure about one’s “identity.” In
an opinion whose justificatory passages were Mystery Passage all the way
367. Justice Alito (joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) wrote in his
Obergefell dissent that the majority’s decision would “be used to vilify Americans
who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 576
U.S., 644, 741 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
368. Id. at 672.
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down, the Supreme Court prescribed marriage as salve for the sores of
self-definition by dead reckoning. “Marriage responds to the universal fear
that a lonely person might call out only to find no one there. It offers the
hope of companionship and understanding and assurance that while both
still live there will be someone to care for the other.”369
Then the Justices conscripted the community and its law to reassure
the “fear[ful]” couple. “The necessary consequence” of traditional
marriage laws, the Court alleged, “is to put the imprimatur of the State
itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own
liberty is then denied.”370 These laws also “harm and humiliate the children
of same-sex couples.” “Without the recognition, stability, and
predictability marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma of knowing
their families are somehow lesser.”371
This way of thinking about civil liberties, moral reality, cultural
norms, and personal well-being had roots going back decades. There were
several Supreme Court opinions during the 1960s which anticipated the
subjectivist turn, though nowhere did the Court crisply articulate it.372 The
Court began early in that decade to quite consciously recast religion as a
personal spiritual brand or anthem of communal identity, or both. That
religions are actually more or less adequate accounts of all that there is, in
its furthest reaches, visible and invisible, was by then as far from the
Court’s minds as Pluto is from Washington, D.C. Instead, the Court came
to think of religion as a kind of existentialist longing for depth of
experience, as the closest thing to “truth” humankind could expect to
attain. Morality was already non-cognitive (a matter of preference and
revulsion or offense), and thus subjective. The difference between an
individual’s “can’t helps” and a social majority’s “moral disapproval” was
just in the numbers: all this “morality” amounted rather to reports about
emotion, feeling, intuition, writ large or writ small.
It is anyone’s guess whether, according to some hypothesized metric
of freedom as the legal liberty to do as one chooses, Americans now are
freer than they were in, say, 1959. After all, the demands of conforming
one’s own conduct and manifest attitudes to the sundry “identities” of
others are more than considerable. Whether Americans today are truly
better off depends entirely on what one thinks is the truth about being
better; that is, more good. If the truth is that morality is subjective and that
human well-being is a matter of actualizing some real “me” deep down
369.
370.
371.
372.
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inside, then the Mystery Passage’s ascendancy could be good news indeed.
But what if instead the alluring “liberty” of self-creation is just a path down
into a rabbit hole of inscrutable psychological and emotional detritus?
What if it the truth is that the constitutive elements of human
flourishing are objective goods, including life, friendship, marriage,
religion, and that there are moral norms which are true for everyone? Then
the other “liberty” described in the Introduction to this Article—genuine
human fulfillment by and through free choices, settling one’s character as
good or bad according to what is chosen—is indispensable to personal
well-being.
That liberty is also essential to social cooperation for the common
good. Where personal liberty is conceptualized in light of true human
goods, a genuine polity-wide common good is easily understood and
practically attainable. Law in this understanding of moral reality is the
ligament of solidarity. It supplies the pathways toward free cooperation
for everyone’s true good. Where human goods are objective, anyone’s fair
pursuit of the good naturally extends to helping others to pursue that same
(true) good (for them). Then it really is the case, as the Founders saw
clearly, that private virtue and public good are intertwined, and mutually
supportive.
The Mystery Passage entails a gross opposition between private wellbeing and public prosperity. Because no society affords persons an
unlimited liberty to do as they wish, the Mystery Passage puts individual
fulfillment on a crash course with legally specified cooperation for
common benefit. What is obviously missing from the Mystery Passage, in
other words, is a morally satisfying illumination of the forbearance,
restraint, and conformity that constitute responsible living in society.
Where fulfillment is deemed to be a matter of individuality, what is the
answer to this compelling question: How is it good for me to forgo my
own preferred course of action for the sake of others? Where the good just
is the liberty to inhabit a world of one’s choosing, what meaning and value
can any “common good” possess?
In the Mystery Passage’s Hobbesian world, legal constraints cannot
be linked to, or considered to be continuous with, private virtue, for the
simple reason that persons’ conceptions of well-being are many and
random. The demands of living together in political society are singular
and unified. These demands are likely to be experienced, then, not as the
reasonable requirements of free and fair cooperation among persons for
the common good. They are instead destined to be felt as brute limitation.
Legal constraints in the Court’s current Hobbesian social world have no
internal guidance to avoid being understood, received, and experienced as

353878-LSU_81-4_Text.indd 321

5/26/21 11:50 AM

1430

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

shackles, fetters, and gross imposition. In this way, we are all liable to feel
in public life like round pegs being hammered into square holes.
Two radically different social worlds now occupy the same territory.
Each requires a culture and law suited to it. Americans’ house is divided,
and it cannot long persist in that condition. Save for the possibility of
living incompatibly within one’s own mind, or within an insular
community willing to live apart, our country will become all one thing
or all the other.
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